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Abstract
Deindustrialization and the Decline of Community in the Coalfields:
McDowell County, West Virginia, 1950-2000
Mark S. Myers

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the coal industry entered
McDowell County, a predominantly rural county in southern West Virginia. Because of
common experiences working and living in the coalfields, workers of significantly different
backgrounds created a unique, working-class community in McDowell County. Although the
coal industry experienced numerous downturns during the first half of the twentieth century,
there was a long-term rise in the number of workers employed by the industry. By 1950,
McDowell County had a population of almost 100,000, most of which was impacted by the coal
industry.
After World War II, however, the industry began to change. Competition from
alternative fuels, such as oil, natural gas, and nuclear power, forced coal companies to cut costs
in order to survive in a tight market. Companies first tried mechanization to cut labor costs, a
phenomenon that had roots well before the post-war period. For those companies that could not,
or would not, implement machinery, the only true alternative was to close the mines.
I argue that deindustrialization, the combination of mechanization and disinvestment in
McDowell County, contributed to the loss of the unique coalfield community that flourished in
the county during much of the twentieth century. This occurred in two ways. First, many former
miners left the county in an attempt to find work; most migrated either to the Midwest or to
Maryland. Second, those who remained found a county much different than before. The lack of
diversification in the county’s economy limited the employment prospects of the people
remaining, leading to a significant increase in poverty. The decline in coal employment and the
increase in poverty created a society of contrasts, where some residents succeeded, while many
more struggled to survive.
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Introduction
For many years, Central Appalachia has been synonymous with extreme
poverty and want. From the 1960s television special, Christmas in Appalachia, to
popular works by numerous authors, the American perception of the Appalachian
region is primarily one of a poor, backward region that is behind the times. The story
of Central Appalachia is so much more than what is commonly perceived. The story of
the region is similar to that of many other areas in the country, one of success turned to
despair. The region enjoyed some economic success with the entrance of the
bituminous coal industry during the latter decades of the nineteenth century and the
early decades of the twentieth century. Because of the nature of industrialization in the
coalfields, the people who worked in the mines developed a unique sense of community
centered around common experiences in the mines and coal towns of the region. The
coal industry, however, was—and is—a very unstable one, characterized by boom-andbust cycles. Although there were periods of great prosperity throughout the region,
there were also years of want and strife. By the middle of the twentieth century, the
coal industry had begun a process of reorganization through mechanization and
consolidation. As a result, many miners found themselves out of work, as companies
either implemented the new, more productive, machines or simply closed the mines.
Poverty, which had been a problem in Appalachia due to the dependence on the
unstable coal industry, exploded as a result of the reorganization of the mines. Because
of the economic problems of the region, people lost the sense of community that
characterized the coalfields for so many years.

1

McDowell County, West Virginia, lies in the heart of Central Appalachia. The
southernmost county in the state, McDowell was built by the people working in the coal
industry. McDowell holds an important place in the history of coal because, for many
years, the county was the leading coal producer in the country. Thousands mined the
coal and lived in the county; by 1950 McDowell’s population reached nearly 100,000.
How, then, did the population decline by more than 70,000 in fifty years? Why did
many of the people who remained in the county suffer from a low standard of living?
What has been the effect of the socioeconomic changes on the people of the county and
their community? By examining these questions, one can not only gain an
understanding of the history of one locale, but also the socioeconomic history of an
entire region.
The experience of McDowell County, and the coal industry as a whole, was not
a purely regional phenomenon. Starting in the 1970s, the American economy
underwent a profound and important transformation. Throughout the Midwest, for
example, industrial plants and mills closed one after another through a process known
as deindustrialization. The costs of deindustrialization were widespread. Not only
were whole communities destroyed, the economy was largely unable to provide
workers with a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s.
To understand fully this process, and the similarities and differences between
deindustrialization in the nation and that of the Appalachian coalfields, several
questions must be considered.1 What was the general process and national trend of

1

Although it seems that what occurred in Central Appalachia is more of a case of industrial restructuring,
I argue that deindustrialization is a more apt descriptor for the phenomenon because of the impact the
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deindustrialization in the United States? How does the experience of McDowell fit into
this broader context? What were some of the economic difficulties facing the coal
industry in the post-World War II era? How did coal mechanization influence
deindustrialization in the coalfields?2
In their highly influential book, The Deindustrialization of America, Barry
Bluestone and Bennett Harrison define deindustrialization as “a widespread, systematic
disinvestment in the nation’s basic productive capacity.”3 In depicting
deindustrialization as a struggle between communities and capital, Bluestone and
Harrison argue that corporations divert funds from the nation’s basic industries into
speculation, mergers, and foreign investment. For example, U.S. Steel paid $6 billion
to acquire Marathon Oil, instead of investing in its steel operations. Therefore, instead
of rebuilding its steel capacity, U.S. Steel chose to focus on acquisitions, furthering the
deindustrialization process.4
There have been several ways in which corporations have shifted capital from
one place to another. First, companies shift profits from one plant’s operation to
another part of the corporation, usually to upgrade the facilities or for new product
development. Second, companies may simply fail to replace obsolete machinery. As a
result, plants eventually fail to generate enough profits and face closure. The third
industrial restructuring had on the people of the region. See: Jefferson Cowie, Capital Moves: RCA’s
Seventy Year Quest for Cheap Labor (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).
2

Bluestone, Barry and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings,
Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 4;
Stephen High, Industrial Sunset: The Making of North America’s Rust Belt, 1969-1984 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2003), 4.
3

Bluestone and Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America, 6.

4

Ibid.; Wall Street Journal, 5 February 1982; High, Industrial Sunset, 4.
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method of shifting capital is to relocate machinery from one location to another. As a
result, the plants continued to operate, but at a much lower rate of production. Fourth,
management can shift capital by closing an entire plant. Often, companies may move
the entire operation to another area where costs may not be as high.5
There are several explanations of the meaning of deindustrialization. At the
core of each theory is conflict. For example, David Bell, in his work The Coming of the
Post-Industrial Society, argued that the changes taking place in industry were indicative
of a new post-industrial economy characterized by computers, telecommunications, and
technology.6 Rather than being an example of the changing economy over which
humans have little influence, proponents of the deindustrialization thesis, including
Bluestone and Harrison, depict the changes as the result of conscious decisions made
by managers. While Bluestone and Harrison see deindustrialization as a conflict
between communities and companies, Robert Laxer (who first suggested the
deindustrialization thesis in 1973) argued that patriotism was the root cause of
deindustrialization. According to Laxer and other Canadian economic nationalists,
American-based corporations closed Canadian plants and relocated operations to the
United States in order to protect jobs south of the border. Despite the differences
between the different versions of the deindustrialization thesis, one important similarity
remains, the loss of control. For Laxer and the Canadian nationalists,
deindustrialization is characterized by the loss of national control over the economy.
5

Bluestone and Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America, 7.

6

Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York:
Basic Books, 1973); High, Industrial Sunset, 7.
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For American deindustrialization theorists, the loss of local control over the economic
lives of the people of the community is the most important characteristic of the process
of industrial change. In a sense, both versions of the theory have the same antagonist,
managers of corporations who make conscious business decisions to shift capital and
employment elsewhere.7
Although the deindustrialization thesis is influential because of the focus on the
decimation of communities, there are many who see disinvestment as a minor problem
or no problem at all. The belief that deindustrialization was a minor issue nationally
resulted from a narrow definition of the situation. If deindustrialization is defined as
occurring only when a plant completely shuts down and relocates elsewhere, then it is
not much of a problem. For example, approximately 2 percent of employment change
between 1969 and 1976 resulted from plant closures.8
Some scholars believe disinvestment is crucial in order to improve the
productivity of the American economy. Lester Thurow, for example, argues that it is in
the best interests of the American economy to shift capital and labor from old areas of
low productivity to areas where higher productivity can be reached. He argues that the
American economy is extremely unsuccessful at disinvestment because of the political
pressure that results from unpopular decisions to close plants. Thurow argues that the

7

Robert M. Laxer, ed., (Canada) Ltd. The Political Economy of Dependency (Toronto: McClelland and
Steward, 1973), 9, 146; High, Industrial Sunset, 7-8.
8

David L. Birch, The Job Generation Process (Cambridge, MA: MIT Program on Neighborhood and
Regional Change, 1979); Bluestone and Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America, 8.
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slow rate of deindustrialization hinders America’s opportunity to compete effectively in
the international marketplace.9
Thurow’s theory is a derivative of Joseph Schumpeter’s writings from the
1940s. Schumpeter argues that capitalist economies can only improve prosperity by
going through a process of “Creative Destruction.”10 In other words, to stay healthy, an
economy must destroy and then regenerate itself. Without change, an economy will not
have the strength to move forward and eventually will decline. As a result,
deindustrialization must occur in order to foster growth elsewhere.11
Although the disinvestment theory makes sense if one considers only the 2
percent of unemployment that results from the closing of plants and mills, the theory
does not stand up to deeper scrutiny. Bluestone and Harrison find that job loss is a
serious problem. If one takes into account all the ways that deindustrialization can
occur, then it becomes clear that private disinvestment cost Americans between 32 and
38 million jobs during the 1970s. Established plants faced a 30 percent chance of
closure and only two out of every five smaller firms survived the decade.12
If deindustrialization existed only in the abstract, theoretical realm, then any
discussion of the phenomenon would be purely academic. However, there is a more
realistic side to disinvestment. Throughout the United States, there are serious personal

9

Lester Thurow, The Zero-Sum Society (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 77; Bluestone and Harrison,
The Deindustrialization of America, 8.
10

Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1942), 83;
Bluestone and Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America, 9; High, Industrial Sunset, 7.
11

Ibid.

12

Bluestone and Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America, 9.
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and social losses that result from deindustrialization. According to Schumpeter’s
theory of creative destruction, deindustrialization will enable capital and labor to
become more productive by closing unproductive businesses. In most instances,
however, this is not the case. Most studies of unemployment find that many displaced
workers find it difficult to get a job comparable to the one they lost. As a result, the
standard of living for millions of Americans has been negatively impacted by
disinvestment. A decreased standard of living is not the only personal cost of
deindustrialization. Workers suffer serious mental health problems when plants are
suddenly closed. Communities and local governments also take in less revenue through
sales and business taxes. As a result, there are fewer available funds for such local
essentials as police and fire service, improved infrastructure, and education. Quality of
life declines as well because there is less available money for parks and other
recreational activities.13
Many of the problems discussed within the literature on deindustrialization
occurred within Central Appalachia. Deindustrialization in Central Appalachia led to
many changes in the region. Because of the socioeconomic changes within the region,
many Appalachians decided to migrate out of the region in search of work. What about
those who stayed behind? What did the economic changes mean for them? For many
within the region, failure to leave, for whatever reason, resulted in an increase in
endemic poverty, as folks found it difficult to find work. This situation affected the
people of McDowell County. With a significant decline in the number of coal mining
13

Ibid., 10-11; Louis S. Jacobson, “Earnings Losses of Workers Displaced from Manufacturing
Industries,” in William G. Dewald, ed., U.S. Department of Labor, The Impact of International Trade
and Investment on Employment (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978).
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jobs available in the county, many people failed to find adequate work in order to
maintain a quality standard of living. With few exceptions, the years since 1950 have
been characterized by intense poverty in many areas of McDowell County. This is a
story of contrast, however. While national media usually focus on the poorest of the
poor in stories on the region, there were many people in McDowell County, and in the
region as a whole, who succeeded during the changing times. The people who
succeeded primarily were miners who survived the job cuts of the 1950s and 1960s,
folks who returned to the mines during the boom years of the 1970s, or collegeeducated residents who found work in service jobs, primarily as teachers or government
workers.
Despite the few examples of success, the story of McDowell County after 1950,
and Central Appalachia as a whole, is primarily one of suffering. After 1980, a decline
in the national economy, coupled by cutbacks in national welfare programs, meant that
the resources that so many poor people depend on were taken away. As a result, a
sense of helplessness and despair has infiltrated the minds of some within the region.
Despite this sense of helplessness, it would not be accurate to characterize the mindset
of the entire region as one of hopelessness. Many people are trying to improve their
lives and communities through economic development activities, including improving
infrastructure. One of the primary reasons for the difficulties facing the region in the
post-war era was the lack of economic diversity within the region. In McDowell
County, the political leadership failed to appreciate the very nature of the coal industry,
that the industry is characterized by boom and bust periods. Furthermore, because the
industry and union came together in support of mechanization without any financial
8

support for the communities and people affected by the massive number of layoffs, the
political leadership of the county was in a position where only it could have limited the
adverse effects of deindustrialization.14
The issue is a much more complex one than described above. The Central
Appalachian coalfields proceeded through three periods of development after
deindustrialization. The 1950s and 1960s were decades characterized by increased
unemployment and poverty in much of the region. During the 1960s Appalachia
became known within the American consciousness as an area beset with deep and
endemic poverty. Nationally, the region was seen as a place that was outside the
mainstream, both socially and economically. The issue was not a structural problem
within the capitalist economy, but rather one of integrating Appalachia, and other poor
regions, into the American economy. By the 1970s, the situation had begun to change
within Central Appalachia. Because of energy concerns and other economic problems,
the demand for coal increased to a point where coal employment began to recover
somewhat. This period of prosperity in Central Appalachia did contrast to that of the
Midwestern Rust Belt, where deindustrialization was in full swing by 1973. The
prosperity was not to last, however. By the 1980s, a pattern of uneven development
began to appear throughout the region. As the coal industry declined and poverty

14

John Gaventa, Barbara Ellen Smith, and Alex Willingham, eds., Communities in Economic Crisis:
Appalachia and the South (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 3-4. See also: Commission on
Religion in Appalachia, Economic Transformation: The Appalachian Challenge (Knoxville, TN:
Commission on Religion in Appalachia, 1986); MDC Panel on Rural Economic Development, Shadows
in the Sunbelt: Developing the Rural South in an Era of Economic Change (Chapel Hill, NC: MDC,
1986); Stuart A. Rosenfeld, Edward M. Bergman, and Sarah Rubin, After the Factories: Changing
Employment Patterns in the Rural South (Durham, NC: Southern Growth Policies Board, 1985);
Southeast Women’s Employment Coalition, Women of the Rural South: Economic Status and Prospects
(Lexington, KY: Southeast Women’s Employment Coalition, 1986).
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began to overtake Central Appalachia once again, a clearer picture of the economic
problems facing the region took shape. Also, rather than being one of several small
pockets of poverty as it was during the 1960s, the Central Appalachian region was part
of a larger pandemic of poverty in the American economy during the 1980s. It was
clear by the 1980s that the problems with the Central Appalachian economy were part
of a larger set of problems within the national economy.15
Scholars of Appalachian studies of the 1960s and 1970s have set forth two
predominant theories that attempt to explain the causes of Appalachian poverty. The
first theory, the culture of poverty model, focuses attention on the people beset by
poverty. What characteristics of the people keep them mired in poverty? The second
theory seeks to look at the structural reasons for poverty. The internal colonialism
model provides insights into the role of the economic development of the Central
Appalachian region on the development of poverty. Both theories have serious
shortcomings as explanations for the causes of poverty in the region.16

15

“Comparing Appalachia’s Counties with the Nation’s,” Appalachia 19, 2-4 (Spring 1986): 8-10;
Report of the 1986 Commission on the Future of the South, Halfway Home and a Long Way to Go
(Durham, NC: Southern Growth Policies Board, 1986), 5; Gaventa, Smith, and Willingham, 4-5. See
also: National Advisory Committee on Rural Poverty, The People Left Behind (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1967) and Peter Dorner, “Fourteen Million Rural Poor,” The Yale Review
68 (1969): 282-292.
16

Dwight B. Billings and Kathleen M. Blee, The Road to Poverty: The Making of Wealth and Hardship
in Appalachia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 8. See also: Dwight Billings, Mary
Beth Pudup, and Altina Waller, “Taking Exception with Exceptionalism: New Approaches to the Social
History of Early Appalachia,” in Mary Beth Pudup, Dwight Billings, and Altina Waller, eds., Appalachia
in the Making: The Mountain South in the Nineteenth Century (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1995), 1-24; Allen W. Batteau, The Invention of Appalachia (Tucson: The University of
Arizona Press, 1990); and Henry D. Shapiro, Appalachia on Our Mind: The Southern Mountains and
Mountaineers in the American Consciousness, 1870-1920 (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1978).
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The culture of poverty model, promulgated during the 1960s rediscovery of
Appalachia, was closely related to many of the traditional views of Appalachian culture
that surfaced with the local color writers of the late nineteenth century. When
Appalachian poverty became a national issue during the 1960s, it was not difficult for
people who believed the old stereotypes to use a cultural explanation for the terrible
poverty that affected Appalachia. For the proponents of the culture of poverty model,
Appalachian culture was structurally deficient and produced a region-wide culture of
poverty. The work that exemplified the culture of poverty model was Jack Weller’s
Yesterday’s People. Weller noted that there were several inherent traits to Appalachian
people, notably individualism, traditionalism, and fatalism, which prevented the
mountaineers from becoming an integrated part of the national economy. Worse yet,
the mountaineers’ fatalism meant that they did not care and took whatever life threw at
them without having the desire and motivation to change their lives.17 As stated in the
work, Weller believed, “The greatest challenge of Appalachia, and the most difficult,
[was] its people.”18
Because increased numbers of people in Central Appalachia were characterized
as poor during the 1960s, the culture of poverty model seemed to make sense to many
theorists. In some counties, half of the population lived in poverty. For many, this high
number of people living in poverty was just too much to be a coincidence; there must
17

Jack E. Weller, Yesterday’s People: Life in Contemporary Appalachia (Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 1966), 7, 13, 32-37; Thomas Ford, “The Passing of Provincialism,” in Thomas Ford, ed.,
The Southern Appalachian Region: A Survey (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962), 9-34;
Billings and Blee, The Road to Poverty, 10. See also: Richard Ball, “A Poverty Case: The Analgesic
Subculture of the Southern Appalachians,” American Sociological Review 33 (1968): 885-895.
18

Weller, Yesterday’s People, 7.
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be some sort of inherent cultural characteristic which explains the high amount of
poverty in Appalachia. As sociologist Rupert Vance put it: “Thus mountain isolation,
which began as physical isolation enforced by rugged topography, became mental and
cultural isolation, holding people in disadvantaged areas, resisting those changes that
would bring them into contact with the outside world. The effect of conditions thus
becomes a new cause of conditions, but the cause is now an attitude, not a mountain.”19
Therefore, for Vance and other proponents of the culture of poverty model, the way to
improve the lives of Appalachians and the economic conditions of the region was
through changing the culture of the region.20
These ideas of a deficient Appalachian culture that kept the region from
succeeding influenced policy makers who were attempting to solve the problem of
Appalachian poverty. As the Appalachian Regional Commission contended,
Appalachia was behind economically because it was “a region apart” and was not fully
integrated into the national economy.21 As a result, policies focused on integrating the
region into the mainstream, rather than on solving the structural problems that led to
poverty throughout the country. This model of development, often called the regional
development model, met with severe criticism. As one of the critics put it, the model
was “concerned with providing social overhead capital, training people for skills for
new individual and service jobs, facilitating migration, and promoting the establishment
19

Rupert Vance, “An Introductory Note,” in Weller, Yesterday’s People, vii.

20

Billings and Blee, The Road to Poverty, 10-11; Vance, “An Introductory Note,” vii-ix; See also: Rena
Gazaway, The Longest Mile: A Vivid Chronicle of Life in an Appalachian Hollow (Baltimore: Penguin,
1969).
21

Quoted in David Whisnant, Modernizing the Mountaineer (New York: Burt Franklin, 1980).
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or relocation of privately-owned industries through a growth center strategy.”22 The
acceptance of a connection between Appalachian cultural deficiency and poverty
encouraged many relief workers to enter the region and attempt to improve the lives of
the people by bringing their culture into the twentieth century. As they attempted to
implement programs designed to combat the problems in Appalachian culture, namely
fatalism, many volunteers began to realize that there were other problems in Appalachia
besides cultural ones. It became clear to many working in the region that the people did
not suffer from a cultural deficiency. Rather, the people of the region lived in a state of
political and economic powerlessness that prevented them from improving their lives
and relegated them to generational poverty. Instead of local political and economic
structures designed to help the people of the region, there was instead a power base
which met the interests of entrenched absentee landholders. Many of the workers took
a radical turn, describing Appalachia as an internal colony.23
In contrast to the culture of poverty view that Appalachian poverty was a result
of Appalachian isolation from the mainstream, both economically and culturally, the
internal colonialism model of Appalachian poverty places blame for the condition of
the region on Appalachia’s connection with, not isolation from, the national economy.
As one VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America) worker noted in 1968:

22

David S. Walls, “Central Appalachia: A Peripheral Region within an Advanced Capitalist Society,”
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 4 (1976): 233.
23

Billings and Blee, The Road to Poverty, 11. See also: John M. Glen, “The War on Poverty in
Appalachia: A Preliminary Report,” Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 87 (1989): 40-57 and
Helen Lewis, Linda Johnson, and Don Askins, eds., Colonialism in Modern America: The Appalachian
Case (Boone, NC: Appalachian Consortium Press, 1978).
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In West Virginia…as throughout Appalachia, we live in a system of absentee
control by large financial and industrial corporations pursuing their economic
ends without respect for the lives of the people in the state or region. The
responsibility for the damage—political, economic, and social—can be
attributed to these colonial exploiters….West Virginia is a rich state. Much
wealth has been extracted from West Virginia’s natural resources, but little of
that wealth has remained in the hands of West Virginians.24
At its very core, the internal colonialism model of Appalachian poverty is not only an
explanation of why much of the region is poor, but also an attack on the culture of
poverty model. Although some proponents of the internal colony theory romanticized
“traditional” Appalachian culture in an attempt to depict more clearly the true effect of
colonialism on the region, most of the radicals ignored any discussion of Appalachian
culture, believing that any discussion of Appalachian culture could degenerate into
victim blaming, which is inherent in the culture of poverty model. Instead, theorists
supporting the internal colonialism model focused on the stark differences between the
two models of Appalachian poverty.25
One of the most influential proponents of the internal colonial model, Helen
Lewis, summed up the differences between the two arguments by noting that poverty in
Appalachia was caused by “either fatalism or the coal industry.”26 The common
acceptance of Appalachia as a deficient culture that kept the region mired in poverty
was largely replaced in the 1970s by a view that the coal industry was a symbol of
24

Quoted in Helen Lewis, “Fatalism or the Coal Industry?” in Bruce Ergood and Bruce Kuhre, eds.,
Appalachia: Social Context Past and Present (Dubuque, IA: Kendall Hunt, 1976), 155.
25

Billings and Blee, The Road to Poverty, 11-12; See also: Helen Lewis, Sue Kobak, and Linda
Johnson, “Family, Religion, and Colonialism in Central Appalachia: Or, Bury My Rifle at Big Stone
Gap,” in Jim Axelrod, ed., Growing up Country (Clintwood, VA: Council of the Southern Mountains,
1973), 131-156.
26

Lewis, “Fatalism or the Coal Industry,” 153.

14

Appalachia as an exploited region. The writer who most advocated the internal
colonial model was Harry Caudill. In his work on Appalachian Kentucky, Night Comes
to the Cumberlands, Caudill argues that the flow of wealth from the natural resources
of Appalachia out of the region left Appalachia destitute and helpless. Caudill’s work
is marred by many of the cultural stereotypes that characterize the culture of poverty
model, yet his work is important because it served as an influence for a new generation
of scholars who have documented the impact of capitalistic development on
Appalachian politics and society.27
Both theories do have serious limits in their attempts to describe the nature and
origins of Appalachian poverty. Culture of poverty theory, of course, is centered
around a faulty view of Appalachian culture that causes one to think that the traits of
the culture of the region are static and unchanging. Because the culture of poverty
theory contends that Appalachian culture is unchanging and monolithic, it encourages
the development of faulty images of the region and its people. Fatalism, for example,
leads to an argument that the people of Appalachia would accept anything life threw at
them, with little or no complaint. This theory essentially denies agency for the
common people, providing a negative, and basically false, view of the region’s
inhabitants. Despite the serious problems with culture of poverty theory, the theory did
bring to light the endemic poverty of the region and the problems poverty created for
families who were forced to live in that state. Culture of poverty did err in describing
27
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the causes of poverty in terms of essentialist family characteristics, but it did bring the
problem of poverty to the attention of reformers and policy makers.28
The internal colonial model of poverty in Appalachia is important because it
focuses attention on the extent of absentee, outside ownership of Appalachia’s mineral
resources and land. There have been many negative effects of this large-scale absentee
ownership, which has had a significant impact on local political and economic
structures. Many jurisdictions never have taxed absentee owners of mineral resources
at a fair rate nor have independent political officials come to power to a significant
extent. Furthermore, internal colonialism in Appalachia has been a disservice to the
region because it prevents economic diversification. There are some serious problems
with the internal colonial model, however. First, the proponents of the internal colonial
model made a mistake in suggesting that absentee ownership was the only cause of
Appalachian poverty. For example, in many parts of the region indigenous coal
operators can be found. These operators are often more known for offering low wage
jobs with few benefits and poor safety records than were the operations owned by
absentee corporations. Second, there are examples of coalfields, particularly in Illinois,
which have a much higher rate of absentee ownership. Nevertheless, the people of the
Illinois coalfield region do not suffer from the same degree of poverty as do the people
28
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of Appalachia, because Illinois coalfield communities had fairer tax policies and some
economic diversification. This is the true weakness of the internal colonial model. By
not looking at the problem of capitalist development as a more complex issue and
focusing solely on the issue of absentee ownership, the theory fails to show the uneven
regional development that is symptomatic of capitalism.29
Yet, the internal colonial model provides an important service by transferring
attention from cultural and sociological reasons for poverty to historical causes of
economic decline in the region. Caudill attempted to provide a historical context for
poverty in the region by discussing the industrial period of Appalachian history,
including the entrance of timber and coal interests, along with the railroads. Caudill
took the discussion a step further by analyzing the development of coal towns and the
boom and bust cycles that are endemic in the coal industry. On a regional level, Ronald
Eller’s Miners, Millhands, and Mountaineers serves as a definitive description of the
colonial development of the Appalachian region. Works such as Caudill’s and Eller’s
fail in several ways, however. By focusing all attention on the insertion of outside
capital in the region and ignoring local political and economic development, these
works imply that Appalachian history only started when outside investors entered the
region. The theory ignores pre-industrial Appalachian history. Although the coal
industry has been extremely important in the shaping of Appalachian history, it has not
been the only factor in the region’s development. Furthermore, many of the poorest
29
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counties, particularly in Eastern Kentucky, produce very little coal. Some other reason
must explain the prevalence of poverty in these counties. In their important work, The
Road to Poverty, Dwight Billings and Kathleen Blee attempt to solve the complex
problem of Appalachian poverty in a more sophisticated way than either the culture of
poverty or internal colonial model. Billings and Blee examine rural poverty within the
context of time and space. Billings and Blee investigate the historical development of
Appalachian Kentucky, economically, politically, and culturally. The authors use the
best aspects of both internal colonial and culture of poverty models by understanding
that Appalachia must be studied in relation to capitalist development and by analyzing
cultural reactions to economic struggles, including reciprocity among kin. In contrast
to the more simplistic earlier theories, Billings and Blee also focus on the development
of political institutions.30 In sum, Billings and Blee find that “capitalist markets, state
coercion, and cultural strategies worked together to set and keep Appalachian Kentucky
on a distinct pathway that might be called Appalachia’s road to rural poverty.”31
Another theory explaining the reason for Appalachian poverty has been
promulgated by Paul Salstrom in his work Appalachia’s Path to Dependency.
Salstrom, drawing heavily on dependency theory, argues that Appalachia’s preindustrial subsistence lifestyle was not prepared to deal with the industrial transition of
the region. Because of the changing economy in the region, the subsistence farmers
became dependent on the extra income provided by industry, beginning a cycle of
dependency that, in Salstrom’s view, extends to the present day. As the
30
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industrialization of the region worked to supplement the subsistence activities of
Appalachian families through the extra income it provided, the level of subsistence
grew as the population increased as industry brought in more workers to serve its labor
needs. The dependency of the people of Appalachia continued to grow as a result of
this phenomenon. Because of this dependency, Salstrom goes on to argue,
Appalachia’s people were ill-equipped to deal with the decline of industry and soon
entered into a new phase of dependency, that of dependency on the federal
government.32
What exactly is dependency and does it automatically result in poverty?
Theotonio Dos Santos defines dependency as:
By dependency we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries
is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which
the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more
economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependency
when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and be self-sustaining,
while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of
that expansion, which can have either a positive or negative effect on their
immediate development.33
In other words, dependency theory argues that the development of a country’s, or a
region’s, economy can be hindered by both internal and external conditions.
Modernization theory, which will be explained below, is more accurate when
discussing the effect of internal, local obstacles on economic development. By
contrast, external obstacles to economic development require a different explanation.
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Dependency theory provides an appropriate explanation for the problems facing those
areas beset by external control of resources. Economic dependency prevents economic
development from indigenous sources. In Appalachia, this means that the extractive
industries are almost totally under the control of outside investors. This has led to
dependent development as the outside capitalists formed an alliance with the region’s
elite to control industry in the region.34
Along with the analysis of Billings and Blee, Salstrom’s analysis provides
important insights into the economic condition of McDowell County during the postwar period. The detrimental effect of deindustrialization in McDowell, as will be
shown, is a direct result of many complex factors. First, and perhaps most important,
the lack of economic diversification in McDowell County resulted in high levels of
unemployment and poverty when the coal industry mechanized during the “bust cycle”
of the 1950s. Second, it is clear from the evidence that there was an alliance between
the coal industry and the elite class of McDowell County. Although it is somewhat
unclear whether there was a true dependent relationship between the industry and the
elites, it is clear that the political leadership of the county did not even consider a need
for alternate forms of employment. As a result, the political failure of McDowell
County exacerbated the negative aspects of deindustrialization. There were some
weaknesses in Salstrom’s theory, as well, particularly in his discussion on preindustrial
Appalachia. Salstrom argues that the subsistence lifestyle of preindustrial
Appalachians failed to provide them with the necessary tools to adequately adjust to the
industrialization of the region. In a sense, Salstrom’s position leads one to assume that
34
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the entire region was made up of small farmers who did not have access to, or even
knew about, national markets. This is an oversimplification of the economic
relationships of early Appalachians. Early mountaineers had a market mentality, even
if poor transportation systems did not allow them to take full advantage of this
mentality. Four antebellum industries support this assertion, livestock, iron, salt, and
timber. When possible, West Virginians provided goods for the country and were fully
integrated into the national economy.35
An antecedent for culture of poverty theory, modernization theory maintains
that there is an evolutionary cycle in economic development. All regions and countries
go through the different cycles at different points, depending on if they are located in
the core or the periphery of the world capitalist economy. For modernization theorists,
development is an evolutionary process. Development can only be achieved by transfer
from core to periphery. What should be transferred? This is where the modernization
theories diverge from one another. All of the answers vary depending on the specific
theory, but most modernization theories argue that modern culture and elites who
would implement modern policies should be brought into the peripheral regions.
Modernization theories have some very significant deficiencies. Other than the
deficiencies involved in the culture of poverty theory, modernization theories in general
have been criticized for disregarding many of the economic relationships between
countries and regions. Regions do not seem to be underdeveloped because of the lack
of free markets or other modernizing economic factors; those factors are usually in
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countries and regions well before the period in question. The problem in economic
underdevelopment is not in the absence of “modern” factors, but rather the relationship
between the society in question and those modern factors. As one critic argued:
Sociologies of development dominant in the West thus come to posit a
transition from a fictional stage to an impossible one. By concentrating on
current characteristics of industrial societies, they neglect the fact that these
traits, as well as those of underdeveloped societies, are themselves evolving and
that social change in each type of society occurs in interaction with the other
type.36
Besides the culture of poverty theories, other modernization theories include
neoclassical development theory, which argues that the exportation of free-market
economics to peripheral regions can provide for the development of the region, and
modernizing elites theory, which leads to culture of poverty theory by arguing that
elites who can foster development must go into a region and change the value system of
the periphery.37
As with the culture of poverty theory, the internal colonial theory is the
intellectual descendent of another broad group of neo-Marxist theories. Unlike the
modernization theories, the neo-Marxist theories believe that uneven development is
inevitable in a capitalist economy. As Ada Haynes put it, “the driving force in such a
system is extraction of surplus value from labor; it is only because of this extraction of
surplus value that capital accumulation can occur.”38 In other words, the capitalists
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seek to exploit the underdeveloped region by extracting its raw materials and taking
advantage of the people’s labor to increase their profit line. Whereas modernization
theories see the market system as part of a natural process that doles out all the benefits
of production in a fair and just way, neo-Marxist theorists contend that the “free
market” is a social construct that allows individuals with political and economic power
to rule and exploit others. As a result, the market is an institution that legitimates the
extraction of surplus value from the worker to the benefit of capitalists. Haynes makes
this argument in her work Poverty in Central Appalachia. Haynes argues that her
research shows that not only does the market cause poverty, but also that the poverty
thus created serves the interests of capital within the region. By evaluating the surplus
value of labor in the region, Haynes finds that there is an above average rate of surplus
value in Appalachia, which shows a high rate of exploitation. In sum, Haynes asserts
that in order to understand Appalachian poverty, theorists must examine the economic
relationships of the region, rather than focusing on culture or the lack of an elite class.39
As the 1980s dawned, poverty became more and more of a problem for the
entire country, not only Appalachia. The policy focus changed, however, from one of a
war on poverty to a war on welfare. Many policymakers and theorists believed that
welfare programs tended to create more social problems by making work less desirable
and increasing the amount of delinquency and crime. Many of the supporters of this
position follow Charles Murray’s position. Murray, in his book Losing Ground, argues
that not only do welfare policies fail to decrease the incidence of poverty, these policies
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cause the social problems listed above. Instead, Murray argues that the government
should cut welfare programs so that people of working age would have “no recourse
whatsoever except the job market, family members, friends, and public or private
locally funded services.”40 To meet this goal, the government should abolish “AFDC
(Aid to Families with Dependent Children), Medicaid, Food Stamps, Unemployment
Insurance, Worker’s Compensation, subsidized housing, disability insurance, and the
rest.”41 In essence, Murray believes that a free market approach to labor is most
desirable. He contends that the poor must be threatened with a severe crisis to insure
that they will work, that the free market economy can create enough jobs for all who
want to work, and that work ends financial deprivation. Murray insists that the inherent
problem with American welfare policy is that it tries to fix an assumed problem in the
American economy rather than focusing on ensuring compliance by individuals of
sound free market principles.42
The father of capitalist theory, Adam Smith, actually took a less harsh approach
to the question of poverty than Murray. Smith insisted that even in a free market
economy, there would be time when poor people would not be able to find work. On
top of this assumption, Smith also argued that even when the market works well and
work is available some people will be unable to make enough to have a standard of
living that is not beset by crisis. Smith contended that certain factors, particularly the
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supply and demand of labor, would explain the prevalence of poverty. Smith also
discussed the exploitation of the poor by the rich through governmental action. It is
odd that writings by such proponents of the free market like Murray only discuss the
conservative side of Smith and not the side concerned with the plight of the poor.
Murray argues that the market is the surest way to peace and stability in society, which
was Smith’s primary goal for society.43
A number of scholars offer serious criticisms of Murray’s position. For
example, Robert Kuttner argues that positions such as Murray’s describe an ideal freemarket economic situation that allows policymakers to ignore systematic problems,
such as poverty and social justice issues. Kuttner’s analysis, and others like it, allow
for an in-depth discussion of the specific causes of poverty which is not hindered by the
laissez-faire ideology of scholars such as Murray. This was particularly important
during the 1980s as the incidence of poverty increased substantially. The rate of
poverty in the United States, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau, actually declined
between 1965 and 1985. By 1989, however, the rate of poverty was larger than the
1969 rate. By 1991, the poverty rate stood at 14.2 percent. As a result, it became clear
that poverty was truly a national problem by the 1990s, not just a regional problem.44
The number of Americans suffering from poverty does not tell the entire story,
however. Not only do Americans recognize that the War on Poverty failed to eradicate
poverty from the country, they also realize the complex reasons for poverty. Of course
43
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there will always be ideologues like Murray who blame the victim for poverty, but
many scholars realize there are structural causes of poverty. Isabel Sawhill, for
example, identified five areas of emphasis in the literature on American poverty:
demographics, economic performance, human capital investments, income transfers,
and the growth of an underclass. One reason for the increase in poverty is the increase
in the number of households headed by women. For numerous reasons, households led
by women are more likely to live in poverty. As a result, as the number of female
headed households increases, so does the number of people living in poverty. This was
an issue particularly after 1970. Economic performance also has an important impact
on poverty. The health of the economy affects poverty, because most poor people work
in one way or another. Economic growth reduces the number of white male headed
households in poverty but does not affect other groups as much. Also, economic
recessions widen the gap between rich and poor and as a result tend to drive the poverty
rate up. Despite these trends, even in good economic times there has been an increase
in the earnings gap between rich and poor.45
The third area emphasized by poverty policymakers is in human capital
investments, which describe programs designed to improve the job skills of the poor in
an attempt to improve the employment opportunities for those mired in poverty. These
programs can include improved educational opportunities and job training programs.
This has been one of the most popular ways to fight poverty since the 1960s but the
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increased rates of poverty cloud the effectiveness of such programs. Although
education and training prepare individuals for good jobs, there must be available work
for those who want jobs. As a result, job training programs can lead to success for
individuals but have an overall record of failure. Of course, debates continue to rage
about the amount of funding provided for the educational programs. Therefore,
education and human infrastructure continue to be some of the best strategies to fight
poverty.46
The fourth emphasis of the literature deals with income transfer which describes
programs that provide assistance to the poor, financial or otherwise. These programs
are extremely unpopular with the general public and certain theorists, notably Murray.
Many policy makers expect the poor to work their way out of poverty without resorting
to accepting a handout. Although spending on social welfare programs rose
significantly since the 1960s, welfare payments are not high enough to provide a
financial alternative to working. Furthermore, about 80 percent of the money spent on
social welfare programs goes to programs designed as social insurance or designed to
prevent people from becoming poor. The fifth area of emphasis is on the growth of the
underclass. This phenomenon is difficult to see, however. It does suggest that poverty
is concentrated in several regions, including both the inner cities and regions in the
rural South, including rural Appalachia.47
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My study will examine the socioeconomic impact of deindustrialization on
McDowell County. Chapters One and Two will provide some background information
to set the stage for the deindustrialization of the county. Chapter One will discuss the
industrial period in the county. Of particular note is how the unique development of the
coal industry in Central Appalachia led to the creation of a community centered on
common experiences. Chapter Two provides the background to the mechanization of
the coal industry by examining the impact of the Great Depression and the New Deal
on the McDowell County coal industry. Specifically, the National Industrial Recovery
Act and, later, the Wagner Act guaranteed labor’s right to organize and bargain
collectively. Because of the increased labor costs, coal operators began implementing
labor-saving machinery in order to cut labor costs and increase their companies’ profit
margins.
Chapters Three and Four provide the specific causes of deindustrialization from
the business and labor communities. Chapter Three discusses the economics of coal
that led to the deindustrialization of McDowell County. Because of the competition
from alternative fuels such as oil and gas, coal companies decided to mechanize on a
large scale in order to stabilize their profit margin. Companies that did not have the
resources to mechanize often fell by the wayside. The result of this phenomenon was a
decline in the job market for workers in the coal industry. Whereas Chapter Three
discusses the role of industry in deindustrialization, Chapter Four examines the role of
the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) in the process. From the beginning of
the twentieth century, the union’s policy was to support mechanization as a way to
improve safety and the standard of living for the workers who remained in the mines.
28

John L. Lewis, the union’s president for four decades, used this position to win
approval for a health and pension plan known simply as “the Fund.” The union failed
in one important way, however. The UMWA had full control over how the Fund’s
money would be used and could have used it to soften the effect of unemployment on
displaced miners. Lewis, however, failed to ask for a large enough royalty payment to
fund the system of union hospitals created by the agreement, much less anything else.
The union had a unique opportunity to help its members move out of the coal industry,
but failed miserably.
Chapters Five and Six examine the social impact of deindustrialization on the
people of McDowell County. Chapter Five discusses out-migration, the most
prominent reaction of displaced miners. Because there was a lack of diversification in
the economy of the southern West Virginia coalfields, workers who lost their jobs had
few options for employment at home. Most made a conscious decision to move to
alternate destinations for work instead of facing certain poverty. Chapter Five
examines the migrants’ move and life in the destination cities. This chapter will
examine the wealth of literature on Appalachian migration and attempt to compare the
McDowell experience with the rest of Appalachia. Chapter Six examines the lives of
people who decided, for one reason or another, to stay in McDowell County. For many
of them, the lack of employment opportunities meant a life of poverty. The chapter will
place McDowell into a national context, as well as examine the economic fluctuations
that faced the people of McDowell County after 1960. With the energy crisis of the
1970s, coal operators reopened many of the mines closed during the previous two
decades, increasing the number of people employed in the McDowell County coal
29

industry. By the 1980s, the coal industry once again left McDowell County, leaving
many people either unemployed or employed in the small, non-union mines that make
up the bulk of the current coal mining operations in the county.
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Chapter One
The Birth of King Coal: The Development of a Coalfield Community
During the late nineteenth century conditions developed, particularly
improvements in transportation, which led to the creation of a dynamic coal industry in
Central Appalachia. Outside capitalists waited for the opportunity to enter the region in
order to exploit the natural resources of coal and timber found throughout the mountain
region of West Virginia, Virginia, and Kentucky. With industrial development, coal
operators needed a reliable source of labor. Native Appalachians provided much of the
industry’s labor needs, but to complete the workforce they imported immigrants from
Europe and African Americans from the South. With the influx of labor, operators
realized another problem, that of housing. Since much of the region was rural at the
dawn of the industrial age in the late nineteenth century, coal operators had to build
communities to house the workers brought in to mine the coal. Operators had another
reason for building the coal towns that dotted the region, however. By owning the
houses in the towns, operators could use the houses as a means of control to keep the
unions out of the Central Appalachian coalfields. The unique experiences of the miners
and their families in the coalfields resulted in the development of a new, diverse sense
of community. Although there was some racial and ethnic tension in the region, miners
more often developed a unique community relationship with their peers based on the
common work and community experience found in the southern West Virginia
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coalfields.1 For example, Helen Goodman, a native of Wilco in McDowell County,
recalled how the community used to come together:
There’s lots of memories. We used to have a larger community than we have
now. It’s all—a lot of it torn away. It was a town—a little community—of
love. Everybody loved one another. If there was illness in the family, the
neighbors would go by, help take care of them. Sit at night with the sick so the
family could sleep and rest. We would go from one door to another to help
people with their work. With anything that had to be done, everybody was
helpful. It was a town—a community—of love.2
Despite the problems with the coal industry, particularly the threats of death, injury,
and occupational illness, some members of the community consistently showed loyalty
to the industry because of common experiences and benefits derived from working in
the mines. Angeline Harmon grew up in McDowell County during the 1920s and
1930s and spoke of this loyalty in a 1992 interview.
I think it’s one of the greatest things that God ever created. I really do. I think
it’s one of the greatest things God ever made is coal because it’s giving me my
benefits. I know it killed my husband because he died of silicosis. My daddy
had a heart attack stemming from a lung infection, but I wouldn’t really swap
what I’ve had all my life. With the love that my mama and daddy had for all of
our children…and the love that’s been in this family, I wouldn’t swap it for
nothing in this world.3
State government officials knew of the existence of coal in the western part of
Virginia as early as the eighteenth century. The extent of coal deposits were so
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immense that Thomas Jefferson wrote in his Notes on Virginia, “In the western country
coal is known to be in so many places, as to have induced an opinion, that the whole
tract between the Laurel Mountain, Missisipi, and Ohio yields coal.”4 The exact value
of the coal reserves, however, would not be known until the beginning of the industrial
age, when the needs of the steel industry provided an impetus to the development of the
coal industry. With the knowledge of the coal reserves, the new state of West Virginia
began promoting its untapped wealth of natural resources as early as 1864. In 1870 the
state sponsored the publication of the West Virginia Handbook and Immigrants Guide.
Written by Joseph H. Debar, the handbook encouraged new immigrants to the United
States to come and work in the West Virginia coalfields. It was essential for West
Virginia to encourage industry, because there were few economic opportunities
available in the rural, more mountainous regions of the state. Many developers and
state officials believed that promotion of the natural resources of West Virginia could
overcome geographical barriers of communication and transport. But, the early
advertising companies promoting the coal industry were largely ineffective in southern
West Virginia. At the end of the 1870s, southern West Virginia still was a rural and
agrarian region. Farmers, hunters, and extended families—sometimes called clans—
occupied the region. It was not until the entrance of the railroad into southern West
Virginia in the late nineteenth century that the region became industrialized. The
growth of the coal industry transformed southern West Virginia into an industrialized
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and economic colony of outside forces that possessed the capital needed to infiltrate the
region.5
Despite the possibilities afforded by the vast coal deposits of southern West
Virginia, the coal industry was not the first industry in the Southern Mountains. The
timber industry entered McDowell County before coal could gain a foothold. The
wealth of virgin timber attracted many businessmen to invest in lumbering interests.
Major lumber companies entered McDowell County and had reached peak production
by 1895. Although the railroad transported most timber in McDowell, railroad officials
primarily built the Norfolk and Western Railroad to take advantage of the enormous
coal reserves. The promotion of coal by the state government as a more profitable
industry hindered the progress of the timber industry and tied the future of the county to
coal. Despite this significant advertising effort, the state’s promotion of the coal
industry was not the most influential factor in hastening the development of coal
mining. Private speculators knew that a fortune could be made in coal lands, and so
they threw enormous amounts of energy into promoting the coalfields.6
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Speculators had their eye on McDowell County and began to enter remote areas
of the county during the 1880s. In order to gain control of the land and, more
importantly, mineral rights, land speculators resorted to unscrupulous methods. To
evict the native landholders, speculators often found a local federal judge who, for a
bribe, agreed to rule that the “deeds” held by speculators were the original and legal
deeds. Despite the support of the United States Supreme Court, many of the county’s
natives could not afford the legal fees necessary to appeal local decisions. The arrival
of the speculators into McDowell County first sparked a major land boom, soon
followed by the eviction of native landowners. This began a long tradition of economic
and political corruption in the coalfields of southern West Virginia.7
Large seams and hillside exposure made entry easy, and greatly impacted the
industry’s development in, McDowell County. The shape of the seam above the water
level eliminated the problem of drainage. Elevation of the mines made pumping water
unnecessary because the hills provided excellent drainage, and facilitated hauling the
coal out of the mines. Without these advantages, the coal industry in West Virginia
may not have developed as extensively as it did. Despite the major geographical
advantages of West Virginia, there was one primary obstacle that had to be met before
widespread industrial growth of southern West Virginia could begin, that of
transporting coal to market. The lack of adequate transportation out of the region
rendered the southern West Virginia coal useless. In the early 1880s, officials of the
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Norfolk and Western Railroad began construction of a rail line into the coalfields of the
Flat Top region, an area that included the Pocahontas and Winding Gulf coalfields, and
encompassed McDowell, Mercer, Wyoming, and Raleigh counties.8
In the early 1880s, however, railroad companies neither possessed the
technological knowledge nor the finances to penetrate the mountains. No capitalist was
willing to commit large sums of money to a railroad project in West Virginia without
reasonable hope for profit. During this decade railroad companies learned more
effective tunneling techniques that allowed the railroads to cross the mountains,
prompting notable financiers, among them John D. Rockefeller, to pay for the building
of railroads. The first wave of railroad construction opened up the Flat Top coalfield of
Mercer and Raleigh counties. Soon after the construction of the first railroads,
speculators bought the majority of land in southern West Virginia, and thereafter
speculation became a distinguishing characteristic of the early industrialization of the
region. The coal industry, however, did not enter McDowell County until 1892 and
1893, with the completion of the Norfolk and Western Railroad’s Ohio Branch, which
traveled through Mingo County to Kenova on the Ohio River. The construction of the
line gave McDowell County mines an opening in the coal markets of the Great Lakes
region because it connected the county with the industrial centers of the Midwest. The
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new markets gave operators more flexibility by allowing them to sell coal to different
markets.9
The United States’ entry into World War I in April 1917 brought a new vitality
to the coalfields. War industries, primarily in the Midwest, needed to produce large
amounts of munitions and other wartime necessities. The new munitions factories
required coal and because there was a shortage of coal, the industry expanded. Many
new mines opened and older mines grew significantly. Throughout the United States,
the number employed in coal mining rose from less than 200,000 in 1890 to more than
600,000 in 1920. After the war, there were two other reasons for the continued
solvency of the coal industry in southern West Virginia. First, a coal shortage in wartorn Europe allowed McDowell County coal to keep its domination of coal production
in the world market. Second, a nationwide strike of union mines in the early 1920s
took these mines out of competition with the non-union mines in McDowell.10
The industrialization of southern West Virginia affected traditional ways of life
by destroying the extended family clan and close mountain communities that developed
in Central Appalachia.11 According to Elmer Short, a descendant of one of the first
families in McDowell County, “That area (Bradshaw) is what you might call an
indogamous [sic] society. They marry within the community. The only new blood that
9
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came in was more or less after the mines were developed and after the first World
War.”12 Clans developed because of the isolation of the mountain regions during the
nineteenth century. The support system provided by the clan allowed families to thrive
in the wilderness. The Hatfield family, involved in the famous Hatfield-McCoy feud,
was the quintessential mountain clan. Although the Hatfield family was involved in
industrial activities (which was a major cause of the feud), the family clan ultimately
could not survive in an industrializing economy. By the 1890s, a general perception
formed in the media about mountaineer culture as lawless and unsuited to the march of
civilization. The media popularized the idea of mountain culture as anarchical by
publishing sensationalized accounts of mountain feuds. The Wheeling Intelligencer
argued that “Capitalists refuse to come and prospect because they say they are afraid of
our outlaws. You cannot get them to go into the interior to inspect our timber and coal
lands for fear they will be ambushed.”13 The eventual industrialization of the region
destroyed the clan and forced families to make tough decisions. Members of the
families who had lived in the area prior to industrialization increasingly chose different
paths; some became coal operators, while others entered the mines as common
miners.14
The native, white population of southern West Virginia could not supply a work
force adequate for the needs of the growing coal industry. In 1880, McDowell County
had a population of only 3,078, of whom 3,071 were white, so the coal companies were
12
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required to import labor from other areas. By 1890, McDowell County’s population
had risen to 7,347, of which 5,260, or 71.7 percent, were white. Two decades later, in
1910, the McDowell County population had risen to 47,856, of which 25,196, or 52.6
percent, were American-born whites.15 The preponderant majority of whites living in
McDowell County were migrants themselves, as the native whites living in McDowell
in 1880 could not have reproduced the numbers necessary to mine the coal. Coal
operators brought in African Americans from the South and immigrants from Eastern
and Southern Europe. Operators recruited both African Americans and Europeans
because they worked for significantly lower wages than did native whites. The
operators influenced labor recruits by offering them a way of life better than that they
had known previously. The recruitment of African American miners increased the rate
of black migration and blacks soon formed their own immigration networks. It was
difficult for married men to migrate because they invariably left their families behind
until they could afford to join the men. Paying African American and European
migrants sub-standard wages not only kept operating costs down and profits high, but
also served as a basis for the exploitation of McDowell County miners, in which miners
did not benefit from the great wealth found in the coalfields.16
The bituminous coal mined in southern West Virginia beginning in the early
twentieth century quickly became renowned for its superior quality. West Virginia coal
had the highest BTU per unit, which is the amount of heat energy produced as coal is
burned, and produced the best steam in the United States. It had a low content of ash
15
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and sulphur, which made it the most fuel efficient and best coking coal in the country.
The coal from southern West Virginia, particularly that from the New River, Winding
Gulf, and Pocahontas (which contains McDowell County) Fields, produced low volatile
coal, which means that coal from those areas have a low amount of gas, leading to a
lower amount of smoke produced when this coal was burned. Because of the low
amount of smoke produced by the coal from these three fields, they are commonly
called the “smokeless” coal fields. Coal from the smokeless fields became extremely
popular in many of the cities because of the concerns with pollution. In fact, West
Virginia coal became so popular with both industry and the general public that the
region’s mines captured the most profitable national markets. For instance, the
Midwestern industries and the United States Navy both preferred West Virginia coal.
McDowell County was probably most affected by the increase in demand. Coal output
in McDowell rose from 246,000 tons in 1889 to 3.5 million tons in 1910.17
The economic success of McDowell County, and the resultant increase in the
number of miners in the county, determined the scope of the effort to organize the
miners into a labor union. Organized in 1890 as a result of the merger of National
Trades Assembly 135 of the Knights of Labor and the National Progressive Union, the
United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) initially was a weak union. In 1898,
17
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however, the union succeeded in achieving an agreement with the operators in the
Central Competitive Field in which the Midwestern operators gave the union
recognition in exchange for a promise by the union to organize the coal miners in West
Virginia. Membership steadily increased from a low of 33,000 members in 1897 to
more than 400,000 in 1917. Many miners came into the union because of their desire
for increased benefits and improvements in their quality of life. The activists employed
by the UMWA realized that industrial democracy meant the right of the majority to
make decisions. The union leaders also realized, however, that an oppressive system,
controlled by a strong minority, could trample on the rights of a weaker majority.18
The UMWA sought to unionize all coal miners in the United States. Yet, before
the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, the union did not make much progress in its
efforts to organize southern West Virginia because one of the primary issues that
concerned the union was that of uniform national wage rates. The southern West
Virginia operators believed that the union was illegal; moreover, after learning of the
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, they saw it as a communist plot to destroy American
industry. Most importantly, however, because the union could not secure agreements
for uniform wage rates from southern West Virginia companies, these producers could
pay lower wages, usually in the neighborhood of 15 to 20 percent lower, which allowed
them to compete in the important Great Lakes markets with closer companies from
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Ohio and Pennsylvania.19 The failure of unionization was one significant contributing
factor to the industrialization of McDowell County.20
There were many small mines that lined the hollows of McDowell County.
They dominated the landscape, yet many mines did not have the technology nor the
capacity to mine a significant tonnage of coal. Throughout the history of McDowell
County, a few companies produced most of the county’s coal. The larger companies
had the resources to hire significant numbers of workers, to keep them satisfied with
social improvements, and to use machinery to increase the rate of production. One of
the most important companies in McDowell County was the United States Coal and
Coke Company (U.S. Coal and Coke), which operated mines around the town of Gary,
West Virginia. A subsidiary of the United States Steel Corporation, U.S. Coal and
Coke had the resources to open many mines in the Gary area. By 1923, the company
had become the largest coal producer in West Virginia. The company would be central
to the economy of McDowell County for many more years. U.S. Coal and Coke also is
important because it pioneered the mechanization of McDowell County mines. The
company used the first successful cutting and loading machines in the county in the
early 1900s. The cutting machines undercut the coal before a charge of powder was
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detonated to loosen the coal. The undercutting machines were electrically driven,
short-wall mining machines.21
The early machine movement did not decrease the number of mining jobs
available in McDowell County, but neither did they cause mass terminations of workers
because they were designed to aid the workers, not to replace them.22 Each miner’s
responsibilities included all steps in the mining operation. The miner undercut the coal
seam, blasted the coal down, loaded it into cars, and made any necessary safety
precautions. It was not until the widespread use of loading machines and the
continuous mining machines of the 1950s, which reorganized the work process, that
many jobs were lost to machines.23
Beginning about the turn of the century, McDowell County experienced rapid
economic growth never before seen in the region. Economic historian Mancur Olson
argued that rapid economic growth leads to political and social instability. This was
true in West Virginia. The political instability that characterized southern West
Virginia led to a coalition of pro-coal politicians and businessmen gaining control of
local and state governments. The political factions that controlled West Virginia
politics during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were deeply connected
to the coal establishment. Throughout the early years of the industry, the political
21
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establishment protected the interests of coal operators by controlling the congressional
delegation and the governor; between the 1890s and World War I, every governor of
West Virginia was a coal operator, investor, or attorney. Moreover, the politicalbusiness coalition infiltrated the important committees of Mines and Mining, and Labor
and Immigration in the West Virginia state legislature. The leaders of the
establishment included dynamic gilded age political figures as Governor William A.
MacCorkle, and Senators Henry G. Davis and Stephen B. Elkins. The coal operators
also dominated local politics in McDowell County. The establishment controlled the
county court and the county’s Republican Party, leading to a political system that was,
as one union official put it, “the willing instrument of the operators.”24 Until the dawn
of the New Deal, McDowell County coal miners could expect little political help for
any grievances they may have had against the coal companies.25
Despite being controlled by the coal establishment, the West Virginia legislature
passed several laws to “aid” miners. Among them were several dealing with the use of
scrip. Scrip was a form of payment that could only be used in the company store. The
goal of the scrip system was to sell the miner necessary goods at inflated prices. Thus,
the system took a miner’s wages and gave them back to the company. Although it
seemed that the legislature took action to ease the miners’ plight, the laws dealing with
scrip were designed to comply with federal concerns with the implications of the
24
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system to legal tender. One law, passed in 1887, required that coal companies pay their
workers in lawful money. A second law, passed in 1891, took a further step and
outlawed scrip outright. But the laws passed by the legislature were ineffective. The
coal operators had enough political power to ignore the laws prohibiting the use of scrip
until the New Deal. Other laws ignored included requirements to keep a
checkweighman on the tipples. Until the 1930s, miners were paid by the ton rather than
the hours they worked, and without a checkweighman on the tipple, the company
could—and often did—shortchange the miner.26
Operators also ignored a prohibition, enacted by the legislature, against
interfering with peaceful efforts of a union to organize workers. Prior to the New Deal,
operators saw the UMWA as a plot that was un-American and harmful to business
because the union challenged the operators’ control of their property. The companies
were also concerned with the threat the union comprised to the prevailing business
model of the time; lower pay was required in order for the Appalachian mines to
compete. The connection between the coal establishment and political leaders worked
to control the miners and, thus, destroy the unionist movement. Because of the lack of
political power held by the miners, the state legislature passed laws that seemed to aid
the miners, yet were victories for the operators. For example, the state legislature
passed a Workers’ Compensation law in 1913. The legislation seemed to be a
significant victory for the miners, but the law exempted operators from damage suits by
injured miners. The statute protected the operators because previous damage suits were
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often won by the miners. The political power of the operators was such that the bills
that passed the legislature had the blessing of the coal establishment.27
The coal operators, determined to keep the union from organizing the southern
West Virginia coalfields, unified to oppose the UMWA. Coal superintendent George
Wolfe explained the new policy in a letter to the owner of Winding Gulf, Justin Collins:
“The operators of the Pocahontas coalfield unanimously agreed by 100% of the tonnage
that this District would make a determined fight against the impending invasion by the
United Mine Workers of America.”28 In addition to flaunting their political power, the
coal operators used other methods to keep the union from organizing the southern West
Virginia coalfields. Many of the operators in the Pocahontas coalfield—which includes
McDowell County—forced their new employees to sign a contract known as a yellowdog contract. The yellow-dog contract was so exploitative that the state court system
characterized it as a contract between master and servant. There were several types of
yellow-dog contracts, but the most commonly-used one specified that the employer
would not employ a member of a union, and that the employee would neither join a
union nor aid in the organization of a union. The operators thus tried to get as many
employees as possible to sign yellow-dog contracts; then, if the union persisted in
organizing McDowell County, the operators intended to secure injunctions against the
UMWA for “interfering” with their labor.29
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The operators could require their workers to sign yellow-dog contracts because
the nature of the coal camps allowed the operators to exercise their power over the
miners.30 The camps were unincorporated, so the operators had control of everyday
life. Within the towns company officials filled such diverse roles as mayor and school
superintendent. The mine operator scrutinized every move made by the miners.
Operators suppressed political activity among the miners and censored miners’ mail to
further control their towns. The miner lived in company housing and if a miner lost his
job, his family would be put out into the streets. Thus, a miner’s job was much more
important than a paycheck; his family’s survival was at stake. If the company
suspected a miner of harboring union sympathizers or of aiding the establishment of a
union, the company could, and did, search miners’ homes at will. If any unauthorized
activity was found to be occurring, the companies could evict the miners without due
process of law. The company sent the mine guards to remove the miners and their
families from the premises. Guards willfully damaged miners’ personal possessions
when they roughly dumped miners’ belongings into the street. Guards evicted the
miners without concern for life or property.31
Despite the control exerted by the operators over miners’ lives, miners still
protested oppressive working and living conditions. Geographic mobility was the most
effective protest. Miners drifted from town to town in search of higher wages,
improved living and working conditions, and enhanced opportunities for advancement
30
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in the workplace. The mobility of southern West Virginia miners eventually led to the
development of a strong, collective mentality, because miners worked and lived in
many places. Each miner was a member of a large coal mining community that
encompassed the five coal fields of southern West Virginia. More importantly,
common experiences with operators and camp life brought miners together. The coal
operators sought to slow the rate of migration among their miners by hiring married
men who had families and were more willing to work harder and longer to support their
families than single men. The cost of moving from town to town was so great, and so
stressful on the families, that married men were significantly less mobile than single
men who had no ties to a specific area. Operators also stemmed the tide of migration
by improving conditions in the coal towns.32
Mobility became an important form of protest primarily because without the
protection afforded by the UMWA, miners had few other options to protest the
exploitation of the coal town system. While it is true that political control of the state
government by the coal operators adversely affected unionization, the primary reason
that miners did not begin to unionize before 1912 was that the union raised concerns,
such as higher wages and shorter hours, that were not yet significant to the miners of
southern West Virginia. The important issues to the miners were those that they
believed affected their families, jobs, and way of life, among them, the mine guard
system, free trade, the checkweighman, unfair practices, and the scrip system. The
32
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union’s priorities did not gain support in southern West Virginia because of the
traditional working of the mine system. Higher wages and shorter hours were not
important, because the miners did not work set hours and were paid by the amount of
coal mined. For example, when discussing the original push for unionism that
developed during the 1930s in McDowell County, one miner noted: “Thing[s] got to be
such a bad situation you just had to do something. We decided we’d join the union.
We wanted to join the union because I call when a man load a car of coal, he get 50
cent or 75 cent for five or six tons of coal. If found two pieces of slate in his car, they
take that away from him, call it docking. They dock him.”33 The labor movement was,
at its very core, a fight for human dignity. As another miner, Paul Haynes, noted: “I’m
going to tell you what used to happen. It used to be before the union came in, the
company had a man and the mule. They put them in the mine. They didn’t want the
mule hurt, but they didn’t care if the man got killed. They could always hire another
man, but they had to buy the mule.”34 Without addressing the concerns that directly
affected the miners, the union had little chance of success in southern West Virginia.35
The emergence of coal towns on the landscape of McDowell County defined the
importance of the coal industry to the miners’ way of life. Companies built coal towns,
because when the coal operators began to enter McDowell County, the area was
desolate. The rural nature of the area required the construction of company housing.
Because few settlements could support the influx of laborers pouring into McDowell
33
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County, company towns sprang up and began to dominate the landscape around the
turn of the century. More miners lived in company housing in West Virginia than in
any other state in the union, about 94 percent. The percentage of miners living in
company towns in southern West Virginia was even higher, approaching 98 percent.
The remoteness of the mountain mines and the domination of the landscape by the
company towns made them an integral part of life. The town quickly became the
dominant influence on community and social life. The social institutions included in
the towns—stores, churches, and recreational facilities—became a form of social
power. The companies owned the towns and controlled them in such a way that upheld
the interests of the company. The emergence of the coal town constituted another
example of the transference of political and social power from traditional sources to the
new industrial power, the coal companies. The price of economic success for southern
West Virginia was, therefore, political and social control by the companies.36
Company towns were also important to the operators because prior to 1900
mountaineers only worked seasonally, when they could leave their farms. These early
miners did not think of coal mining as a career. They considered mining as a way to
make extra money to supplement their seasonal farm incomes. To combat the labor
shortage, and to persuade the mountaineers that mining was the best way to make a
living, the operators tried to insert stability by establishing social institutions, such as
schools, churches, and civic clubs. The ultimate goal of the coal operators was to
secure a more permanent, family-based labor force. Once the labor force was in place,
36
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the companies had to ensure that their workers would not have a reason to leave. The
continued migration of unhappy workers and the desire to cultivate the loyalty of
workers in order to keep the union out forced the operators to improve continually
social conditions in their towns. By the mid-1920s, conditions had improved
considerably in the coal towns. Operators installed baths and electric hookups in
miners’ homes. Such recreational facilities as theaters, restaurants, dance halls,
bowling alleys, pool rooms, and baseball fields, constructed by the operators, improved
the quality of life in the coal towns of McDowell County. Operators also built
clubhouses to house bachelors and newlyweds. The facilities built by the companies
helped to soften the sting of the miners’ lot in life, yet only larger companies, such as
U.S. Coal and Coke, offered such amenities. The smaller operators did not have the
capital to offer such benefits to their workers, so it was very difficult for them to keep
workers for an extended period of time. Miners simply moved to the larger towns,
where houses had indoor plumbing and electric lights.37
Operators knew that leisure activities were paramount to the satisfaction of the
miners. Thus, most of the coal camps, even the smaller ones, fielded a baseball team
that traveled from camp to camp to play games. Operators built the ballfields, bought
the uniforms, and subsidized road games to keep the miners satisfied and to keep the
union out of McDowell County. Baseball was popular, and crowds of several hundred
people attended the games. By the mid-1950s, the county seat of Welch continued the
coalfield baseball tradition by fielding a professional baseball team, the Miners, who
37
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played in the Class D Appalachian League. In a historical sense, the importance of
baseball to the residents of the coal towns was another example of how coal affected
the everyday lives of the people of the county and created camaraderie among
residents.38
Another example of the impact of coal on the society of McDowell County was
the influence of the in-migrants. In addition to the native white mountaineers, the
migrants who entered McDowell were black southerners and Europeans, primarily from
eastern and southern regions of the continent. All of the migrants came to West
Virginia for the same reason, opportunity. European immigrants probably had the most
difficult time adjusting to life in the coalfields. Most could not speak English and
simple tasks like communication were difficult. Despite the differences between ethnic
groups such as culture and language, European immigrants really assimilated into their
communities, especially the children of the original migrants. For example, as one
woman living in McDowell County put it, the various ethnic groups “didn’t seem to
like each other. One day, one of the girls came down to my house. I lived in 44 then,
and she said, ‘I just cannot understand Miss Jack at all. …and I don’t understand a
word she says.’ I don’t understand them all either. …but after you stay with them a
long time you can understand what they say. They thought I was an angel. They loved
me. They ever wanted to love me, they just loved me to death. When my babies would
be born, they would come. They had to give you something. That’s what they thought
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they had to do. No matter what it is, they had to give you something.”39 This view of
different ethnic groups coming together on a small scale was corroborated by another
resident of the county, who declared that the ethnic groups “got along well because they
were all working for a living. They didn’t fraternize too much except maybe on the
streets, but they went to different churches and they had different social groups. It was
difficult for them to mingle completely together because of their ethnic backgrounds.”40
After the Pocahontas mines opened in 1892, African Americans from Virginia,
North Carolina, and Alabama were recruited to work in the coalfields. Professional
labor agents were sent to Alabama to persuade African Americans to come to West
Virginia. Sometimes these agents doubled as guards hired by the Baldwin-Felts
agency, the preeminent mine guard company in West Virginia, but more often
companies sent African American agents into Alabama because it was illegal to entice
labor to leave Alabama. While Baldwin-Felts men coerced a small number of African
Americans into moving to West Virginia, most African Americans came willingly.
Despite their common origin in the tenant farming system of the South, blacks migrated
to southern West Virginia for several different reasons. First, African Americans could
make a better living as coal miners than as tenant farmers. The second, and probably
the most important, reason was that West Virginia had few official Jim Crow laws and
the ones on the books dealt with miscegenation and education. True, many public
facilities were separate, but unlike other southern states, facilities for African
39
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Americans and whites were somewhat similar in quality. African Americans worked in
both skilled and unskilled positions. Because of the inherent race prejudice in the
larger society, blacks rarely assumed positions of authority in the mines (e.g. mine
foreman). Race relations were intimate and friendly due to the close proximity in
which the miners worked. White and black miners worked and ate together.
Systematic white discrimination of black miners did not occur because there was no
separate pay scale for white and black miners.41
Because of the equitable pay scale, there was a decrease in race consciousness
in favor of an increase in class consciousness. Many of the miners formed a cohesion
because they perceived themselves to be members of an oppressed class. For example,
Elmer Rose, a white miner, stated when asked about the relationship between white and
black miners: “They got along pretty good. Best friends that I’ve ever had, I’ll say,
have been black people.”42 Both white and black miners had to support one another
because the coal companies politically and socially oppressed all miners, regardless of
race. One interesting example of good relations between African American and white
miners was found in the “Cinder Bottom” section of Keystone, a merchant town in the
eastern part of the county. Cinder Bottom was famous as a coalfield “red light” district.
Some of the brothels in Cinder Bottom catered to black patrons only, some to white
patrons only, but most were not particular about the race of their customers. In
contrast, a resident of Tazewell County, the Virginia county just south of McDowell,
41
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was appalled with what he saw in Keystone when he visited the town in the early
twentieth century. The primary problem this visitor saw with Keystone was not
necessarily the debauchery and immoral behavior, but the fact that white prostitutes
often entertained the black miners of the region.43
Black residents also held considerable political influence in parts of McDowell
County. The white officials of Keystone had to cater to the wishes of the black
community, else they would find themselves voted out of office very quickly. From the
mid-1920s to 1995, McDowell County sent at least one black member to the West
Virginia House of Delegates. The African-American community even published its
own newspaper, the McDowell Times. There were many opportunities for hardworking black miners in McDowell County. Things were so good that the editor of the
Times, M.T. Whittico, stated that West Virginia was “a veritable Eldorado for the
industrious Negro.”44 Because of the quality of race relations and the number of
opportunities available to African Americans, McDowell County quickly had the
largest concentration of black labor in the coalfields. For instance, in 1908, 11,483
miners toiled in the county’s coal industry. Of this total, 43.1 percent were black.
According to the 2000 census, McDowell County still has a large concentration of
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black residents, about 11 percent, the highest in the state. In general, race relations
continue to be good.45
The influx of African American miners was a reflection of the prosperity of the
McDowell County coal industry. McDowell County grew for several other reasons.
The state’s vast mineral resources would encourage the economic growth of the state,
the advancement of new technologies, and the demands of World War I led to the
development of a unique way of life for residents of McDowell County. The coal
companies built towns and various recreational and civic institutions which gave the
people of the county a sense of cohesion the likes of which they had never experienced
before. Although miners enjoyed material, the lack of political power created a sense
of oppression caused by the actions of the operators. The reaction to this exploitation
led to another source of community development based on common employment
experiences. The new sense of community would be challenged during the 1920s,
however, as economic crisis gripped the coal industry and, by 1929, the entire country.
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Chapter 2
Depression, Recovery, Instability: The New Deal and McDowell Coal
By the mid-1920s, the coal community that characterized society in
McDowell County was well established, but confronted serious challenges. During the
decade, coal companies faced an uncertain future as the industry suffered through a
decade-long downturn; in the coalfields, the Great Depression began well before the
stock market crash of October 1929. By 1932, conditions in McDowell County were
among the worst in the nation, but would slowly improve after the election of Franklin
D. Roosevelt in 1932, and the implementation of his New Deal reforms. The passage
of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the authority given to the National
Recovery Administration (NRA) to promulgate industrial codes of fair competition to
stabilize the coal industry, resulted in a change in mining methods and relationships
between miners and employers. Although it seemed that the NRA succeeded in
bringing recovery to the coal industry immediately after the implementation of the coal
codes, the agency ultimately failed to stabilize coal. The production and employment
numbers for three representative mines in McDowell County, Olga number one in
Coalwood, United States Coal and Coke number six in Gary, and Peerless Coal and
Coke in Vivian, show that the coal industry went through another downturn in the late
1930s.1 Furthermore, the NIRA, with its support for collective bargaining, led to
increased labor costs and encouraged companies to introduce machinery in an effort to
protect their profitability. Although the McDowell mines did not mechanize to the
1
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extent that mines in traditional union coalfields did, the NRA set the precedent to
encourage the adoption of machinery, which as a core component of deindustrialization
eventually displaced many miners in McDowell County.
By the mid-1920s, the McDowell County coal industry held an important place
in the markets of the world. Migrants who poured into the region to find work in the
coal mines settled into the company towns that dotted the landscape where coal mining
had become a way of life. On the surface it appeared that the economy of the county
was strong, but a depression in the bituminous coal industry began in 1919 and
remained unstable. The instability resulted from the very cause of the expansion during
World War I. The needs of the war led to the opening of new, often marginal mines,
and after the war demand for coal plummeted. As a result, many mines closed and coal
prices were volatile. Because of the importance of mining to West Virginia, the
problems in the coal industry set the stage for the Great Depression well before 1929.2
The problems facing the national coal industry during the 1920s were
momentous. The supply of coal increased while demand fell with the pull back of
wartime industries, but there were other reasons for the drop as well. Increased output
and productivity of the oil and natural gas industries made oil and gas cheaper
alternatives to coal in many regions of the country. The invention of the diesel engine,
for instance, led to oil replacing coal as the preferred fuel for the railroads. Demand for
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coal shrank and as the growth rate of consuming industries grew slowly, it became
difficult for mines to sell coal at a price which covered production costs.3
The labor strife that resulted from continued UMWA efforts to organize nonunion fields added to the problems facing the coal industry in the 1920s. Labor strikes,
external competition, and divisive competition among state operators led to chronic
losses for the operators and frequent failures of mines. To prevent bankruptcy,
operators either reduced wages or adopted labor-saving machinery. The reduction of
wages led to near starvation for many of the miners. Many smaller mines closed and
left a multitude of miners out of work. About 14,000 miners lost their jobs between
1923 and 1929. For much of the decade, coal production continued to increase despite
the problems in the industry, peaking at 144 million tons in 1927. Market forces,
however, caught up with the coal industry in West Virginia as demand and production
began a consistent downward trend after 1927.4
The future in West Virginia seemed bleak. When West Virginia became the
leading coal producer in the nation in 1928, the state’s newspapers cheered the news,
despite the obvious downturn in the entire industry. The Charleston Gazette took an
optimistic approach when it declared that downward trends in the industry “cannot
mean anything but that the coal business is readjusting itself and lopping away the
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deadwood.”5 The Clarksburg Exponent, on the other hand, took a realistic approach
when it noted that in 1928 production declined, companies failed, and the numbers
employed decreased. It was clear to the editors of the Exponent that coal was a sick
industry and that the economy of West Virginia was on tenuous footing.6
The coal industry’s production and employment trends in McDowell County
followed the national patterns. The county’s production totaled almost 22 million tons
in 1927, but just two years later had declined by almost one million tons.7 Employment
declined as well, from 20,109 in 1926 to 18,558 in 1928.8 By the eve of the economic
collapse in 1929, the county’s coal industry seemed to rebound from the industry-wide
depression of the 1920s. Employment increased to 19,424 and production increased to
almost 138 million tons.9 Individual companies also saw an improvement. Although
the Annual Report of the Department of Mines for the state does not give employment
figures for individual companies between 1929 and 1934, the increase in production
numbers for both Peerless and U.S. Coal and Coke’s number six mine between 1928
and 1929 suggests that, contrary to national trends, the state of the coal industry in
McDowell improved during the late 1920s.10 National economic problems, however,
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would destroy the gains made by the industry and seriously harm the lives of the miners
of McDowell County.
The crash of the stock market on October 29, 1929, ushered in a period of
economic hardship unknown before in the United States, a period later called the
“Great Depression.” The economic collapse hit the entire country; banks closed, men
and women lost their jobs, and a general sense of hopelessness settled upon the
landscape. The slump of the 1920s had depressed the coal industry enough to make
collapse inevitable after the crash of October 1929. Coal production fell 40 percent
from 1929 to 1933. This drop in production, in and of itself, would not have been a
problem if market demand had remained steady. But demand fell proportionally to the
drop in production. As a result of the drop in both demand and production, wages fell
significantly. Coal families faced economic hardships never seen before and created a
sense of despair among the county’s miners and their families. During the Depression,
thirty of the county’s ninety mines closed, almost 3,000 of McDowell’s miners lost
their jobs, and the remaining 16,000 worked only a few days per week. At best, a
mining family could barely expect to survive on the reduced wages miners earned. At
worst, a family faced the prospect of starvation and homelessness because there were
no other employment opportunities available. Migration was not an option because
jobs were scarce throughout the nation.11
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As the Depression deepened in West Virginia, conditions were among the worst
in the United States. Some 33,000 coal jobs disappeared as coal production fell from
144 million tons in 1927 to 84 million tons in 1932.12 Throughout the state, coal
families lost their homes and became trapped in a cycle of despair. Relief for the
suffering families became a top priority for local government officials who exerted
every effort to provide relief for the suffering citizens of West Virginia in the face of
seriously inadequate budgets to deal with the crisis. Every county dealt with the crisis
in its own way, because fiscal conservatives who controlled the state legislature refused
to assist the counties in their relief efforts. In McDowell, the county court met in
November 1930 to discuss the worsening problem. After the meeting, the court asked
the county’s coal operators to divide available work among each family head so that
everyone had an opportunity to work each week. The commissioners further argued
that “it should be the responsibility of the large coal companies to prevent suffering in
their camps whenever possible,” and urged the companies to cooperate with charitable
organizations.13 Some government officials believed that relief efforts were not
necessary and might create economic dependency. Conservative policy-makers argued
that if given relief people would quit working and cease to contribute to society. Every
relief organization struggled with the problem of identifying those who were only
interested in a “free ride.” In McDowell, the county court sought assistance from the
coal companies in identifying those worthy of assistance. Identification by the coal
12
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operators of needy applicants, who were willing to work given the chance, resulted in a
denial of aid to loafers so the assistance could go to those who were truly worthy.14
As the economic crisis deepened in McDowell County, coal mining
employment continued to decline and required companies to dismiss thousands of
miners. Coal mining employment decreased in the county from 19,424 in 1929 to
16,098 in 1932.15 Peerless and U.S. Coal and Coke felt the economic crunch as well.
Production at Peerless declined from 358,149 tons in 1929 to 146,841 tons during the
height of the Depression in 1932.16 Although the miners employed in the Peerless
mines at Vivian suffered tremendously during the Depression, the economic crisis of
the 1930s affected the miners working at U.S. Coal and Coke’s number six mine even
more. Production at number six fell from 904,580 tons in 1929 to 278,638 tons in
1931. By 1932, U.S. Coal and Coke decided to close the number six mine, resulting in
the displacement of hundreds of miners.17 The widespread poverty caused by
unexpected layoffs hindered relief initiatives. County and private relief efforts could
not help everyone in need, many of those who usually contributed to relief efforts
quickly found themselves on the relief rolls. Conditions deteriorated to such desperate
levels that county officials petitioned the state for funding to cover the growing requests
for assistance. The problems in McDowell touched all aspects of life. Six thousand
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children of the county could not attend school due to a lack of clothing and books,
sanitation and nutrition diminished for those who still lived in coal camps, and an
alarming growth in the incidences of typhoid, diphtheria, and dysentery struck
McDowell County coal towns.18
As the election of 1932 approached, there was no end in sight for the economic
crisis. The Republican administration of Herbert Hoover supported traditional relief
programs, those provided by private individuals and charities. It was clear that this
approach was not working and in the election of 1932 the voters of West Virginia
supported the Democratic presidential nominee, Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of
New York. The election of the Democrats in 1932 demonstrated that West Virginians
had accepted the necessity of government relief programs. Riding the tidal wave of
discontent, Roosevelt immediately began to change the way in which the country
assisted those affected by the economic collapse.19
The passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in 1933 influenced
industry in several different ways. The NIRA set forth a general procedure for the
formation of industrial wage and price codes. The establishment of the industrial codes
fell to the National Recovery Administration (NRA). The NIRA did not, however,
provide guidelines as to the type of provisions to be found in the codes. The only
specifics required to be included in the codes were those dealing with labor. Labor and
industry representatives negotiated the rest of the industrial codes. Section 7 of the
NIRA stipulated that the codes would set minimum wages, maximum hours,
18
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appropriate working conditions, outlawed yellow-dog contracts, and guaranteed the
right of labor to collective bargaining.20 Businesses which accepted the industrial code
agreements would be exempt from antitrust laws and widespread acceptance of the
codes served as a stabilizing agent for the coal industry.21
The NIRA was significant because it was the first peacetime attempt by the
national government to regulate industry. During the latter part of 1933,
representatives of various industries promulgated codes of fair practice under the
direction of the NRA. The negotiations were tense in most industries, however,
because business and labor representatives had different ideas concerning the solutions
to the nation’s economic problems. Business leaders wanted to protect business,
government officials wanted to protect competition, and organized labor wanted to
protect the interests of workers. The NRA ultimately failed because it tried to
accommodate too many contradictory interests. Also, the federal government did not
have the resources to regulate business adequately so that was left to the trade
associations.22
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The coal industry found the task of enacting the industrial codes difficult
because mining and wage standards varied in all thirty-three mining states, and so did
the degree of unionization, further impeding the future negotiations of the coal code. In
an effort to protect their interests, many coal companies submitted versions of the coal
code that would be sympathetic to their interests. The administration believed that the
best way to resurrect industry in the United States was through national coordination,
therefore the federal government thwarted all efforts to submit regional codes.
Moreover, General Hugh Johnson, head of the NRA, was generally ignorant of the
problems confronting the coal industry, and that retarded the debates on a code of fair
competition for the industry. The negotiations on the code broke down when Johnson,
on August 22, 1933, stated that he would clarify section 7A. The southern operators
believed that Johnson threatened their interests and immediately refused to bargain
further. There was also dissension among the operators. Because the Illinois and
Indiana coal fields were unionized, it was very difficult to get the operators to agree
among themselves on anything. Southern operators wanted regional codes in order to
protect their interests.23 Northern operators and the union argued for a single national
code in order to achieve parity and unionism in the South. General Johnson worked
diligently to coerce the industry representatives to sign the code, but the debates
dragged on through the summer. The UMWA insisted that the operators’ delay in
negotiations was an effort to retain the old system in the coal industry. In the United
Mine Workers Journal of September 15, 1933, the union argued that the negotiated
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code was fine and that the objection of the operators was nothing more than an effort to
continue exploiting the miners. The final code would, in the UMWA’s opinion,
stabilize the coal industry. Finally, President Roosevelt became involved in the process
on September 14, 1933, when he declared that if the representatives did not come to an
agreement within twenty-four hours he would impose one. The committee reached
agreement one hour before the deadline, but the pact would prove to be a very fragile
one.24
The code was a compromise between operators of union fields and operators of
non-union fields, because it required a national board, pursuant to the wishes of the
union operators, yet the code also allowed for regional boards to handle disputes, a
demand of the non-union operators. The code provided for five regional divisions and
fifteen wage districts. A national board governed the industry and each division had its
own labor board to handle disputes. Together with the code agreements, the committee
also signed the Appalachian Agreement on September 21, 1933. The Appalachian
Agreement was a labor compact that gave the code national recognition. The
agreement provided for an eight-hour day and forty-hour week, the right of the miners
to choose their own checkweighmen, the end of compulsory purchases at the company
store, the abolition of scrip, the end of mandatory company housing, the institution of a
minimum age of seventeen to work in the mines, and the right to collective
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bargaining.25 The right to collective bargaining in the Appalachian Agreement was
significant because it was the first time that the non-union operators agreed to recognize
this right.26
The NIRA aided the UMWA in its efforts to organize the southern West
Virginia coalfields. Section 7A gave a languishing organization needed momentum to
conduct a largely successful organizational drive in southern West Virginia. The
success of the membership drive did not derive solely from the changes instituted by
the NIRA. Even before the passage of section 7A, John L. Lewis, president of the
union, began planning the most extensive unionization movement in West Virginia
history. During the drive, many organizers told the crowds, “the president wants you to
join the union.”27 The tactic of invoking the president seemed to make joining the
union synonymous with patriotism, yet when asked, organizers admitted that they
meant the president of the union. Before the organization drive by the UMWA, wages
in southern West Virginia were as low as $1.50 a day. After the Appalachian
Agreement was signed, wages were about $4.20 a day, only about fifty cents below the
minimum for the traditionally unionist Central Competitive Field.28 Furthermore, the
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UMWA saw the code as the final solution to the problems facing miners and their
families. In the first issue of UMW Journal published after the code was signed, the
union stated: “This gigantic achievement gives to the bituminous coal industry a code
of fair competition and sound business and industrial principles that should prove to be
the salvation of the industry and all who are interested in it.”29 Not only did the new
contract cover every mining field in which the UMWA enjoyed some success in
previous years, it also included non-union fields such as McDowell County where the
union had previously been forbidden to enter. Therefore, changes resulting from the
NRA produced a higher degree of labor stability in the coal industry, or so it seemed.30
Not every mine, however, came under the auspices of the NRA. Originally, the
NRA did not apply to “captive mines,” such as those of U.S. Coal and Coke, because
they did not compete in the commercial coal market. All of the coal mined at U.S. Coal
and Coke mines went to its parent company, U.S. Steel, but miners employed at captive
mines wanted access to a fair contract too. After an unauthorized wildcat strike at
captive mines in western Pennsylvania, most of the steel companies agreed to follow
the provisions of the bituminous coal code in their mines. United States Coal and Coke
resisted the code more than other captive mine companies. In December 1933, two
months after most of the steel industry agreed to follow the code, the UMWA District
17 published a letter that had been sent to McDowell miners at the Gary mines of U.S.
Coal and Coke. In the letter, the union called on the miners to make a decision about
29
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accepting the UMWA as their bargaining agent without fear of reprisal from the
companies. The federal government, under the auspices of the NRA, would ensure that
the company permitted the miners to organize. The company continued using force to
keep the union out of Gary, however. In April 1934, a letter from W.O. Stuart,
president of the UMWA local at Gary, appeared in the Journal. Stuart noted that the
organizing process was extremely difficult at Gary, and “two union men were beaten
with blackjacks by company thugs.”31 Stuart lamented about the lack of federal support
for the unionization movement at Gary, yet ended the letter by restating the union
men’s resolve to organize the mines at Gary.32
The workers at U.S. Coal and Coke eventually succeeded in gaining recognition
for their local union without a long work stoppage. Miners at other mines in McDowell
were not as lucky, though. After the signing of the bituminous coal code and the
Appalachian Agreement, miners at the Fordson mine at Twin Branch organized under
the auspices of the UMWA. The management at Fordson refused to negotiate with the
union; rather than allowing the UMWA to gain a foothold at their mine, management of
the Twin Branch mine closed their operation in January 1934. The company asked all
miners to turn in all equipment owned by the company and report for final settlement of
wages. The mine stayed closed for at least six months. In July, a letter appeared in the
UMW Journal from the recording secretary of the Local at Twin Branch which
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suggested that the company was considering reopening the mine, but it is unclear
whether the company agreed to negotiate with the union miners of Twin Branch.33
On the state level, the NRA had many economic, social, and political
consequences. In keeping with the spirit of the NRA, the state government of West
Virginia struck several blows to the old order. In October 1934, Governor Herman
Kump ordered Sheriff Maginnis Hatfield of McDowell County to disarm and disband
the 195 deputies who had public authority, but were paid and controlled by the
operators. In 1935, the state legislature abolished the mine-guard system, approved a
prevailing wage-rate law, amended workmen’s compensation, and provided
compensation for victims of silicosis. Within a five-year period, it seemed that the
miners in West Virginia were freed from the yolk of oppression by the operators.34
Despite the apparently harmonious relationship between labor and industry in
West Virginia, defenders of the old order did not disappear. At the twenty-seventh
annual meeting of the West Virginia Coal Mining Institute, for instance, William
Beury, vice-president of the Algoma Coal Company, defended practices condemned by
the NRA. Beury argued that it was necessary for coal operators to be patriarchs for
their miners. Companies required camps because the areas where coal could be found
were so desolate that adequate housing did not exist. After the coal industry expanded,
the camps kept the workers satisfied. Beury argued that payment in scrip protected
families because wages could be used for liquor or labor racketeers (i.e. union
organizers). Beury continued the tradition of “paternalism” by arguing that miners
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either would not, or could not, provide for their families. Beury also believed that mine
guards were superior to elected officials because they were controlled by the
company.35 Other operators agreed with Beury’s assessment; some decided to use
traditional methods in an effort to ensure the survival of the open-shop. A miner from
Welch told the UMWA that although organization of McDowell County was almost
complete in November 1933, the Baldwin-Felts agents continued to operate in the
county.36 The “gunmen,” as the miner called them, tried to confuse the workers of
McDowell by circulating false contracts. The operators hoped that the confusion over
the false contract would result in miners striking against the true UMWA contract and
breaking up their local unions. Although some miners struck against the contract,
union efforts to explain the situation kept most workers on the job.37
Was the coal code successful in relieving unemployment and stabilizing the
industry? Some argued that the code did little to help workers. The Progressive Miners
of America objected to the code, because the organization contended that the code
failed to help the unemployed because it did not allow work-sharing between employed
and unemployed miners.38 Although the Progressive Miners had little influence in the
creation of public industrial policy, its opposition served as a benchmark for further and
future opposition to the NRA and the coal code.
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Within a year after the promulgation of the coal code, the agreement reached in
1933 began to fall apart. The differences in local conditions that hindered the original
negotiations recurred with efforts to modify the original code in order to allow parity
within the industry. For example, in 1934 operators from Alabama, western Kentucky,
and Tennessee, sought relief from the minimum day rates included within the code,
because they felt that only by amending the code could operators from regions where
local conditions might increase production costs compete in the market. The NRA
agreed to pass some amendments, which particularly entailed increases in tonnage and
piece work rates. While this action aided some portions of the coal industry as with the
original code, operators in other regions, such as West Virginia, argued that the
government unfairly discriminated against them and did not allow for fair competition.
In public comment on the proposed amendment before it passed, H.R. Hawthorne,
representing the Smokeless Operators Association of southern West Virginia, argued
that increasing piece work rates was illegal and unethical to the concepts of NIRA and
would “secure the maintenance of the existing lack of parity in certain districts.”39
Whatever the issue, local considerations hindered the federal government’s efforts to
ensure fairness in industry.40
Even the UMWA eventually turned against the NRA. By early 1935, the union
argued that the NRA had failed because it did not provide adequate relief for the
unemployed. Both UMWA President John L. Lewis and American Federation of Labor
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President William Green argued that the only solution to the unemployment problem
was a thirty-hour week. Under the codes, there were no limits on the number of hours
employees could work. The codes only retained the provisions for an average fortyhour week over a one-year period. Without some method to share available work,
organized labor believed that the effort to take workers off relief rolls and back onto the
job fell far short of its goals.41
The NRA failed to address a number of problems common to the coal industry.
Overproduction was the most serious of these difficulties. Price increases exacerbated
overproduction by giving the small operators incentive to open marginal mines. The
reduction in hours by the NRA increased hourly wages, leading to a large increase in
the cost of labor. As a result, many small operators realized that their marginal mines
could not produce the amount of capital required to meet production costs. Smaller
operations which relied on hand mining (mining coal without any mechanical aid)
faced an uncertain future. Because of the higher labor costs, larger operators began to
strip mine and to use mechanical loaders in the underground mines. Mechanization,
once begun, intensified until machines eventually replaced most of the underground
miners.42
What machines affected coal miners in the 1930s? As with most issues in the
coal industry, the type of machinery used depended heavily on locale. Some of the
unionized fields, such as those found in Illinois and other Midwestern states, instituted
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mechanical coal loaders during the depression years of the 1920s. Mechanical loading
machines varied by design, but most included gathering arms that swept the loose coal
onto a conveyor. The southern West Virginia coalfields labor costs had been so low
that coal operators could profitably mine coal with less advanced methods. The most
common machinery used in McDowell County mines were undercutters. Undercutters
used a chain blade to notch the coal at the base of the seam, thus relieving the miner of
the painstaking job of cutting the coal at the base of the seam by hand. Although the
use of undercutters increased during the 1920s, most McDowell mines did not take
advantage of the machinery available on the market. For most of the 1920s, Peerless
mined a majority of their production by hand. U.S. Coal and Coke, in contrast, used
undercutters to produce most of their coal during the decade. There was one important
reason for the more frequent use of machinery in U.S. Coal and Coke mines during the
1920s. U.S. Coal and Coke, more than any other operation in the county, led the way
in research and development. In the early 1920s, Colonel Edward O’Toole spent
considerable time working on building a machine that would improve efficiency and
increase profits for the company. O’Toole claimed that he built the first machine that
combined both the cutting and loading actions in one motion. Although the number six
mine did not use the O’Toole machine, the company, as a result of O’Toole’s passion
for coal machinery, implemented undercutters at number six.43
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By the mid-1930s, the UMWA had entered into a national contract with the coal
industry which set minimum labor costs. If a company wanted to lower its prices, it
had to reduce costs of production by lowering wages rather than by employing cost
efficient machines. New Deal policies alone, however, do not explain the spread of
mechanization in the 1930s. Low interest rates and capital costs, an increase in the
demand for coal in 1934 and 1935, the concentration of large-scale production in the
larger mines, and the selection of machinery offered by the mine supply industry all
aided the spread of mechanization. The decrease in interest rates and the increase in the
demand for coal influenced operators to invest in the new machinery developed by the
mine supply industry. Because production was concentrated in the larger mines which
had the capacity to implement new machine technology, mechanization affected more
miners in the 1930s than ever before.44
The onset of mechanization inevitably led to the loss of jobs. If anything could
have stopped the mechanization movement, it was the UMWA, but the union, led by
Lewis, supported mechanization because he believed that the survival of the coal
industry required mechanization. As might be expected, the rank and file of the
UMWA did not agree with this assessment. At the UMWA national convention in
January 1934, a delegate proposed that the union oppose all mechanized mining. The
delegate thought it was the union’s place to protect the jobs of all members of the
union. In response to the motion, Lewis shouted in protest, “You can’t turn back the
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clock!”45 The motion died as a result of Lewis’s opposition. Lewis favored
mechanization because he believed that it would stabilize industry in the long run, and
as a consequence, he had promoted mechanization for many years prior to 1934. In his
book, The Miners’ Fight for American Standards, Lewis elaborated on his view as early
as 1925 that the values of the UMWA necessitated mechanization.
Fair wages and American standards of living are inextricably bound up with the
progressive substitution of mechanical for human power. It is no accident that
fair wages and machinery will walk hand in hand….The policy of those who
seek a disruption of the existing wage structure would only postpone
mechanization of the industry and perpetuate obsolete methods.46
Lewis probably was correct in his assessment of the influence mechanization would
have on the coal industry. Yet the miners, particularly the African American miners
who lost their unskilled jobs to machines, had every right to be dismayed with the
progress of mechanization.47
By looking at the statistics, can historians argue that the NRA succeeded in
stabilizing industry and improving the lives of workers? The immediate aftermath of
the institution of the coal code showed remarkable improvement in both statewide and
countywide production. State coal production increased from 84 million tons in 1932
to 98 million tons in 1934, and McDowell County production showed just as
impressive an increase, from 13 million tons in 1932 to 17 million tons in 1934.48
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Individual companies also showed a significant improvement in business after the
NIRA. The Olga number one mine (a renaming of Consolidation Coal Company’s
Coalwood mine after its acquisition by the Carter Coal Company) increased production
in its first two years under Carter from 462,314 tons in 1933 to over one million tons
the next year. Peerless improved its output to 311,863 tons and U.S. Coal and Coke
reopened its number six mine and produced 413,773 tons in 1934.49 Therefore, by
1935, most indicators showed that the coal industry seemed to be pulling itself out of
the depression and was stable.
As the 1930s progressed, however, it became clear that the efforts of the
Roosevelt administration to stabilize industry had mixed results. The coal industry in
McDowell County, for instance, reached its highest level of production of the decade in
1936, when county mines produced more than 23 million tons of coal. After a slight
decrease in production in 1937, the bottom dropped out again in 1938 when county
production fell to 16 million tons.50 As with the economic collapse of the early part of
the decade, miners suffered the consequences of another crisis within the coal industry.
McDowell employment declined in one year, between 1937 and 1938, from 21,521 to
18,606.51 The miners most affected by the layoffs, however, seem to have been those
employed by small, marginal mines. All three mines represented in this study showed
increased employment between 1937 and 1938. Olga number one employed 952
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miners in 1938, up from 922 the year before. Peerless had an increase of fifteen
miners, while U.S. Coal and Coke worked ninety-four more miners in 1938.52
Why did only the smaller mines of McDowell County lay off workers during
the late 1930s? The smaller mines did not have the resources necessary to compete
with more prosperous companies. The realities of the coal industry during the late
1930s required mines to mechanize in order to produce enough coal to pay miners the
higher wage scales required by the NRA codes. Olga number one used undercutters to
mine all of its production since Carter acquired the mine in 1934. Peerless, by 1938,
undercut a majority of its coal, specifically 227,898 of its total production of 424,772
tons.53 The reason the companies that survived the economic decline of the late 1930s
could hire new miners was because of the very nature of the undercutting machine.
Undercutters, like most early coal mining machines, aided the workers in their jobs and
allowed for an increase in production. Under the room and pillar system of mining,
prevalent in the southern West Virginia coalfields during the early twentieth century,
miners controlled every aspect of the mining process for a certain area, or “room.”
Before the implementation of the undercutter, the miner had to undercut the coal seam,
as well as blast the coal, load the coal, and make any necessary safety precautions.
Because undercutters did not displace any miners, the machines allowed for an increase
in both production and employment.54
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In coalfields with a strong labor movement, the combination of the support for
unionization by the federal government that began with the NRA and the support for
mechanization by the union, contributed to the continued use of mechanical loading
machines. Even before the creation of the NRA, operators in the Illinois coalfields
worked with union officials to negotiate an agreement that would allow operators to
mechanize without fear of union reprisal. The UMWA agreed to the proposal and, after
ratification of the contract in 1928, Illinois mines began to mechanize their mines so
that by 1933 machines loaded 58.9 percent of the underground coal in Illinois. By
contrast, West Virginia companies only loaded 1.2 percent of their underground coal by
machine in the same year.55 The increased wage rates mandated in the coal code
increased reliance on loading technology. Even after the Supreme Court ruled that the
NIRA was unconstitutional in 1935 and revoked the authority of the industry codes,
federal influence was still at a level that kept operators from breaking agreements made
with the UMWA in the aftermath of the NIRA. As a result, price competition resumed
after the Supreme Court ruling, yet the decision did not cause wage competition.
Because of the reluctance of operators to break their contracts with the UMWA
and the need to stay competitive in an uncertain coal market, operators increasingly
looked to machinery in an effort to increase profits.56 Interestingly enough, the
McDowell County coal industry did not prescribe use of mechanical loaders during the
latter half of the 1930s. Because of its non-union tradition, McDowell County only
began to use undercutters during the 1930s. It was not until the crisis of World War II
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and the consequent manpower strain placed on the United States, that McDowell
County mines looked to mechanical loaders in an effort to meet the increased demand.
Although it failed to stabilize industry, the NRA caused many changes to
McDowell County. Traditional paternalistic institutions collapsed in the many coal
towns of the county. The NRA’s support of unionism, however clandestine, led to
union contracts in West Virginia that increased labor costs. Mechanization was the
answer for operators looking to maximize profits and decrease production costs.
Although the mechanization that resulted from the institution of NRA codes did not
directly lead to the implementation of mechanical loaders, that would have displaced
numerous miners, it set the precedent for the future use of machinery in the mines of
McDowell. A vicious cycle thus began. During World War II, McDowell mines
looked to mechanical loaders to meet demand. By the 1950s, a decline in demand
caused by increased competition from alternative fuels led the companies to implement
use of continuous mining machines, which combined the mining and loading processes
in one step. Along with the continued reliance of McDowell County on the coal
industry, the continuous miner would result in a massive displacement of West
Virginia’s workers and, with continued problems within the industry itself, the collapse
of McDowell County’s economy.
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Chapter 3
Deindustrialization and the Economics of Coal
In 1964, the Governor’s Council of Economic Advisors submitted a report to
West Virginia Governor Wally Barron titled The Condition and Prospects of the West
Virginia Economy. In this optimistic report, James Thompson, the principle author,
noted that many indicators suggested an improvement in the overall economic
condition of West Virginia. Despite the general improvement in the economic outlook
for the state, Thompson stated that employment in the coal industry declined by almost
1,000 people between September 1962 and September 1963. Although decline in
employment is an obvious negative, Thompson placed a positive spin on this
development. In discussing the statistics, Thompson said, “However, the sharp,
downward plunge in mining employment which characterized the 1950s has apparently
been halted.”1 There was some evidence for this optimism; between September 1961
and September 1963, the coal industry suffered a net loss of 200 jobs; for the previous
two year period, the net loss was 11,600 jobs.2
Overall, however, the optimism of the report was misplaced, particularly for the
coal industry. For McDowell County in particular, traditionally a leader in coal
employment and production, the 1960s was the decade in which the deindustrialization
process first became evident. The economics of coal had become so perilous that
companies were forced to cut production costs wherever possible. To stay competitive,
the mining industry in McDowell implemented the latest technology in its operations,
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which resulted in a large decline in the number of employees needed in the mines. For
example, between 1949 and 1986, the number of workers in the McDowell coal
industry decreased from 21,058 to 2,859.3
How is the experience of McDowell County similar to, and different from, the
national trend of deindustrialization? As with disinvestment elsewhere,
deindustrialization in McDowell County resulted in significant job loss and the
destruction of the community. Job loss forced thousands of people from their homes
and into new positions elsewhere. Despite this important similarity, deindustrialization
in McDowell County was very different from national deindustrialization in two ways.
First, because of the unstable nature of the coal industry, deindustrialization began at a
much earlier time, the 1950s. Second, as a natural resource extraction industry, mines
must be located where coal exists. As a result, runaway shops, operations that are
moved elsewhere, were rare. This does not mean that mines stayed open, however.
Many mines did close between 1950 and 1990, putting a significant number of miners
out of work. The second way in which deindustrialization occurred in McDowell was
through widespread mechanization. As market pressures cut into the profits of coal
companies, managers made the conscious decision to cut labor costs by introducing
machinery. As a result, machines displaced many more miners than mine closures,
particularly between 1950 and 1970.
As noted above, World War II placed West Virginia’s coal industry at the top
nationally in terms of production. War production, although very important, cannot
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explain the industrial preference for West Virginia coal alone. From the opening of the
coalfields in West Virginia, three economic factors caused the growth of the West
Virginia coal industry. First, with the completion of the railroads into the southern
West Virginia coalfields in the late nineteenth century, the area’s proximity to regional
markets could easily be exploited. Second, favorable freight rates kept transportation
costs low. Third, lower wage rates in the southern West Virginia coalfields ensured
that the price of southern West Virginia coal would continue to be competitive with
coal from other states.4
With the beginning of World War II in Europe in 1939, American industry
needed to increase production to meet the potential threat of being drawn into yet
another European war. As a result, coal production increased significantly as the coal
industry attempted to meet the fuel demands of the war industries. Because of the
increased demand, coal production in West Virginia rose to 165 million tons in 1944.
At the end of the war, there was an expected decline in the demand for coal.
Surprisingly, however, the national economy experienced a post-war boom, from which
the coal industry benefited tremendously. Coal production reached an all time high of
174 million tons in 1947. It seemed as if the coal industry could expect a bright future.5
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Any optimism found in the coal industry soon proved to be misguided. After the high
point of 1947, coal production varied until the early 1950s, when it declined
precipitously. By 1955, coal production in West Virginia had fallen to 113 million
tons, the lowest amount since the Great Depression of the early 1930s. There were
several reasons for the collapse. First, the war had pushed coal demand to heights
which could not be sustained by the industry. The coal industry is, by its very nature,
volatile and extremely susceptible to outside factors. Second, coal’s share of the fuel
market declined rapidly in the years following World War II, from 47 percent to 32
percent between 1947 and 1956.6
Why did coal’s share of the energy market decline in the post-war period? The
primary answer to this important question is that traditional customers of the coal
industry began using natural gas and petroleum products as a source of fuel. By 1956,
petroleum products accounted for 37 percent of the fuel market, up from 31 percent in
1940. The natural gas industry was even more successful during this period. Between
1940 and 1956, the percentage of the national energy market supplied by natural gas
increased from 12 percent to 26 percent. Coal industry leaders recognized the threat to
the industry as early as 1946. Coal Age, a leading industry journal, ran numerous
articles discussing the competition with oil and gas in an attempt to determine a course
of action and understand the problems facing the industry. One advantage natural gas
has over coal is in transportation. Gas is, of course, less bulky than coal and is less
expensive to transport to market. Although gas pipelines represent a large, initial
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capital outlay, once a pipeline is built, transportation costs decrease significantly. Also,
since a pipeline is one-way only there are no empty return trips to increase
transportation costs. Another major advantage enjoyed by natural gas is its cleanliness
and convenience. Gas can be piped directly to the customer and represents a much
cleaner fuel source than coal. During the 1940s and 1950s, American businesses and
households were willing to pay for this convenience.7
How did the increased competition from natural gas and oil affected coal’s
standing in important national markets? For the purpose of this study, coal markets are
divided into six separate categories: electric utilities, steel and coke, other
manufacturing, retail deliveries, railroads, and miscellaneous. Naturally, increased
competition and efficiency from other fuel sources resulted in a decline in the demand
for coal in four of the six categories. The most important change that developed in the
post-World War II period was the decline of demand by railroads. In 1945, the
railroads bought 22 percent of the national coal production. By 1950, railroad use
accounted for 13 percent; by 1956, railroads used only 3.3 percent of the total coal
production.8 What accounts for this drastic decline? As with other industries, the
railroads converted to other fuels, specifically diesel. To a large degree, the collapse of
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the railroad market, which had traditionally been a strong market for coal, shocked
many within the industry.9
The other market in which coal lost ground in the post-World War II period was
the retail market. The term retail, in this instance, primarily describes coal use for
residential and commercial heating. In 1945, retail sales accounted for about 21
percent of the total U.S. coal production. As retail customers realized the advantages of
alternative fuels, particularly natural gas, retail demand for coal dropped dramatically.
By 1956, national retail deliveries totaled about 49 million tons, about 11 percent of the
total.10
Statewide, the coal industry went through trends similar to the national industry.
Two separate surveys conducted by the West Virginia University Bureau of Business
Research detected the trends found in the West Virginia coal industry between 1951
and 1956 when consumption of West Virginia coal declined significantly in the railroad
and retail markets. Railroad deliveries accounted for 13.0 million tons in 1951, or 8.0
percent of the total West Virginia coal production. In 1956, the railroads consumed 5.0
million tons, 3.3 percent of the total. In retail, a similar, although not as drastic, trend
developed during the post-war period. In 1951, retail consumption was at 18.9 million
tons (11.6 percent). By 1956, the retail market used only 12.4 million tons (8.2
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percent). Thus, the two markets which showed a decline in demand nationally went
through a similar drop in West Virginia.11
Although the news in the railroad and retail markets was not good for the coal
industry in 1956, some markets increased in demand or remained stable in the post-war
period. One market which continued to perform strongly for American coal was the
steel and coke market. Nationally, coke plants and steel mills used 111 million tons of
coal, about 25 percent of the national consumption. This national percentage remained
relatively stable during the post-war period. In West Virginia, the steel and coke
market remained the most important destination for state coal and actually increased
somewhat. Between 1951 and 1956, consumption by the steel and coke market rose
from 42.8 million tons to 46.5 million tons, an increase from 26.2 to 30.9 percent.12
Along with the improvement in the steel and coke market, the bituminous coal
industry enjoyed a major increase in demand from the electric utility market. In 1934,
electricity used only 9 percent of national coal production. As the nation electrified,
however, the fuel needs of the electric utilities increased as a result of the higher
demand. From the end of World War II to 1956, the amount of coal burned to generate
electricity more than doubled. As a percentage of the national total, the electric utilities
consumed about 31 percent of the coal sold in 1956. The rise in demand by the electric
utilities is particularly important because it partially offset the losses felt in the retail
market. As more and more homes and businesses turned to electricity as a heating
11
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source, the harm felt by the coal industry was minimized. The percentage of West
Virginia coal used by the electric companies increased as well. In 1951, electric
utilities consumed 22 percent of the state coal production, and by 1956 the percentage
had increased to a little over 23 percent. Although the electric utilities only ranked in
second place as a destination market for West Virginia coal (to steel and coke), the
growth of the national coal market for electricity foreshadowed the importance
electricity would play for West Virginia coal in the future.13
Between 1956 and 1963, the electric utility market finally took the lead in
consuming West Virginia coal. During this period, the electric utility market was the
only market which increased its use of West Virginia coal. The steel and coke market,
which ranked as the most important destination for state coal in 1956, experienced a
slight decline to 24 percent of total consumption, down from 25 percent. By contrast,
the electric utility market share of state coal increased from 23 percent to about 33
percent. The most severe losses occurred in the railroad and retail markets, which was
a continuation of the trend which began in 1951. By 1963, the railroad market had
virtually disappeared, and retail accounted for only one-third of its 1951 amount.14
The trends in the coalfields of southern West Virginia differed somewhat from
the market trends in the rest of the state. During the period between 1951 and 1956, the
southern coalfields experienced a substantial decrease in production. The only market
that increased its consumption of southern West Virginia coal was the export market.
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From 1956 to 1961, the state of the coal industry in southern West Virginia became
even worse as production decreased by four times the drop from 1951 to 1956. The
primary reason for this significant decline was the total collapse of the export market.
Combined with further declines in the other markets, the situation for the southern West
Virginia coal industry in the early 1960s was perilous. From this low point, however, a
revival of sorts began with the recovery of the export market. Coupled with the
expansion of the utility market for southern West Virginia coal, the economic outlook
for southern West Virginia seemed to be vastly improved. There were several reasons
why southern West Virginia operators turned more to the utility market. First, electric
power production had been increasing in the Southeast more than in any other area.
Second, reductions in rail freight rates made it more profitable for operators to sell to
the utilities. Before, operators focused more on the higher priced markets of steel-coke
and exports because of transportation problems and thinner seams. Third, new seams
had been opened in the early 1960s. Although the coal in the new seams were in the
12,000 to 13,000 B.T.U. range, which was low by regional standards, the heat from the
coal from the new seams was still better than coal from most other fields.15
With the onset of the energy crisis in 1973, coal became an even more
important source of energy, particularly for the electric utilities. In 1984, nearly 84
percent of the coal used in the United States went to generate electricity. Coal provided
about 56 percent of all the electricity used in the country. Appalachian coal played an
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important role in meeting the nation’s electric needs. About 41 percent of the coal
burned to generate electricity was provided by Appalachian coal mines.16
There were several reasons for the growth of coal as an energy source.
Although prices played an important role in causing electric utilities to increase their
use of coal, the primary reasons for the increased burning of coal for electricity was the
question of supply. With the oil embargo of 1973, electric companies, and other
domestic buyers, realized that American coal was a secure energy source. As a result
of the energy crisis, oil fell to fifth place in the production of electricity during the mid1980s.17
Despite the major advantages of natural gas, its cleanliness and cost
effectiveness, coal continued to dominate the electric utility market. Before 1974,
electric utilities used natural gas to a large extent. However, with the onset of the
energy crisis, numerous supply interruptions occurred with natural gas. The primary
reason for these supply interruptions was not because of a decrease in productive
capacity. Rather, federal pricing policies caused most of the supply problems with
natural gas. The U.S. Federal Power Commission kept the price of natural gas sold in
interstate commerce so low that a balance between supply and demand was impossible.
Suppliers, in an effort to maximize profits, would either supply the intrastate market,
which was outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission, or cut back
supply, resulting in significant interruptions of gas to the electric utilities. With the
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recession of the early-1980s and the deregulation of natural gas in the mid-1980s,
demand for natural gas declined even more.18
Of coal’s competitors for the electric market, residual fuel oil has traditionally
been the strongest. Residual fuel oil is the thick residue left behind when crude oil is
refined into products such as gasoline. American oil refiners traditionally have sought
to refine as much crude as possible, leaving little residual oil. Foreign producers, in
contrast, usually found residual oil to be very profitable and produced higher quantities
than American refiners. Until 1966, the American government had strict import quotas
on residual oil. That year the government lifted the quotas on imports to many eastern
states, which led to an increase of residual oil use in power plants. As with other
petroleum products, the oil embargo of 1973 led to a decrease in residual oil use as
electric companies reexamined their use of the fuel. As a result, coal continued to play
an important role in providing for the nation’s electric needs.19
With the onset of the nuclear age, and for some time thereafter, it seemed that
nuclear power would provide a continually increasing amount of electricity. In 1984,
13.6 percent of American electricity was produced by nuclear power. However,
controversies regarding environmental concerns, safety, and technical problems led to a
decrease in new reactors. Although nuclear power did produce a large amount of
electricity in some states, reactors were increasingly removed and not replaced as they
wore out. As a result, coal and oil use increased in the electric industry.20
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Although the electric industry became the most important market for coal by the
1970s, the coal industry remained an industry characterized by boom and bust periods.
The oil embargo of 1973 and the subsequent energy crisis led to an improvement in the
prospects for the industry. By 1978, however, the country found itself mired in a
recession. There was a worldwide decline in steel production, which dropped the
demand for coal. Also, new air pollution limits forced power plants to search for a type
of coal which produced a lower amount of sulfur. Generally, this need was met by coal
mined in western fields. As the energy crisis subsided, falling oil prices also cut into
the demand for coal overseas, further damaging the industry.21
With the pressures faced by coal companies from competition, managers sought
ways to cut costs and prices. With many mines in southern West Virginia under a
collective bargaining agreement with the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA),
cutting costs by decreasing wages was not feasible. The only way companies could cut
production costs was by cutting labor costs through increased efficiency, which meant
the implementation of machinery. The mechanization of the coal industry in
McDowell County began in earnest with World War II. The transformation to a
mechanized industry did not occur quickly, however. Companies bought new
technology in small quantities as new machines became available. Despite the slow
pace of mechanization, the employment situation in McDowell County changed
considerably as machines displaced many miners and prevented many young people
from gaining employment in the mines.
21
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Market competition was not the only reason for the increased reliance on
mechanization in the coal industry. Coal companies began employing machinery well
before the rise of oil and gas as competitors to coal. In the years following World War
I, for example, the industry in West Virginia became more and more unstable. The
operators in the Pocahontas coalfield of southern West Virginia defeated postwar
organizing efforts by the UMWA. Coupled with the fact that West Virginia coal
remained popular in commercial markets, due to its smokeless burning, the lack of
union success encouraged the opening of new mines, which inundated the market with
excessive amounts of coal. When prices began to drop in 1923, operators were hit
hard. To prevent bankruptcy, operators reduced wages or used labor-saving machinery.
The reduction of wages led to a near starvation existence for many miners. Smaller
mines closed, leaving thousands of miners out of work. As a result, the entire mining
community suffered the consequences of overproduction.22
As stated above, machines became important during the dark days of the early
1920s because they held the promise of raising profits for the operators by accelerating
the pace of mining and reducing labor costs. The first machines introduced in the early
years of the twentieth century were undercutters. Undercutters , usually mounted on
track, used a chain blade to notch the coal at the base of the seam, a job previously
performed by hand. As early as 1915, undercutters produced 60 percent of West
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Virginia’s coal. Productivity rose from 3 to 4 ½ tons per man day as a result of the use
of undercutters.23
The success of the undercutting machines was the first step in the long
evolution of the use of coal mining machinery. As early as World War I, coal operators
and industry analysts discussed ways to manufacture machines for coal loading. In
addition to the obvious reason for implementing mechanical loaders, increasing the
production rate of coal, some analysts agued that the control miners had over
production under the traditional room and pillar method of mining impeded the
production rate.24 In 1918 E.N. Zern, editor at Keystone Publishing, presented a paper
on loading machine technology to the Coal Mining Institute of America. Zern argued
that the industry’s labor problems caused mechanization. He did not know whether the
problem was “due to the scarcity of labor, its indifference, or its antagonism,” but “the
fact that it exists is sufficient.”25
Zern’s analysis is too simplistic to adequately explain the social and economic
forces that contributed to the introduction of machinery in the coal-mining process.
The effort to replace obsolete machinery actually preceded World War I and the labor
problems caused by the war. The significance of Zern’s argument is his reasoning
behind the use of machinery. Zern contended that mechanization exemplified a
23
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progression within the coal industry.26 In 1924 the industry journal, Coal Mine
Management, reported that there were twenty-seven mechanical loading machines that
had been tested underground. Through manufacturers’ advertisements and articles in
trade journals, coal operators became aware of the advantages of mechanization and the
numerous loading machines available.27
Early loading machines varied in many different ways. Conveyors had to be fed
by hand, while other machines loaded the coal after it had been blasted from the face.
Still other devices, forerunners of the modern continuous mining machine, mined and
loaded coal in one motion. The only similarity among these early machines was that
most of them used an electric-powered chain conveyor. As stated above, Colonel
Edward O’Toole of the United States Coal and Coke Company claimed that he had
developed and built the first “real” cutting and loading machine in the early 1920s.28
O’Toole told an industry journal in 1925 that his work on machinery lagged because of
the “excessively low labor rates prevailing at the time.”29 O’Toole stated that the labor
costs of the wartime era required some sort of labor-saving device. Working in the
U.S. Coal and Coke machine shops, O’Toole devised a system that involved a cutting
26
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chain mounted on a long cutter bar that was used to cut and load simultaneously. In
back of, and parallel to, the cutter bar was a conveyor that loaded the coal into a car.
The interesting feature of this machine was that it did not require drilling and blasting,
but rather it used the weight of the rock to crush the coal as it was cut. The broken coal
fell onto the conveyor as the machine worked. The O’Toole machine required a longwall, retreating system layout in the mine instead of the traditional room and pillar
layout. Miners worked long-wall rooms out to a distance of about 600 feet, with pillars
of coal left between each room. Besides the pillars of coal, roof support was provided
by hydraulic jacks and collapsible timber cribs. As mining progressed, miners removed
the cribs set behind the jacks and allowed the roof to cave in.30
The O’Toole machine did not succeed in changing the way miners dug coal.
Because the coal industry was firmly committed to the traditional room and pillar
method of mining, O’Toole’s system received little attention from the industry as a
whole. The O’Toole machine, and other early mining and loading machines like it, can
be considered the predecessors of the continuous mining machines, but they did not aid
the evolution of mobile loaders, which changed room and pillar mining.31
Operators introduced loading machines after World War I, but in the years prior
to 1933, their use was confined to northern, union coalfields. After the passage of the
National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933, machinery rapidly entered West Virginia.32
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For example, during that year, coal loaded by machines in West Virginia constituted
less than one percent of total production; by 1940, however, the proportion had risen to
over 70 percent. During this period of rapid expansion of mechanical loading, the
favorite machine of the industry was one that could be moved from room to room and
was adaptable to different mining conditions. Joseph Joy, a miner, invented such a
machine. The Joy loader became synonymous with coal mechanization and became the
most widely-used loader in the coal fields of McDowell County.33
Machinery did not hinder the coal industry in West Virginia prior to World War
II. In 1934, for example, the state Department of Mines reported that of the 98 million
tons of coal produced by the state, over 87 million tons were hand loaded into cars.
None of the coal produced in 1934 was loaded by machine. Continued effects of the
Great Depression, the lack of available capital, and the use of cheap labor explain why
machinery was not being used in West Virginia mines in 1934.34
Historians have disagreed over whether or not southern West Virginia waited
too long to mechanize its mines. Richard Simon, for instance, has argued that West
Virginia coal operators waited too long to automate because of “destructive
competition” among the coal operators. Simon contended that competition delayed
automation and that southern West Virginia operators harmed their position by refusing
As a result, labor costs rose and operators implemented machinery in order to decrease the costs of
production.
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to mechanize. In his work, Appalachia’s Path to Dependency, Paul Salstrom debunked
Simon’s argument. Salstrom stressed that southern West Virginia would not have
developed economically to the extent that it did if the people of the region had not been
willing to mine coal for lower wages than did northern workers. Coal operators would
not have been willing to enter southern West Virginia because of the high costs of
transporting the coal out of the region. Mechanization came exactly when it should
have, when operators could mine the coal more cheaply by using machinery.35
In the late 1930s, the beginning of another war in Europe encouraged increased
production of war materiel in the United States. Higher production resulted in a
significant rise in the amount of coal mined in West Virginia. By 1940, coal
production in West Virginia grew to over 126 million tons. An expanded movement
towards mechanization occurred during the period before the United States’
involvement in World War II. In 1940 West Virginia miners loaded over 30 million
tons of coal by machine. Both hand loading from machine-cut coal and hand mining
decreased significantly by 1940.36
During the wartime era, McDowell County’s coal production followed the same
patterns as the state’s production. The mines of the Carter Coal Company in Coalwood
and Caretta, for example, relied on machines to cut their coal, although miners still
hand loaded the coal into cars. By contrast, the Peerless Coal and Coke mines in
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Vivian were in the process of phasing out hand mining in 1940.37 About half the
company’s production that year was still hand mined, the other half was mined by five
cutting machines and hand loaded into cars.38
By 1940, neither coal company had made the move to mechanized loading.
Peerless began incorporating cutting machines by this time. The absence of
mechanized loading was also evident throughout the county. In 1940, about 80 percent
of the county’s coal production was cut by machine and hand loaded into cars. Hand
mining was still responsible for a portion of county production in 1940. Almost 3
million tons of coal were hand mined in the traditional room and pillar method of
mining. Less than 2 percent of the total production was loaded by machine, continuing
the pattern seen within the entire state.39
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Table 1. Production and Machinery at Selected McDowell County Coal
Mines, 1940.
Olga #1
Olga #2
Caretta
Peerless
County
(Coalwood) (Caretta)
(Vivian)
Totals
Cutting
Machines

3

4

8

5

305

Conveyors
(Loaders)

0

0

0

0

85

Machine
Loaders

0

0

0

0

19

Hand Mined 0
Production
(in tons)

0

0

359,058

2,868,863

Machine
Loaded (in
tons)

0

0

0

0

1,280,753

Loaded in
Conveyors
(in tons)

0

0

0

0

2,062,869

Hand
Loaded (in
tons)

1,647,047

1,800,224

332,322

353,882

19,466,892

Total
Production
(in tons)

1,647,047

1,800,224

332,322

712,940

25,679,377

Source: State of West Virginia, Annual Report of the Department of Mines
(Charleston: 1940), 42-45.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor spurred increased industrial activity in the
United States, that in turn enhanced demand for coal. Despite the increase in the
production of war materiel since the onset of the European war in 1939, the United
States still was not fully mobilized for war production. The entrance of the United
101

States into the war also led to a new, yet familiar problem, that of a labor shortage. The
coal industry had suffered the effects of labor shortages during World War I and the
shortages impaired the industry, but during World War II labor shortages were not as
intense. As miners went off to war, coal companies needed to find ways to increase
production with fewer miners.

For one thing, the competition from oil and gas

actually helped the coal industry by relieving the pressures the war effort placed on the
industry. Another trend which aided the industry was mechanization. Mechanization
allowed coal companies to increase production with fewer miners. For those mines that
still used traditional methods of mining, there was a need to increase production and to
mechanize in a timely manner.40
The problem facing the West Virginia coal industry in 1941 was the need to
increase production by mechanizing its mines. From 1940 to 1944, the machine loaded
portion of the state’s production more than doubled. During the period from 1940 to
1944, hand mining was completely eradicated and coal loaded by hand, on either cars
or conveyors, fell from about 76 percent to about 56 percent of the total production. In
1945, when statewide production fell slightly, the amount of coal loaded by machine
actually rose.41
The loading of coal for the Carter mine portray the acquisition of the
mechanical loaders. As noted in Table 2, the Carter mines, which had no mechanical
loaders in 1940, had twenty among its three mines in 1945. At the two Olga mines in
Coalwood and Caretta, about 88 percent of the total production was loaded by machine.
40
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Olga miners still loaded the remaining tonnage by hand, but the company began a
major effort towards complete mechanization of the mining process. At Vivian,
Peerless bought three mechanical loaders and three conveyors between 1940 and 1945.
The movement towards complete mechanization at the Peerless mine began with the
introduction of the new machinery. Miners only hand loaded a little over half the
production at Peerless in 1945, the rest was either loaded by hand on conveyors or with
mechanical loaders. Although lagging behind many of the other mines in McDowell
County, Peerless also strove to mechanize in the early 1940s. In McDowell County as
a whole, mechanization continued, yet still trailed the rest of the state of West Virginia.
Miners loaded approximately 35 percent of the county’s coal production by machine.
Workers loaded the rest by hand, either on cars or conveyors.42

42

Ibid., 42-43.

103

Table 2. Production and Machinery at Selected McDowell County Coal
Mines, 1945.
Olga #1
(Coalwood)

Olga #2
(Caretta)

Caretta

Peerless
(Vivian)

County
Totals

Cutting
Machines

4

5

5

9

358

Conveyors

0

0

0

3

124

Mechanical
Loaders

9

10

1

3

126

Production
Mechanically
Loaded (in
tons)

930,280

1,173,345

0

235,196

8,728,591

Loaded on
0
Conveyors (in
tons)

0

0

39,464

1,238,288

Hand Loaded
(in tons)

246,106

7,041

294,018

333,996

15,019,443

Total
Production
(in tons)

1,176,386

1,180,386

294,018

608,656

24,986,322

Source: State of West Virginia, Annual Report of the Department of Mines
(Charleston: 1945), 42-43.

The labor shortage symptomatic of the coal industry during World War II did
not impede West Virginia mines. Despite the immense manpower needs of the United
States military, coal operators in West Virginia had few difficulties in finding enough
workers to meet the fuel demands of war industry in the early years of the war. Total
mine employment in West Virginia rose between 1940 and 1943. By 1943, however,
mechanization of the West Virginia coal industry was in full swing. The result of the
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increased reliance on machinery to load the coal was a significant and rapid decrease in
West Virginia coal mining jobs. By 1945 coal employment in West Virginia had
decreased 8.6 percent.43
Employment in McDowell County followed a similar pattern. The eradication
of hand mining and the rapid utilization of mechanical loaders affected McDowell in a
more demoralizing and destructive manner. For example, almost half of the workers at
the Carter mines in 1940 were hand loaders, with the rest being classified as either
cutting machine workers or general inside labor. By 1945, only about 10 percent of
Carter miners were still classified as hand loaders. As a result, Carter employed
approximately half the number of miners in 1945 as it had in 1940. These hand loaders
also produced about one-quarter of the amount of coal loaded by machine.44
Peerless’s employment did not decline as much as Carter during the period
between 1940 and 1945. The total number of inside workers at Peerless decreased less
than 20 percent during the war years. A large layoff did not occur in 1945 at Peerless
because of the sheer amount of coal still being loaded by hand at the mine. While the
Carter mines, by 1945, were close to completely phasing out hand loading, Peerless still
relied on the practice for well over half of its production. More than half of the miners
employed by Peerless in 1940 were either hand miners or hand loaders. In 1945 the
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acquisition of conveyors and mechanical loaders allowed some of the job losses to be
absorbed by the creation of crews to man the new machines.45
After World War II ended, the move towards complete mechanization of the
coal industry accelerated. Lower demand for coal as a result of decreased industrial
output of war materials led to a decrease in the amount of coal mined in the United
States. The important statistic, however, was the percentage of coal loaded by
machine. Between 1945 and 1950 the percentage of coal loaded by machine rose from
48 to 58 percent. It is interesting to note that although coal production in West Virginia
fell by 19 million tons between 1945 and 1950, the tonnage of coal loaded by machine
actually increased by about three million tons. Employment obviously suffered due to
the decreased levels of production and increased use of machinery in the late 1940s.
There were 10,000 fewer miners employed in West Virginia in 1950 than had worked
in 1945. In hindsight, as will be shown below, the decline in employment was not a
trend that would destroy an industry, but it was one that affected thousands of people
whose jobs were lost.46
By 1950, the use of mechanical loading expanded in McDowell County. The
Carter Coal Company sold its Coalwood and Caretta mines. The three mines were
reorganized as Olga Coal Company, after the two primary mines owned by the
company. The Olga company completely eradicated hand loading in its two major
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mines, Olga #1 and Olga #2. Hand loading on conveyors continued at the company’s
Caretta #5 mine, but the output of that mine was miniscule. Peerless also continued the
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Table 3. Employment in Selected McDowell County Coal Mines,
1940 and 1945.
Olga #1
Olga #1
Olga #2 Olga #2 Caretta Caretta Peerless Peerless County County
(Coalwood) (Coalwood) (Caretta) (Caretta) 1940
1945
(Vivian) (Vivian) Totals Totals
1940
1945
1940
1945
1940
1945
1940
1945
Pick Men

0

0

0

0

0

0

132

0

501

0

Mechanical
Men

0

28

0

37

0

0

0

20

155

545

Conveyor
Workers

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

20

493

507

Hand
Loaders

407

55

503

0

123

81

131

116

9,979

5,017

Machine
Men and
Helpers

10

9

13

14

10

7

10

16

614

719

General
Labor

403

434

462

474

141

96

130

163

6,120

6,788

Total Inside 820
Employment

526

978

525

274

184

403

335

17,862

13,576

Source: State of West Virginia, Annual Report of the Department of Mines (Charleston: 1940), 82-85; State of West Virginia, Annual
Report of the Department of Mines (Charleston: 1945), 98-101.
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mechanization of its mines during this period. Ninety-three percent of Peerless’s
production was loaded mechanically. The rest was hand loaded onto conveyors. In all
of McDowell County, over half of the county’s total production was loaded by
machine.47

Table 4. Production and Machinery in Selected McDowell County Coal
Mines, 1950.
Olga #1
(Coalwood)

Olga #2
(Caretta)

Caretta #5

Peerless
(Vivian)

County
Totals

Cutting
Machines

5

14

0

9

451

Conveyors

0

0

0

3

140

Mechanical
Loaders

14

18

0

7

200

Production
932,909
Mechanically
Loaded (in
tons)

960,514

0

456,376

10,770,213

Loaded on
Conveyors
(in tons)

0

0

28,336

32,255

1,303,468

Hand Loaded 0
(in tons)

0

0

0

8,706,999

Total
Production
(in tons)

960,514

28,336

491,631

20,780,680

932,909

Source: State of West Virginia, Annual Report of the Department of Mines
(Charleston: 1950), 50-51.

47

State of West Virginia, Annual Report of the Department of Mines (Charleston: 1950), 50-51.

109

Interestingly, the employment in McDowell County coal mines overall actually
increased by more than 15 percent between 1945 and 1950. The same was not true for
the Olga and Peerless companies. The Olga mines employed 10 percent fewer miners
in 1950 than in 1945, with only forty-two workers still loading coal by hand. These
hand loaders, as mentioned above, worked at the Caretta #5 mine, which had always
been technologically behind in comparison to the two Olga mines. The rest of the
miners either worked on mechanical loaders, cutting machines, or as general inside
labor. Peerless also lost employees by 1950, about 15 percent. The primary reason for
the continued decrease in number of workers at Peerless was the cessation of hand
loading into cars. By the end of 1950 there were no hand loaders in the Peerless
mine.48

48
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Table 5. Employment in Selected McDowell County Coal Mines, 1950.
Olga #1
(Coalwood)

Olga #2
(Caretta)

Caretta #5

Peerless
(Vivian)

County
Totals

Mechanical
Workers

39

43

0

30

743

Conveyor
Workers

0

0

42

18

857

Hand
Loaders

0

0

0

0

4,535

Machine
Men and
Helpers

18

45

6

30

923

General
Labor

442

445

38

209

8,754

Total Inside
Employment

499

533

86

287

15,812

Source: State of West Virginia, Annual Report of the Department of Mines
(Charleston: 1950), 124-127.

During the 1950s companies introduced machines that subsequently
revolutionized the mining process, the most important of which was the continuous
mining machine manufactured by the Joy Company. A twenty-six foot long, eight-foot
wide machine consisting of a ripper bar designed to tear coal from the face and place it
into a central hopper, the continuous miner combined the cutting and loading of coal
into a single operation. The new machine shortened the time needed to produce a ton
of coal and did it with much less labor than traditional mining methods. A continuous
miner with ten men produced three times as much coal as thirty men loading coal by
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machine. Fortune magazine stated that the total cost per ton to mine coal was $5.28 for
hand loading, $3.79 for machine loading, and $3.16 for continuous mining.49 The
increased production resulting from the continuous mining machine also changed the
industry. Consequently, the mechanical loader led to a 20 percent increase in
productivity between 1930 and 1950. During the 1950s, productivity rose about 100
percent due to the continuous mining machine.50
Production in West Virginia declined from 1950-1955, yet the amount of coal
loaded by machine increased drastically. During this period, the tonnage of coal loaded
by machine increased 38 percent. As Table 6 shows, however, fewer miners held onto
their jobs, as employment decreased between 1950 and 1955, declining by almost 50
percent. 51
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Table 6. West Virginia Coal Production and Employment, by Method of
Mining, 1951-1955.
1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

Hand
Loaded (in
tons)

34,042,454

26,443,899

18,207,787

12,224,865

12,668,243

Conveyor
Loaded (in
tons)

25,671,846

20,668,689

15,248,902

8,421,291

7,621,829

Machine
Loaded (in
tons)

92,356,473

84,609,103

88,833,642

84,229,243

106,053,859

Total
Production
(in tons)

152,070,773

131,721,681

122,290,331 104,875,399 126,343,859

Total
Employed

84,117

75,733

62,251

48,047

47,149

Source: State of West Virginia, Annual Report of the Department of Mines
(Charleston: 1955), 5.

The early 1950s were critical years in McDowell County. Olga Coal Company
closed the Caretta #5 mine, because it ceased to be profitable. Production at the two
remaining Olga mines increased marginally between 1950 and 1955. During the same
period, however, over half of Olga’s inside miners lost their jobs. Any production
increase, no matter how small, with an employment decline the magnitude of Olga’s,
was the result of the continuous mining machine. The continued mechanization
movement destroyed Peerless. Peerless did not buy a continuous miner and paid dearly
as a result. Production fell marginally from 1950 to 1955; employment fell as well.
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Because Peerless did not further mechanize its mines, it could not produce the tonnage
needed at a low enough price to compete with larger mines. Because of the difference
between Peerless and its competitors, the company went out of business and closed its
Vivian mine in 1960.52
Throughout the late 1950s the coal industry in West Virginia continued to see a
decline in both production and employment. By 1960 coal mining was almost a
completely mechanized process. About 89 percent of the coal produced in 1960 was
machine loaded, mostly by the continuous mining machine. McDowell County also
followed the path to complete mechanization. Market conditions impaired the two
Olga mines; they produced less coal in 1960 than in 1955. The increased use of the
continuous mining machine caused the expected decline in employment as well. As
noted in Table 7, in McDowell County as a whole, production fell by about six million
tons and about 700 jobs were lost between 1955 and 1960.53
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Table 7. Production and Employment at Selected McDowell County
Coal Mines, 1955 and 1960.
Olga #1
(Coalwood)

Olga #2
(Caretta)

Peerless
(Vivian)

County Totals

Total
Production (in
tons) (1955)

1,103,702

818,958

484,948

20,912,416

Total Inside
Employment
(1955)

319

289

221

7,846

Total
Production (in
tons) (1960)

869,334

630,866

N/A

14,802,004

Total Inside
Employment
(1960)

283

225

N/A

7,118

Source: State of West Virginia, Annual Report of the Department of Mines
(Charleston: 1955), 30; State of West Virginia, Annual Report of the Department of
Mines (Charleston: 1960), 62-63.

The patterns of development evident in McDowell County continued
throughout the immediate postwar period in the rest of the southern West Virginia
coalfields. Large companies with the vision to realize the importance of mechanization
thrived, albeit with fewer workers. Mines which either did not have the capital or the
foresight to buy loaders, continuous miners, or other machines usually could not
compete on the marketplace and ended up closing. Of course there could be other
reasons for mine closures, including the “working out” of a coal seam; however, it is
clear that mechanization was necessary for the future success of a mine.54

54
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In his case study of the Kay Moor mine in Fayette County, Michael Workman
reinforces many of my findings about McDowell County. Located in the New River
Gorge, the Kay Moor mine opened in 1900. The Low Moor Iron Company of
Allegheny County, Virginia, began working on the mine in an attempt to improve the
coke supplies to the company’s iron furnaces.55 During the industry-wide push towards
mechanization through the widespread use of loading machines, Workman notes that
the company experimented with loaders during the mid-1930s. Despite the use of the
loaders, however, the machines loaded no more than 2 percent of the mine’s production
until they were discontinued in 1937. Another attempt at mechanical loading took
place in the early 1940s, yet by 1943 this experiment was over. From that point until
1962, when the mine closed, miners hand loaded all of the mine’s output.56
Workman finds that the reason the Kay Moor mine did not mechanize was
because management resisted introducing mechanical loaders. According to Workman,
there were two reasons for the conservatism of the management at Kay Moor. First, the
general manager of the mine believed that mechanization would not be a permanent
part of the coal industry; he believed hand loading would continue to account for the
bulk of the industry’s production. Second, it is possible that management realized that
the mine would not have a long life. Within thirty years of its opening, the main
headings of the Kay Moor mine had been driven to the edge of the company’s property.
There was still a large amount of coal available for mining, but it was clear that the
55
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mine would eventually close. The actual reason for the lack of mechanization at Kay
Moor does not matter for our purposes. What is important is that the Kay Moor mine
experienced a similar evolution as did Peerless. Both companies either failed to
mechanize in a timely manner or did not mechanize at all. With the tight markets that
the coal industry faced throughout the 1950s, these two companies could not decrease
the cost of production enough in order to stay competitive. As a result, both companies
closed their mines in the early 1960s.57
The decline of markets for coal and the mechanization of the industry had a
significant impact on McDowell County. The competition with oil and gas led to a
consolidation of the coal industry, and an effort in the surviving mines to decrease costs
through mechanization. Both circumstances created a situation where fewer miners
were needed to meet the demand for coal. This is particularly important in McDowell
because of the lack of diversity in the county’s economy. Once the available coal jobs
decreased, the job market in the county constricted to a point not seen before.
The contraction of the job market in McDowell County developed in two ways.
First, during the 1950s the job loss in the county was not accompanied by a
corresponding decline in the number of mining operations. In 1950 the unemployment
rate in McDowell County was about 6.0 percent. Throughout the 1950s the continued
mechanization of the mines of the county resulted in a significant rise in the
unemployment rate. In 1950 1,557 people were without a job. At first glance this
statistic does not seem to be indicative of an economic decline in the county; but, when
the number of workers in the labor force, only 16,789, is taken into account, it is clear
57
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that something occurred in McDowell County to explain such a rise in the
unemployment rate (about 10.2 percent). Mechanization and a lack of economic
diversity are the primary reasons for such a drastic decline in the employment prospects
in the county. The coal industry employed about 75 percent of McDowell workers in
1950. Although the percentage of people employed by the mining industry declined to
a little under 50 percent in 1960, the industry still was the largest employer in the
county. With the drastic decline in mining employment during the decade, along with
the increase in mining operations, the only explanation that makes sense is
mechanization. Increased competition and the decline of markets did not lead to a
contraction in the county’s industry during the 1950s. The 1960s, however, would be
an entirely different example.58
Employment prospects during the 1960s improved slightly as the
unemployment rate fell to about 8.0 percent. Yet, the number of individuals in the
county’s labor force continued to fall precipitously. In the twenty-year period from
1950 to 1970, the number of persons in the labor force fell significantly, as did mining
employment. The 1960s can be considered a decade of contraction, as mine after mine
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closed. In addition to Peerless, over one hundred other mining operations shut their
doors during the decade.59
During the post-World War II era, McDowell County began to undergo the
process of deindustrialization. In contrast to the process of deindustrialization in the
industrial Midwest, where plants closed as management transferred production to
places with lower labor and production costs, deindustrialization in McDowell County,
and Central Appalachia as a whole, was characterized by two points, mechanization
and competition in the energy markets. Because the primary industry in McDowell
County was coal, a natural resource, management did not have the option of moving
production to other areas. The only way to decrease the costs of production was to
replace large numbers of miners with machines. Otherwise, if a mine ceased to be
profitable, the coal company was forced to shut down the operation. Both strategies
were used by the companies and the end result was a drastic decline in the number of
jobs available in the county’s coal industry. Before we explore the effects of
deindustrialization on the inhabitants of McDowell, one other question must be
answered. Because McDowell County was so heavily unionized, particularly after the
1930s, what role did the UMWA play in the mechanization process? With so many
union members affected by the decline in available jobs in the industry, it is important
to explain why the union was unable or unwilling to protect their jobs. Without the
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institutional support of the union, McDowell’s miners were only struggling against the
tide of “progress.”
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Chapter 4
“American Standards?” The Union and Deindustrialization
In late 1959, John L. Lewis sat down with a reporter from U.S. News and World
Report to reflect on his accomplishments as president of the United Mine Workers of
America (UMWA). Lewis responded to questions on numerous issues, including
union-management relations, mechanization, and the miners’ standard of living. As
expected, Lewis spoke in glowing terms of his record. When asked about union
cooperation with management, Lewis stated, “The United Mine Workers not only
cooperates with the operators on that—we invented the policy. We’ve encouraged the
leading companies in the industry to resort to modernization in order to increase the
living standards of the miner and improve his working conditions.”1 With the
“progress” achieved by Lewis in the 1950s, there was some attrition within the
industry. Lewis understood this fact and downplayed the significance of job losses
within the coal industry. He stated that “there are pensions for those above sixty years
of age. The younger men go by the tens of thousands into other industries to get jobs.
Some of the older men stay in the area and manage to get along with the help of
relatives….There is public assistance and Social Security assistance in some cases.”2
To Lewis, the job losses within the coal industry were worth the improved standard of
living enjoyed by the miners who continued to work in the mines.
The miner who fifty-five years ago lived in poverty now lives like an ordinary
citizen. He is a respectable member of the community. He lives in a modern
house, with carpets and rugs. He has a bathroom, TV and every electrical
gadget to make household work easier for his wife. His child goes to school.
1
2

U.S. News and World Report, 9 November 1959.
Ibid.
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He can often afford to send him to college. No young man in a mining
community now has to go into the mines to work without getting a high school
education, as formerly happened….It’s true there aren’t as many miners. But
those young men who have been absorbed in other industries are better off than
working in a coal mine underground.”3
To a certain extent, what Lewis said was true. The wage increases and benefits
from the Welfare and Retirement Fund did allow working miners a better life. Yet,
there were many unemployed miners who found it difficult to adjust without a job. A
sense of desperation overtook many of the coal towns throughout McDowell County
and the entire Appalachian region. The union, the savior of the miners, failed to
support its members who found themselves displaced by machines. From the early
years of the twentieth century, the union supported the operators in their effort to
mechanize. John L. Lewis, the primary figure in UMWA history, continued this policy.
As outlined in his work, The Miners’ Fight for American Standards, Lewis believed
that mechanization was absolutely necessary to stabilize the industry and improve the
lives of mine workers. Lewis held this view throughout his forty-year presidency of the
union. With the 1950 contract, Lewis was able to use his support of mechanization to
gain operator approval for a Welfare and Retirement Fund that provided health and
pension benefits for workers. Mechanization was a process within the coal industry
that the union probably could not have stopped. The Fund, however, represented the
perfect opportunity to soften the effects of unemployment and to provide the workers of
McDowell County some hope. The UMWA could have provided assistance in
relocation or job retraining, but it failed to ask for royalty payments high enough to

3
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provide consistent benefits to working miners, much less unemployed workers. As a
result, the UMWA failed all of its members.
Although Lewis’s vision of the coal industry was not brought to fruition until
the 1950s, the UMWA as an organization supported the principle of technological
advancement within the coal industry from the earliest days of the twentieth century. In
every era, the union’s position on mechanization was influenced by the economic
forces of the day. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the coal
industry experienced significant growth. National coal production increased from 212
million tons in 1900 to 569 million tons in 1920. Consequently, employment grew by a
similar margin during the same period. Coal is, however, an industry characterized by
boom-and-bust cycles, so there were several economic downturns in the industry even
during this period of long-term growth. Despite these downturns, it seemed as if the
industry would experience consistent long-term growth. During this growth period, the
union had an excellent opportunity to fight for policies on mechanization beneficial to
the membership of the UMWA. The leadership did not, however, hesitate in
announcing their unabashed support for mechanization. Keith Dix, in his important
work, What’s a Coal Miner to Do?, suggests that the leadership was so focused on
gaining recognition that it feared any opposition to technology might be interpreted as
union intransigence. In an era where public and operator approval were critical to
establish union credibility, the union could not be seen as standing in the way of
“progress.”4
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There were mixed signals coming from the miners’ camp, however. During the
earliest days of mechanization, the union sought to ensure all members could earn
about the same annual wage. Mechanization complicated the situation because miners
were paid by the ton. A miner working with a cutting machine could produce coal at a
higher rate, so consistent tonnage rates resulted in a major discrepancy in wages. To
reach the goal of consistency in wages throughout the industry, the union had to ask for
higher tonnage rates for pick miners, which was difficult for the mines to achieve.5
There were other reasons for opposing machinery. In 1897, the UMW Journal
discussed the potential use of machinery within the coal industry. The author’s opinion
was ahead of its time, and would become increasingly important as companies
implemented new technologies during the twentieth century. The biggest problem,
according to the author, was the physical impact the new machinery would have on the
miner. Miners would have a difficult time keeping pace with the undercutting machine
and over-exertion would result. Furthermore, inhaling “several cubic feet per minute of
powder smoke, diluted with machine mining dust and deleterious gasses…is going to
tell on rising generations.”6 In 1901, the U.S. Industrial Commission declared
machinery “the natural enemy of the coal miners, it destroys the value of their skill and
experience, obliterates their trade and reduces them to the ranks of common laborers.”7
Moreover, machinery increased the danger of falling rock, and economic issues,
5
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particularly contracts that limited the number of loaders to each machine and the
amount each person could load, created significant bitterness among many miners.8
Despite the increased opposition to mechanization from miners of the early
twentieth century, some workers clearly believed that technological advancement
within the coal industry would improve their standard of living. Loading machines of
the day tended to make the work a little easier and had the potential to shorten the
workday. Consequently, miners had more time to spend with their families and
participate in other leisure activities. The only official position the UMWA held on
technology was that workers should receive some of the financial windfall from
technological expansion. As profits for the companies increased, the UMWA held,
worker wages should move upward as well. The person primarily responsible for the
union’s early policy on mechanization was UMWA president John Mitchell.9
As president of the union during the first decade of the twentieth century, John
Mitchell presided over one of the largest expansion periods in UMWA history. Under
his leadership, union membership grew ten times, operators in the South signed union
contracts for the first time, and the union organized the anthracite miners in 1902. At
that point, the UMWA was the largest union in the country, with a membership of
330,000.10 Mitchell brought the success that characterized the union during this era
into his relationships with the members of the union, and as a consequence enjoyed
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widespread popularity and support for his policies. Nevertheless, he had his critics.
Socialists within the union, for example, criticized Mitchell for his conservative
policies and business unionism.11 Radicals insisted that he was wrong on many of the
important issues of the day, particularly industrial unionism, the organization of
workers based on industry rather than craft. Conservatism in the leadership was
important, according to Mitchell, because using conciliation and arbitration to settle
disputes was important in establishing a good relationship with employers. These
policies were more realistic and, therefore, more appropriate for solving the problems
faced by the miners. For conciliation to work, however, the union and its workers had
to cooperate with business and show respect for the labor agreement. Thus, Mitchell
opposed all wildcat strikes. Mitchell also joined the National Civic Federation, a top
business organization and prohibited political discussion in the United Mine Workers
Journal, supporting the American Federation of Labor’s official nonpartisan policy.12
Mitchell brought his conservatism to union policy on mechanization. In his
1903 work, Organized Labor, Its Problems, Purposes and Ideals and the Present and
Future of American Wage Earners, Mitchell fully explained his, and the union’s,
philosophy on machinery.
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The unionists believe that machinery should be introduced with the least possible
friction and the least possible hardships to individuals. When the employer is
asked to increase wages or reduce hours, he frequently asks for an interval of a
certain time in order to allow him to accommodate himself to the change, and the
labor unions are now beginning to recognize the necessity of making great
changes in industrial conditions by slow degrees. An equal duty should rest upon
the employer to make alterations gradually, so as to extend the effect of the
change over a series of years, and thus permit the workmen to accommodate
themselves to the new condition.13
Mitchell defended the union movement against business criticism that unions usually
obstructed technological advancement. He noted that there had been past union
opposition to mechanization, but “at the present time all but a small minority of
workmen are converted to the view that machinery is a necessity, to which it is foolish
and unwise, if not impossible, to offer permanent resistance.”14
Despite his belief that technological advancement was necessary, Mitchell
recognized that there were negative consequences of mechanization. For Mitchell,
leading the union during a period of great craft and skill within the coal industry, the
most negative aspects of technology were the decline in employment caused by the new
machines and the loss of traditional craft positions. The primary impact of machines
was that “in hundreds of thousands of cases the machine drove the man from his work
and in many instances substituted for patiently and painfully acquired skill the services
of an untrained laborer, of a little boy or girl.”15 Despite the potentially negative
consequences of mechanization, Mitchell recognized the futility of resistance.
13

John Mitchell, Organized Labor (Philadelphia: American Book and Bible House, 1903), 249-250;
Morton S. Baratz, The Union and the Coal Industry, Reprint edition (New York: Kennikat Press, 1973),
53.
14

Mitchell, Organized Labor, 247, 253.

15

Ibid., 248.

127

Improved technology is a natural phenomenon in a capitalistic economy, and Mitchell
understood this fact. Mitchell argued that any obstruction of the introduction of
machinery would cause operators “to send the new machines into non-union
establishments, and by means of competition of the new with the old, of the better with
the worse methods of production gradually to lower and reduce the union scale.”16 In
an era characterized by the union’s struggle for legitimacy, Mitchell cannot be faulted
for his practical stand on mechanization.17
Even though he was not against mechanization, Mitchell demanded that new
technology be implemented within a union framework designed to protect members’
interests. “While there can be no doubt that the sudden introduction of machines often
works great hardship to working men, the method of securing redress is not by fighting
the machine but by obtaining control over it.”18 For Mitchell, control meant keeping
bargaining rights and control over new jobs which may be created as a result of the new
technology. Furthermore, in order to protect the livelihoods of the workers who would
continue to mine coal after the implementation of new machinery, mechanization must
evolve within a union setting. “Where trade unions do not exist, employers with the
worst and oldest machinery and the most antiquated methods manage to eke out a
precarious existence by underpaying and starving their workmen, but where trade
unionism is able to enforce a definite maximum wage, these less skillful and less
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adequately equipped manufacturers must either introduce the modern appliances or go
to the wall.”19
Although Mitchell spoke of the impact of mechanization within the framework
of his business unionism, he failed to consider one very important fact. He dealt with
the job losses that could occur as a result of mechanization, but he did not discuss the
private and social costs of any unemployment that might result from the introduction of
machinery in the coal industry. Mitchell, through his narrow business unionism that
was so common during the early twentieth century, only saw the employer-employee
relationship as an essentially cooperative one. Therefore, issues such as mechanization,
if the union focused only on narrow concerns such as wages and working conditions,
could be used to benefit the employee, as well as the employer. Since the social and
economic costs of mechanization did not affect current workers, the problem was
outside the scope of business unionism. Dealing with the social issues stemming from
mechanization would have committed the union to social change, which could, in the
union philosophy of the day, deflect attention from the more important matters such as
union recognition, wages, and working conditions.20
The union presidents who followed Mitchell continued his policy on
mechanization. John White, in a speech to the Northwestern Coal Dealers’ Association
in 1911, noted ‘“some day the machine may prove a blessing instead of an evil to the
miners, but that will be when a more equitable system of distribution [of profit] is
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adopted.’”21 In 1916, White used the increasing productivity of mines that had
mechanized as the basis for his call for a shorter workday. At the end of World War I,
the union clarified its position in The Case of the Bituminous Coal Mine Workers. In
this work, the UMWA noted that the support of mechanization was a safety issue. The
more productive a mine became, the less time miners had to work at the face, therefore
the risk of injury or death from mine accidents declined significantly. Also, the belief
that mechanization would aid the industry by consolidation and increasing profits for
operators was further developed. The industry needed ‘“the establishment of such
modern standards that the operator must either equip his mine and operate it efficiently
or go out of business.”’22
During the presidential administrations of John Mitchell and John White, the
UMWA developed a coherent policy on mechanization: Technological improvement in
the coal industry was inevitable and the union would not actively oppose
mechanization. As long as mechanization occurred within a union framework, it could
benefit both the operators and miners. Furthermore, both Mitchell and White
developed the view that mechanization would lead to the stabilization of the coal
industry by forcing small, marginal operations either to invest in machinery or to go out
of business. The ideas promulgated by Mitchell are particularly important because of
their influence on John L. Lewis. Lewis, who was president of the UMWA for forty
years, oversaw the period of greatest technological and social change within the coal
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industry. Lewis’s philosophy would drive the union’s position on technology long after
his presidency was over.
John L. Lewis, the central figure in the history of the UMWA, was born in 1880
near Lucas, Iowa. The son of a miner, as a child Lewis saw many of the problems
faced by miners. As an adult, Lewis began his meteoric rise through the union ranks in
the Illinois coalfields. As a local president and lobbyist at the Illinois legislature, Lewis
was quickly recognized as a rising star in organized labor. Samuel Gompers, president
of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), offered Lewis a position as an organizer
for the AFL. Through his work with the AFL, Lewis caught the eye of John White,
who brought Lewis back to the UMWA in 1917. When John White resigned to take a
position with the Fuel Administration, catapulting Vice-President Frank Hayes to the
union presidency, Lewis, at Hayes’ request, was appointed vice-president of the
UMWA. During 1918 and 1919, Hayes fell ill and, on January 1, 1920, he resigned.
John L. Lewis thus became the president of the UMWA, a post he held until 1960.23
During the World War I period, a movement grew within the UMWA
advocating that the industry’s problems could be alleviated by the nationalization of the
mines. This belief was rooted in the socialist influence within the union prior to the
war. Frank Hayes, whose brief presidency bridged the presidencies of White and
Lewis, was an Illinois socialist who supported the nationalization movement. In 1919,
Hayes called a National Policy Committee Meeting where, among other things, he
proposed a nationalization plan that the committee accepted. There were several
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reasons for Hayes’ support for nationalization. First, Hayes saw his proposal as a move
of solidarity in support of British coal miners who, at the time, were advocating
nationalization of British coal mines. Second, he believed the Fuel Administration,
which had stabilized the industry during the war, proved that government could serve a
positive role in the economy. Third, Hayes, and others on the policy committee,
thought that government ownership of the mines would lead to the elimination of
geographic wage differentials, the reduction of the work-day and week to spread the
available work around, and wage increases to protect the miners against inflation.24
There were several weaknesses in Hayes’ vision of nationalization. First, he did
not have an implementation plan for nationalization. Second, Hayes did not deal with
many important details, including mechanization. But Hayes did not remain in office
long enough to work out many of these details. By early 1920, Hayes had resigned and
Lewis, who was particularly hostile to the idea of nationalization, became UMWA
president. Although he publicly supported nationalization at times, privately Lewis
would not support the movement and worked to destroy it by neglecting to carry out
resolutions and taking advantage of the post-World War I red scare to publicly discredit
union liberals and socialists. Despite Lewis’s opposition to nationalization, the
movement refused to die during the early 1920s. Led by John Brophy, president of
UMWA District 5, progressives offered a plan for nationalization in their 1922
pamphlet How to Run Coal: Suggestions for a Plan of Public Ownership, Public
Control, and Democratic Management in the Coal Industry. The Nationalization
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Research Committee, which was headed by Brophy and appointed by Lewis, dealt with
the legal questions of government ownership, including the cost and policymaking
issues. With the depression faced by the coal industry during the 1920s, it seemed that
nationalization was needed to provide stabilization to the industry.25
Although Lewis felt the need to support publicly the nationalization movement
in the early 1920s because of the internal politics of the UMWA, his conservative
business-unionism would not allow him to privately advocate such a move. By the
mid-1920s, Lewis had solidified his control over the union and was more able to
distance himself from the nationalization movement. Lewis primarily used the UMWA
Journal and its editor, Ellis Searles, as his mouthpieces on the issue. In May 1923, a
New York newspaper reporter interviewed Searles. In this interview, Searles outlined
Lewis’s policy for promoting stability in the coal industry: “Shut down 4,000 coal
mines, force 200,000 miners into other industries, and the coal problem will settle itself.
The public will then be assured of an adequate supply of low-priced fuel.”26 To Lewis,
nationalization was not a responsible plan to stabilize the coal industry. Lewis did
more than just use the Journal to further his own ideas; he used it to defuse the
nationalization movement that was so popular among the rank-and-file. For example,
Lewis refused to publicize the Nationalization Research Committee’s plan in the
Journal and would not allow debate on the issue. Furthermore, after the discussion of
25
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nationalization by one committee member during a New York speech, Searles criticized
him in the Journal for discussing a plan that had not been approved by the union and
had been “prepared largely by a bunch of Greenwich Village Reds.”27 After this attack
on the committee’s work, the members resigned and nationalization research was ended
by the UMWA. The 1924 UMWA convention adopted another resolution calling for
the nationalization of the coal mines; however, the resolution had no teeth without the
support of the Lewis administration. John Brophy wrote, “the resolution was adopted,
but the national organization made no effort whatever to translate its pious generalities
into activity. It was not intended, by the administration, to be a plan for further
education and research, but rather as an epitaph over the grave of the nationalization
idea. I kept hoping that we could reform our lives and resume the campaign, but that
hope was never realized.”28
Lewis’s intransigence on nationalization can be seen by analyzing his 1925
book, The Miners’ Fight for American Standards. In this work, Lewis not only
discussed the union’s fight for collective bargaining, decent working conditions, and
good pay for all miners, but he also presented his plan to stabilize the coal industry,
which was in the midst of an economic downturn caused by overproduction and excess
capacity. In slight contrast to earlier union presidents, Lewis insisted that
mechanization was the key to future stabilization of the coal industry. The book
outlined Lewis’s basic, conservative political and economic philosophies. He brushed
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off the nationalization movement, rejected government control of the nation’s coal
mines, and supported “the operation of natural economic laws to bring about a
permanent improvement.”29 He went on to say that “the policy of the United Mine
Workers of America at this time is neither new nor revolutionary. It does not command
the admiration of visionaries and Utopians. It ought to have the support of every
thinking business man in the United States, because it proposes to allow natural
economic laws free play in the production and distribution of coal.”30
Lewis also hoped to use his work to change the perception of the UMWA and
himself. Lewis wrote as if he spoke for the entire union; in effect, Lewis sought to
create the perception that he had centralized power within the UMWA. This, of course,
was not necessarily true. John Brophy, for example, gave Lewis a relatively tough race
for the union presidency in 1926. Brophy sought to make nationalization the primary
issue in that election. Lewis won the election; however, there is evidence that some
fraud took place in Lewis’s favor. After 1926, Lewis was never again seriously
challenged for the presidency of the UMWA, thus completing the consolidation of his
power. Another reason for his writing the book was to change the public perception of
the UMWA. The union had been attacked during the investigation of the President’s
Coal Commission in 1923 and had little public support because of the refusal of the
union to make wage concessions under the Jacksonville Agreement. Lewis justified the
union’s policy of not making wage concessions by arguing that higher wages served
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two purposes. First, high wages led to greater purchasing power for miners, he argued,
and “mass production can only be maintained by a purchasing power in the home
market sufficient to make it possible.”31 Second, he believed that high wages would
lead to increased mechanization in the mines and would drive out marginal producers
who perpetuated “obsolete methods.”32
The crux of the Lewis plan for industrial stabilization rested on the belief that if
the UMWA succeeded in holding the line on wages, then the high labor costs would
force mine operators to install machinery in an effort to remain competitive. In this
way, union operators would lower their cost of production and drive out of business
mines which were less efficient and, most likely, non-union. The decline in the number
of mines would also help the industry as a whole by confronting the problem of
overexpansion and excess capacity. By cutting into the overall production of the
industry, mechanization would potentially bring the industry’s capacity more in line
with costumer demand. Lewis also believed that stabilization of the industry could
only be achieved by organizing all coal miners. Lewis declared that, “every car of
Non-union coal at present represents an intrusion into the general industrial system of a
malignant influence; because this coal could not be produced and sold, as it is now,
without the denial of American rights in the mines from whence it comes and without
an uneconomic system of railroad favoritism to boost it to market.”33
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Another important component of Lewis’s plan for the stabilization of the coal
industry revolved around wage levels. Lewis insisted that the tonnage system of
payment, in which companies paid miners by the amount of coal they mined, should be
replaced by a time-payment system, whether by the hour or by the day. A uniform
daily wage would serve the same role as mechanization would. A uniform wage
would, in Lewis’s mind, raising the labor costs per unit for inefficient mines with low
productivity, would eventually force these mines, which were a drag on the industry,
out of business. Lewis also contended that a uniform wage would lead to labor
harmony within the coal industry, as many strikes started as a result of local disputes
caused by the piecework system, and that these local strikes would decline significantly
by the shift to a daily wage. Another important component to Lewis’s plan was the
elimination of regional wage differences. The vast differences in pay rates between the
different coal-mining regions tended to keep too many inefficient mines, particularly
non-union mines, open. Lewis consistently supported his wage policy and, eventually,
his policy became the union’s policy with the centralization of the power of the
UMWA president. Morton Baratz claimed in 1955, “The union’s current [wage]
strategy is easy to describe. By raising wage rates (and labor costs per ton) and by
eliminating regional wage-rate differentials, heavy pressure to mechanize will be
brought to bear on all firms, especially the relatively high-cost operations….The
increased use of machines will enable the union to exact even higher wage rates or
shorter hours or both. Higher wage rates encourage mechanization which, in turn,
permits still higher wage rates.”34
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During the late 1920s, however, economic and labor conditions forced Lewis to
back off of his high-wage position in order to consolidate his control over the union.
Facing pressure from nonunion coal mines, the rank-and-file in Illinois and Ohio
pressured Lewis to allow district unions to negotiate local wage rates. Lewis thought
that backing off of his high-wage policy would be a mistake, because a high wage rate
would force larger coal operators to implement machinery to cut down on labor costs
and force smaller firms out of business. Historian Keith Dix argues that this policy
may have worked had the union succeeded in its effort to organize the entire industry in
order to impose a uniform national wage. Furthermore, had Lewis been able to combat
local control the union would have succeeded in negotiating a wage scale for machine
operators and in eliminating limitations on the use of machinery. Because of the
economic depression in the coal industry during the 1920s, Lewis failed on both counts.
In order to protect his hard-fought control of the UMWA, Lewis gave in to the
pressures of the rank-and-file.35
For numerous reasons, Lewis failed in his effort to effect true consolidation
within the coal industry. Formed during the depressed years of the 1920s and 1930s,
Lewis’s program of consolidation and mechanization could not be thrust to the top of
the union’s agenda. With the New Deal’s protection of workers’ rights to bargain
collectively under the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Wagner Act, the
UMWA was in a stronger political position. With the start of World War II, the
material needs of the country forced the nation’s mines to mechanize in order to keep
up with demand. After the war, the union was in a more stable position and could use
35
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its mechanization policy to work with the operators and, at the same time, improve the
lives of the union’s members.
Although World War II brought an improvement in the fortunes of the coal
industry, some analysts, including Lewis, recognized that the industry was in a longterm decline that reached back to the 1920s. Lewis knew as early as 1945 that, because
of the expectation for another post-war depression, the coal industry could not afford to
employ as many workers as it had during the war. As a result of this realization, along
with his natural support for mechanization policy, Lewis accepted, if not welcomed, the
loss of jobs and union members that naturally result from mechanization. Lewis was
not willing, however, to allow companies to mechanize without just compensation for
the members of the union. Lewis contended that the miners should not only be paid
well, but future contracts should establish a new benefit plan for union miners. This
benefit package, later known as the Fund, would, as Curtis Seltzer puts it, “shape coal
politics for the next thirty years.”36
The call for a health plan was particularly important because prior to 1945,
union miners had only sporadic health coverage and no pensions. Still in use in many
mining towns was the company doctor system. Mine operators developed the company
doctor system during the earliest days of the coal industry to provide health care for
their workers. Paying a monthly fee to the company, miners and their families called
upon the doctors whenever the need arose. The inherent problem with this paternalistic
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institution was the doctor being a company employee who could be used as an
instrument of exploitation, namely as a labor spy. Although there were many fine
company doctors, in many towns the doctors provided substandard care at best. There
was also little freedom for the miners. It was almost impossible for miners to go to
doctors other than the company’s because this would require the miner to travel to an
independent town within the area. The very nature of the company town system,
therefore, prompted miners to demand control over their health care.37
The unusual prosperity of the immediate post-war period allowed Lewis and the
UMWA the opportunity to fight for a benefit plan in 1945. Lewis recognized that the
strong performance of the industry would not last; therefore, time was of the essence.
If the UMWA was to win a benefit package for its miners, the principle would have to
be established during a period of prosperity. Otherwise, before long the coal companies
would be able to cite economic conditions as an excuse not to provide benefits to union
miners.38
Despite the ideal economic conditions that existed within the coal industry in
1945, Lewis was initially unable to secure acceptance of the benefit plan. The fight
over the benefit package took place in several rounds of collective bargaining after
1945. Two issues surfaced after Lewis proposed an industrial health plan in the spring
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of 1945, the cost and quality of the benefits for the miners, and who would control the
operations of the plan. Lewis proposed that the union control the health plan and that
the plan be financed by a nickel-per-ton royalty on all union-mined coal. Although the
coal industry was enjoying a period of prosperity in 1945, the mine operators still
rejected all union demands that would increase costs. When Labor Secretary Francis
Perkins supported the mine operators, Lewis realized that the situation was not
conducive for a successful conclusion so he signed a contract that did not include a
health plan.39
A year later during contract negotiations, Lewis once again brought up the issue
of a health plan. The 1946 proposal included hospital and medical services, life and
medical insurance, and rehabilitation for injured miners, among other benefits.
Interestingly enough, pensions were not a part of Lewis’s early proposals. The 1946
plan would be financed by the operators through a 7 percent payroll tax, with the union
managing all of the finances and programs of the plan.40 Seltzer notes that the
difference between financing the plan through a tonnage royalty or a payroll tax was
extremely important.
A tonnage tax tied benefits to the level of unionized production. That link gave
Lewis an incentive to promote mechanization, which promised to boost
production. A payroll tax, on the other hand, tied benefits to the number of
working miners and their wage scale. Depending on how it was calculated, a
payroll tax could act as a drag on mechanization. In 1945, Lewis argued that
the Fund should be financed by a tonnage royalty; in 1946, he switched to a
payroll tax. He would reverse himself one final time.41
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Once again, the operators refused to negotiate with Lewis in 1946 and, unlike
1945, the union called for a strike. About 340,000 coal miners walked off the job in an
attempt to win acceptance of the proposed welfare plan. The scale of this strike was so
immense that the federal government began to pressure both sides to settle the dispute,
and the coal operators agreed in principle to a health and retirement plan. Negotiators
for the industry argued that the Fund should be operated jointly, but Lewis resisted this
proposal insisting that companies could then veto the programs of the Fund. Once
again, animosity between the union and operators over the health plan led to deadlock
as the companies repudiated their earlier agreement with the union. The industry
declared that the payroll tax was the sticking point in the negotiations and, once again,
the deadlock forced the federal government to get involved in the dispute.42
President Harry S. Truman knew that it was critical to keep the mines open
because coal fueled the American economy. Therefore, on May 22, 1946, the president
ordered Julius A. Krug, the Secretary of the Interior, to seize American mines affected
by the strike. In this instance, however, seizure did not mean ownership of the mines
by the federal government. Instead, the federal government would administer the
mines and hold all profits in escrow until the government returned the mines to the
owners. There were both economic and political reasons for this action. Secretary
Krug was not particularly worried about preserving all the privileges coal operators had
enjoyed during the war, but rather the affect a coal shortage on the post-war economy.
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Furthermore, 1946 was a mid-term election year and Krug found it beneficial to
negotiate a settlement with Lewis as quickly as possible.43
The contract signed between the federal government and the UMWA was an
important victory for John L. Lewis. The union won a wage increase of 18.5 cents per
hour, but that was not the most important feature of the 1946 contract. Secretary Krug
also agreed to two separate welfare funds, one each for pensions and health care, which
would be financed by a nickel-per-ton royalty for each. The pension plan would be
administered by a committee of three trustees. The industry and union would each
appoint one member of the committee and the two groups together would appoint the
third trustee. Particularly important to Lewis was the agreement on the health care
program. The contract stated that the health plan would be run by three trustees; all
three trustees would be union appointees, bringing to fruition the original union
proposal on the Fund.44
The importance of the federal seizure of the nation’s coal mines in 1946 is that
the contract signed between Secretary Krug and John L. Lewis set the precedent for a
later agreement with the operators containing the Fund provisions. In 1947, the
companies and the UMWA signed a contract containing most of the terms from the
federally-negotiated contract of the previous year. The agreement merged the two
separate pension and health care plans into one single Welfare and Retirement Fund.
The Fund would be financed by a ten-cent per ton tax and jointly administered by a
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three-member board, much like the earlier pension plan. This was a fateful agreement,
however. The Fund’s income depended on the productivity of the industry, not on the
number of workers. As a result, the union had an even larger incentive to support the
mechanization of the mines. Actually, downsizing would aid those miners who could
survive the attrition. With fewer employees, workers would enjoy better medical care
and larger pensions. There were problems other than simple job loss, however.
Because coal production financed the Fund, there formed a real interest in minimizing
anything that could hinder production. As a result, Fund trustees saw occupational
health and safety as constraints on production, and little was done on either during the
1950s and 1960s. One final result of the Fund’s reliance on tonnage royalties was the
partnership that developed between Lewis and the coal industry during the 1950s.
Cooperation between labor and capital is not necessarily a negative development;
however, the partnership between the UMWA and the coal operators did not support
the rank-and-file very well.45
Although a very close relationship eventually developed between John L. Lewis
and the coal operators, Lewis had to fight a continuous battle between 1947 and 1950 to
force the operators to meet their obligations to the Fund. The two parties deadlocked
over a proposed pension. The operators’ trustee sued multiple times in an attempt to
put an end to the Fund. There developed a pattern of strikes and injunctions. In 1948,
the contract continued the Fund, but the coal industry found itself at the beginning of
another downturn. Poor business forced the industry to battle Lewis once again over
the royalty. In 1949, operators decided to stop paying the tax and, as a result, the Fund
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went bankrupt. Labor relations between the union and industry were at a low ebb in
1949. Combined with falling demand for coal, the problems within the industry
eventually forced both sides to rethink their relationship, which they did in the Spring
of 1950.46
In addition to the inherent economic problems associated with coal, the primary
problem facing the bituminous coal industry during the late 1940s was the lack of
leadership. There were too many bituminous coal companies, and those companies
could not agree on a common course of action in regard to labor relations.47 Lewis
himself recognized the problems created by the lack of leadership in unionmanagement negotiations. An article in Fortune noted:
When asked…what the major difficulty was in collective bargaining, Lewis
replied: ‘In one sentence…the lack of leadership among those with whom we
deal….If you were to ask me today who could speak for the industry on any
suggested idea that would be constructive in itself for the industry, I would say
very frankly that there are no such men.’48
Lewis was not the only industry insider to notice the need for strong, unified
leadership among the coal operators. The largest operators in the bituminous coal
industry realized that the industry needed a new framework for collective bargaining.
By 1949 a small group of operators, most likely led by Consolidation Coal and U.S.
Steel, got together “to do some long range thinking,” recollected Harry M. Moses of
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U.S. Steel in 1955.49 This group sought to achieve industry stability without the need
for federal intervention. To meet this goal, the operators would pursue summit
diplomacy with Lewis. They also approved the appointment of George Love of
Pittsburgh-Consolidation Coal to negotiate and restructure the relationship between
capital and labor in the bituminous coal industry.50
Love became powerful within the bituminous coal industry because of his
position as president of Pitt-Consol, which was the most powerful coal company in the
country. Love was able to forge an alliance between two of the three main groups of
coal companies, the northern operators and the captive mines.51 From this alliance
sprung a new group, the Bituminous Coal Operators’ Association (BCOA) in 1950. It
became clear soon after its formation that the BCOA intended to control the costs of
labor throughout the industry.52
Love had three goals in the initial negotiations with the UMWA. He wanted a
“new stable and binding contract…that neither party have the right to cancel or
suspend…during the intervening two and one half year period.”53 Love’s second goal
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was to eliminate the right for the union to strike at will, which would be the most
difficult goal to meet. The third goal was to continue the royalty payment to the
welfare fund but that payments should only go to miners who worked for the
companies that contributed to the Fund. Furthermore, if the union would guarantee
labor peace and work to keep labor costs in check, the BCOA would allow Lewis to
control the welfare fund.54
Although it would have been difficult to get Lewis to give up the right of the
union to strike under normal circumstances, the federal courts gave Love the upper
hand in the negotiation process. After Lewis had organized a walkout on February 11,
1950 in response to a ten-day federal court injunction barring strikes under the TaftHartley Act, the courts served the UMWA with a contempt citation for continuing the
stoppage. After the government asked for a permanent injunction, Judge R.B. Kleech
issued a ruling that stopped the union from asking for certain non-wage provisions to be
written into the contract, including the demand for “a closed or union shop, limitation
of the benefits of the welfare fund to union members, the ‘able and willing’ clause, or
the right to stop work during ‘memorial periods.’”55 It seemed that this ruling forced
Lewis to give up the right to strike. However, the union never appealed the judge’s
ruling. Lewis recognized that the industry was changing and that strikes would serve
no purpose in a period of long-term decline in demand. Instead, Lewis announced a
thirteen-point list of demands, which included:
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a guaranteed annual wage based on 200 working days; 7 ½ hour work day,
portal- to-portal; an increase in the basic wage from $14.05 to $15.50 a day…;
an increase in the welfare-fund payment from 20 cents to 35 cents a ton; a new
board of trustees for the fund, with the guarantee that the operators would
cooperate with the union and its welfare program; abandonment by the
operators of all lawsuits against the union, now totaling millions of dollars.56
It was clear, however, that these demands were negotiable. As noted in the UMWA
Journal after the negotiations were concluded, “the UMWA had proposed to negotiate
a contract without any previous commitments in nay way, shape or form on either the
economic or controversial legal issues, such as the union shop.”57
Despite the union’s being in a disadvantageous situation as a result of Judge
Kleech’s ruling, Love needed Lewis to remain active in industry affairs, if any solution
to the industry’s long-term problems were to be found. It was no longer in the interest
of the bituminous coal industry to break the UMWA, as it had been in previous years.
Breaking the union would lead to instability in the form of local strikes and increased
price competition resulting from the lack of consistent union wage scales. The end
result would then be a drastic decline in profits. To Love, the better approach was to
form a strong business relationship with Lewis and the UMWA in an effort to ensure
the long-term health of the bituminous coal industry. Love noted the problems that the
industry and union needed to solve in a speech to the Edison Electric Institute on June
7, 1950. According to Love, the issues were “(1) labor relations; (2) competition within
the industry; (3) competition from other fuels; and (4) maintaining earning ability to
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permit continued progress.”58 The capital-labor alliance would, ideally, alleviate all
four of the primary problems. Love and Lewis would be able to stabilize labor
relations through their positions of power. Through this stabilization of the industry,
the UMWA and the BCOA could enact uniform labor costs throughout the entire
bituminous coal industry. Uniform labor costs would result in consolidation as small,
inefficient operators who could not afford the higher union wage rates would be forced
out of business. Because of consolidation, only large companies that could invest in
machines would remain in business, thus increasing the productivity of the entire
industry. Finally, an alliance between Lewis and the operators would solve the final
two problems outlined by Love. Labor stability would allow large coal companies to
negotiate long-term supply contracts from big consumers only if the coal industry could
promise a predictable supply of coal at a low price. This would improve coal’s
standing in relation to other fuels and the earning ability of the coal companies which
remained in business.59
Fortune noted how important the 1950 contract was to the development of new
mining technology: “In the coal industry 1950 may be remembered as the year of the
great shakeout—and also as Year One of its technological revolution.”60 The issue was
not, however, mentioned in the language of the contract. Instead, there was an implied
understanding between Love and Lewis that the union would not fight the
mechanization of the coal mines. Of course, from the earliest days of the twentieth
58
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century the UMWA consistently noted how important mechanization was to the
stabilization of the coal industry. Love knew that this was the policy of the union, he
observed in 1950, “Lewis’s union…has one great advantage over many others. It has
never fought mechanization.”61 In fact Lewis would take all the credit for the
modernization of the industry. As he noted in 1952:
The American coal operators never could have mechanized their mines and
increased per-man-day productivity unless they were compelled to do so by the
pressure of the organization of the mineworkers….We want participation. We
ask for it. We ask for it…to compel him to modernize. Otherwise, he wouldn’t
move.62
With the most powerful leader in the history of the union supporting a policy
that would eventually lead to the loss of tens of thousands of coal mining jobs, how
would the rank and file act? At the 1952 UMWA convention, Lewis summed up the
policy for the delegates: “We stand for the usage of all modern equipment and
scientific devices and forms that will take the raw materials which God gave our people
and make them of increasing value in the marts of trade. We only ask and we will
always ask our rightful participation in that new productive efficiency.”63 It seems that
most of the rank-and-file accepted mechanization in the mines. The only concession
that they pressed the leadership for was a strong seniority clause that would provide
protection for those miners with the longest terms of service. The delegates at the
conventions did discuss different ideas that would alleviate the negative impact of job
loss, including unemployment compensation, shorter workdays to spread out the
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available work among more miners, better pensions, and health and safety issues
associated with the new machinery. Despite the delegates’ belief in the importance of
these issues, the leadership failed to press for any of them.64
For Love and Lewis, the implications of mechanization on competition within
the bituminous coal industry were clear. Fortune summed it up best: “Mechanization
is now a means of squeezing out marginal mines and thus increasing the industry’s
profitability.”65 Lewis had always seen, from the earliest days of his presidency,
mechanization as a tool to revolutionize the very structure of the coal industry.
Before the technique of the coal industry can be brought to a state
commensurate with what the nation has a right to expect, there must be a change
in the financial structure of the coal business.…It is obvious that only solvent
corporations, sufficiently financed, can undertake the improvements that the
times demand.66
The idea behind this philosophy was simple, large companies with stable markets
would be able to afford mechanization, thus driving out the small, less efficient
operators who could not implement machinery. By decreasing labor costs and
concentrating production in a select number of larger companies through the agreement
between the UMWA and the BCOA, coal would be able to hold off the competition
from the alternative fuels by remaining inexpensive and free from labor strife.67
Lewis, however, was not willing to ensure labor peace only for increased
mechanization. In return for stability, Lewis demanded higher wages and control of the
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Welfare and Retirement Fund. The BCOA agreed, as Seltzer notes, in return for the
deletion of the right-to-strike clause in the contract.68 As Coal Age summed up the
contract, “by inference the union gained control of the welfare fund and therefore
complete responsibility for its operations.”69 The problem for Lewis was financial.
Although the UMWA gained control of the Fund’s operations and finances, the union
never had enough money to fulfill all of its obligations. The contract of 1950 financed
the Fund with a 30 cent royalty on every ton of coal mined by BCOA members. The
contract further noted the Fund’s obligations:
(1)benefits to employees…, their families and dependents for medical or
hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for
injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide
any of the foregoing, or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance or
accident insurance; (2) benefits with respect to wage loss not otherwise
compensated for at all or adequately by tax supported agencies created by
federal or state law; (3) benefits on account of sickness, temporary disability,
permanent disability, death or retirement; (4) benefits for any and all other
purposes which may be specified, provided for or permitted in…the “LaborManagement Relations Act, 1947”…; and (5) benefits for all other related
welfare purposes as may be determined by the Trustees within the scope of the
Act.70
The Fund represented a new era for labor-management relations in the
bituminous coal industry. For the first time, miners had control over their own health
care, as well as pension benefits. The Fund could go much further, as well. Lewis
wanted a welfare system that would take care of miners and their families by providing
unemployment, disability, and other social welfare benefits. The trustees had the right
to choose which benefits would be paid by the Fund monies. There were endless
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choices. The Fund could have provided benefits for occupational illness that resulted
from the new machinery, notably black lung. It may have been used in a preventative
effort, such as implementing techniques and technologies to reduce the immense
amounts of coal dust that are released when the continuous miners tear the coal from
the seam. It could have been used to lessen the sting of unemployment for those
displaced by the new machinery. The Fund could have provided retraining for those
workers forced out of the coal industry. The Fund could have also been used to
diversify the economies of the coalfield regions which depended so heavily on the
industry for their economic livelihood. None of these opportunities came to pass. The
only real accomplishment was that the Fund continued to pay medical benefits for
unemployed miners for a time. But even this was not enough. That is the real tragedy
of this era in UMWA-BCOA labor relations. From the hope represented in the 1950
contract came mostly loss and despair for many miners and their communities.71
Why was the Fund unable to fulfill its original mission? The answer is quite
simple. The royalty payments outlined in the 1950 contract, as well as later
agreements, were never high enough to pay for the services necessary to bring the coal
industry into the modern era in a humanitarian way. In fact, the UMWA leadership
never asked the BCOA for a royalty that would have allowed for the full scope of
benefits. The royalty that was mandated by the contracts barely paid for the health and
pension benefits, so any supplemental benefits were out of the question. The fact that
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the union did not ask for higher royalties brings up another question. Why did the
UMWA fail to negotiate higher royalties?72
Seltzer believes there were two reasons that the UMWA leadership failed to
negotiate higher royalties for more than twenty years. First, the 1950s and 1960s was a
period of serious economic decline in the bituminous coal industry. Markets dried up
and sales became stagnant as a result of this downturn. To remain competitive and
survive the economic climate of this period, BCOA members had to maintain a very
tight control over their costs. With the increasing competitiveness of alternative fuels,
even a minimal increase in the cost of coal to the consumer could mean the loss of a
sale for the coal companies. Consequently, it is safe to say that the BCOA operators
would have resisted any increase in the royalties. There is another factor to consider in
the analysis of company resistance to higher royalties. Despite the stagnant economic
climate of the 1950s and 1960s, the bituminous coal industry’s profits rose throughout
these two decades. Therefore, the industry perhaps could have afforded an increase in
the royalties without passing on the cost to the customer. In the post-industrial period
throughout the country, however, industrial management generally resisted any policy
that cut into the profits of the company. That is the nature of capitalism; companies
driven by profit will seek to maximize those profits with little attention paid to the
humanitarian consequences of the company’s action. As a result, the BCOA operators
would have resisted any increase in the royalties even if the companies could have
afforded it because it would have resulted in a decline in the companies’ profits.73
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Second, the union leadership did not ask for a royalty increase because of a
larger phenomenon taking place in American industry at the time, the rise of business
unionism. Starting with Lewis in the late 1940s and early 1950s, union presidents
agreed with the new system of labor-capital relations, in which the union would
become an important partner for business. In this “partnership,” however, the UMWA,
and unions in other industries, would play an essentially subservient role. Unions were
content to accept higher wages and increased benefits in exchange for labor peace and a
guarantee of the status quo. For the UMWA, the leadership realized the precarious
situation facing the bituminous coal industry during the early 1950s. As a result, the
leadership believed that their own survival depended on keeping costs down and
maintaining labor peace. To do this required a partnership with the coal industry.74
The BCOA was more than happy to use Lewis for its own purposes. In his
statement about the signing of the 1950 contract, Love noted:
This 2 ½ year contract gives the industry its first real opportunity for
stability in the last decade….The operators definitely established the right to
control their own production and their mining facilities. The union asked for a
cooperative administration of the Welfare Fund and we are giving it to
them….The responsibility [for the Fund] is squarely on the shoulders of the
union and if it fails, the public and ourselves will look directly at the union.
The coal business is not a sick industry as it has been said recently. This
country is one of the very few where coal mining is still in private hands
operating under a free enterprise system. I hope that from this contract will
come such mutual understanding and we will do away with coal strikes in the
future.75
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Although Lewis had been a thorn in the side of the coal operators for many
years, his reaction was eerily similar to Love’s:
It is [a] reasonable assumption that for a substantial period of time the industry
can abate its labor warfare and apply itself, both management and labor, to the
constructive problems of producing coal in quantity for the benefit of the
American economy at the lowest possible price permitted by modern technique.
The Mine Workers stand for the investors of the industry to have a return on
their capital; they stand for the public to have coal at the lowest possible price
consistent with the right of mine workers to live a free life on the same
standards and with the same opportunities and under the same laws as other
citizens under our flag.76
Another reason for the fact that the leadership did not demand a higher royalty
in order to meet all of the Fund’s obligations was because the rank-and-file did not
pressure the leadership to do so for almost twenty years. In the early years of the
agreement, the workers who lost benefits were also those who lost their jobs. Since
these workers were no longer members of the union, there was no agitation among
those who were in a position to push for higher royalties. Furthermore, miners who
remained employed during the 1950s often felt so lucky to have a job with benefits that
they did not want to “rock their own boat.”77 However, the Fund began to drift away
from those who it was designed to serve. One major reason for this situation was the
rise of business unionism within the bituminous coal industry. As the leadership
became more closely associated with the operators, their bond with the rank-and-file
weakened. Since the union leadership controlled the Fund’s finances, the Fund began
to fail its constituents. Also, the consolidation of union power in the president, which
Lewis accomplished more than two decades before, precluded any coordinated attack
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on the Fund by the miners. If a member of the rank-and-file questioned the
administration of the Fund or its policies, that member was quieted. Through the
economic climate, the relationship with the operators, and the power enjoyed by the
union’s leadership, the rank-and-file had little voice to protest the problems with the
administration of the Fund.78
What were the problems with the administration of the Fund? Despite the
problems inherent from the fact that the union never asked for a high enough tonnage to
fulfill its mission, other problems soon developed as well. From the highest year of
national production in 1947, production consistently declined throughout the 1950s.
The declining tonnage rates put a hindrance on even the health care system and the
pensions. As a result, the declining royalty payments forced the Fund’s board of
trustees to make some very difficult decisions. The directors decided to cut benefits
and limit the number of miners who were eligible for health benefits and pensions. As
a result, miners who had been loyal to Lewis and the UMWA for many years often lost
part or all of their benefits. For example, in 1962 the directors decreed that a union
miner had to retire from a union mine in order to be eligible for a union pension. This
was a significant problem because the loss of jobs in union mines and increasing
numbers of non-union mines forced loyal union men to make a difficult decision. The
miners could either migrate, enter a non-union mine, or let their family starve. Many
men decided to enter non-union mines, thus losing their union pension.79
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Another significant problem in the administering of the Fund dealt with the
health care provided for union members. In the early 1950s, the directors of the Fund
decided to open a series of union-run hospitals to provide medical care for its members.
This was an innovative idea that would not only provide health care for the miners, but
also had the potential to improve the medical care miners and their families received.
For a very short amount of time, the hospital system worked as planned. However, the
hospitals soon ran into financial trouble. Mismanagement, combined with the decline
in royalty payments stemming from the decline in production, resulted in the hospitals
being operated at a continuous loss. Eventually, the financial situation with the
hospitals became so poor that the union sold the hospitals in 1964 at a loss of $14
million. Even after the union sold the hospitals the health care portion of the Fund
continued to fail the union’s members. The directors cut many of the benefits provided
to the miners. Doctors employed by the UMWA, in an effort to minimize strains
placed on the Fund, failed to recognize the existence of health conditions caused by the
new machinery, particularly black lung, for many years. Exacerbating the debilitating
effects of miners suffering from the disease with no hope of compensation, the failure
of union doctors to recognize black lung and other occupational diseases, further
underscores the fact that the union leadership had distanced itself from the rank-andfile.80
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John L. Lewis retired as union president in January 1960, ending one of the
most significant periods in the history of the UMWA. He was eventually succeeded by
Tony Boyle, a former Lewis associate who had very little empathy for the miners.
Although Lewis did consolidate his power within the UMWA and ruled the union as a
virtual dictator for many years, he had a true concern for the welfare of the miners.
Throughout the 1960s, numerous advocates asked Lewis to denounce Boyle for
mismanagement of Fund monies, corruption, and violence that characterized his
administration. Lewis refused to do so. Privately, however, Lewis did say that hiring
Boyle as his assistant in 1948 was “the worst mistake I ever made.”81 Consumer
advocate Ralph Nader asked Lewis shortly before his death in June 1969 to call for a
grassroots revolt against the Boyle-run union. Once again, Lewis failed to do this.
When Lewis died, he left a legacy of great success in the battle for unionization in the
1920s and 1930s, and in the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO). There was also a legacy of great failure: the lack of democracy within the
UMWA, Lewis’s turn towards collaboration, and the failure of the Fund to truly serve
the members of the UMWA.82
From the earliest days of the twentieth century, the leadership of the UMWA
consistently advocated the modernization of the coal industry through the
mechanization of the production process. This was at the center of John L. Lewis’s
plan for stabilization of the industry. Lewis argued that the best way to ensure the
continued success of the bituminous coal industry would be through unionization.
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Unionization would increase the labor costs to mine coal, which would foster
mechanization. Only large, stable companies could afford the implementation of
machinery, thus leading to consolidation of the industry as small companies either sold
out or went out of business. Mechanization was a slow process, but the union’s support
for the practice, coupled with the use of the strike, led to the 1950 agreement. With the
increased competition from other fuels and the loss of market share, members of the
BCOA believed that labor peace was crucial to the survival of the coal industry. As a
result, Lewis was able to get more benefits for his miners, under the auspices of the
Welfare and Retirement Fund.
Mechanization was an inevitable process in the coal industry. The real tragedy
of this story is not necessarily the job losses that resulted from the increased use of
technology, but the lack of support given to those who lost their jobs. The Fund
represented an opportunity to soften the sting of unemployment through providing
unemployment benefits, retraining, help with migration costs, or reinvestment in
coalfield communities long dependent on the coal industry. The directors of the Fund
provided none of these benefits. Furthermore, miners who remained employed in the
coal industry often suffered the loss of their benefits as the Fund suffered from
mismanagement and bankruptcy. Without the support of their union, miners had to
look within themselves for deliverance from the hopelessness of their situation. With
job prospects poor, folks from southern West Virginia made the conscious decision to
provide for their families by leaving the area and looking for work elsewhere.
Thousands of former miners and young families just making their way in the world left
West Virginia behind in an attempt to better their, and their children’s, lives.
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Chapter 5
You Can’t Go Home Again: Out-Migration from McDowell County
As described earlier, during World War II, McDowell County enjoyed a period
of prosperity and a quality of life not seen for a long time. The depression in coal
throughout the 1920s and 1930s made life in the coalfields precarious at best.
However, with the boom years of the 1940s, more people were working in the coal
mines of McDowell County than ever before. The culture of the coalfields is a unique
phenomenon that has been explored in numerous academic studies. The isolation of
southern West Virginia during the industrial period forced coal operators to build coal
camps to house the workers brought into the region to mine the coal. Furthermore, the
native, white population of the region could not supply a work force adequate for the
needs of the growing coal industry. For example, the population of McDowell County
in 1880 was only 3,078. As a result, the industry began a process of importing labor,
either European immigrants or African Americans from the South.1
Despite the disparate peoples brought into the southern West Virginia coalfields
to work in the mines, the different ethnicities and nationalities formed a bond unlike
any other. Throughout many oral histories and other first-hand accounts, interviewees
consistently mention how important community was to them. Donald Bowles, who
migrated from McDowell County in 1965, noted when talking about his childhood
during the 1940s. “Most of the people in school were on a pretty equal basis. We were
1
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always kind of like a family.”2 The economic problems within the coal industry created
havoc on this camaraderie enjoyed by many in McDowell County. As mines either
mechanized or closed, the loss of employment left many coal miners at an impasse.
Miners had to make decisions about their future. The lack of economic opportunity did
not necessarily force miners out of the county, but it did require careful thought. If the
inhabitants of McDowell determined to make their lives in the county, then it was
probable that the quality of life for them and their families would decrease significantly
as jobs became harder and harder to come by. If they believed that the success and
survival of their family could be assured only by migrating to areas where jobs were
available, then they were likely to leave. Everyone, miners and non-miners alike, had
to decide whether to stay in the county and try to find another job or to move.
Throughout the 1950s, many people in McDowell County chose to make a better life
for their families elsewhere. Their migration resulted in a demographic catastrophe for
McDowell County as the population fell from 98,887 to 50,666 between 1950 and
1970.3 With so many people leaving, an inevitable loss of community developed
during the post-war period.
The McDowell migration of the 1950s and 1960s was part of a larger,
generalized Appalachian migration during the same period. Several factors influenced
the migrants’ decision to leave their home. The lack of jobs and opportunity, which
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caused an increase in poverty, required the residents of Appalachia to look for areas
with greater opportunity. Luckily for the displaced Appalachians, industry in the
Midwest flourished during the post-war era. As a result, most of the Appalachians who
left their home region relocated to the Midwest. By looking at the flow of outmigration, one can trace the relationship between economic change in Appalachia and
job opportunities in the North. As with the specific McDowell migration, Appalachian
migration reached its peak during the 1950s, resulting in significant change throughout
the region. For example, sociologist James Brown, who had studied the community of
Beech Creek, Kentucky, during the 1940s, was surprised to find that more than half of
the population had left the community by the early 1960s, mostly to Ohio.4
To understand the full scope of the migration from Appalachia, it is important to
detail the numbers of people who left the region. Between 1940 and 1970, 3.2 million
Appalachians migrated, primarily to the Midwest. Half of this migration occurred in
the 1950s. The areas hardest hit demographically were Eastern Kentucky, West
Virginia, and Southwestern Virginia, those areas of central Appalachia dependent on
the coal industry. During the 1950s, Appalachian Kentucky lost one-third of its
population, while West Virginia and Appalachian Virginia lost one-fifth. The pattern
continued into the 1960s when both Appalachian Kentucky and West Virginia lost 15
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percent of their population. In 1981, an estimated six million people who were either
born in Appalachia or whose parents were born there lived outside of the region.5
World War II was the catalyst for much of the post-war Appalachian migration.
During the war, the demand for coal increased precipitously in order to support the war
effort. To meet the increased demand, coal companies worked the miners six days a
week. The need for coal meant good money for miners. Garnet Fuller, a miner from
Maybeury, explained the phenomenon. “When coal was in demand a whole lot, like
they get in a big order, they worked six days a week…. Six days was time and a half.”6
Paul Haynes echoed Fuller’s assessment of the effect of World War II on McDowell
County. Because so many miners had to leave to mines to enter the service, coal
companies scrambled to find enough workers to meet demand. “If you was a good
electrician or a good machine man, company tried to get you deferred if they could, and
if they did, the miner, I guess, was better off than some farmers or something like that
because they could get a deferment, and the company would apply for the man.”7
Despite the difficulties facing coal companies during the war, operators succeeded in
keeping production at a high enough rate to meet the demands of war industry. Haynes
noted the difference in the mines after the beginning of the war.
Production stayed up. During the war with the use of machinery, it began to
increase. When I first went to work, the company [mined] by handloading.
You get five tons of coal per day per man for each and every employee they
5
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had. They was making money. When I quite work, if they wasn’t getting a
hundred tons of coal per day per man, [they] stayed at work they wasn’t doing
any good. That’s slippings in production. When they were handloading, they
were satisfied with five tons of coal per day per man. That included the bosses
and all, everybody, not just coal miners. The biggest part of coal loaders, good
coal loaders, would load from 16 to 20 tons a day. By now with the machines
and everything now, if they don’t get a hundred tons, laying down on the job.8
The war did not only mean opportunities for the men of McDowell County. Women
also had the chance to contribute to the war effort and improve their standard of living.
Angeline Harmon, who grew up in the Berwind area of McDowell County, contributed
to the war effort by moving to Deerborn, Michigan to work in a Chrysler Sub Plant
making airplane wings. Harmon’s experience, while not part of the Great Appalachian
Migration of the post-war years, foreshadowed the predominant pattern for
Appalachian migrants. Although she liked her job, Harmon noted that she did not like
the city. Furthermore, she had difficulty adjusting in the period immediately following
her move to Michigan. In response to a question about her impression of Deerborn,
Harmon responded:
I was lost. My sister and I both cried. We set down on a sidewalk in Deerborn,
Michigan, and cried like two idiots, but we were scared to death. We never
been out of War. She said, “What are we going to do?” I said, “We’re going to
catch a cab and find this address and settle down. That’s what we’re going to
do.” We did, and we found the place and found our girlfriend. We were fine.
We got along good then. It was different, I’ll tell you that.9
After the war was over, however, the demand for coal declined as a lower
amount of coal was necessary to support the nation’s industry. Coupled with a high
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degree of coal company consolidation, mine mechanization, and increased dependence
on alternative fuels, thousands found themselves without work. Because the
undiversified economy of Central Appalachia depended on coal, many people had few
options for providing for their families. Therefore, the displaced miners migrated to
areas where they could have a chance at a good life, and the level of out-migration
serves as a key indicator of the tremendous social change that characterized the
Appalachian region during the post-war period.10
In addition to the obvious reasons to leave the region, why did the displaced
Appalachians choose the Midwest? There are two primary reasons. First, jobs were
being created in metropolitan areas. Since there are few metropolitan areas in
Appalachia, with the exception of Knoxville and Chattanooga, Tennessee, these
migrants had to go elsewhere. Second, there was a shortage of labor in the Midwestern
states, specifically Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, and Indiana. This phenomenon began in
the 1920s with the decline of foreign immigration caused by World War I. Even during
this first decade of labor shortage in the Midwest, the industries of the region turned to
Appalachia for its labor supply. Of course, this early migration declined during the
Great Depression, but it picked up again during and after World War II. Because of the
booming economy and the labor shortage in the region, Appalachian migrants became
the major labor pool for Midwestern cities.11
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The migration from Appalachia did not exist in a vacuum. There are three ways
to place this phenomenon into a larger context. First, the Appalachian migration was
part of a larger, more generalized migration from the South. Economic difficulties
throughout the southern region necessitated widespread migration by both whites from
the upland South and blacks from the Deep South. Second, another important shift
taking place during this period was the movement of people from rural areas to urban
areas. Because of the “foreignness” of their destination, rural Appalachian migrants
found it somewhat difficult to adjust to their new surroundings, although this accented
idea is somewhat disputed by Chad Berry and James N. Gregory. Third, the most
important characteristic of the Appalachian migration is the fact that the people of the
region, contrary to common stereotypes of Appalachians as being isolated, fatalistic,
and backwards, were willing to migrate in order to provide a better life for their
families, through increased income, better housing, and educational opportunities.12
Throughout the entire migratory process, kinship networks remained
particularly important in the experiences of the Appalachian migrants. The process
largely began with the development of a “beachhead,” usually by a young man who
moved to the destination city in order to find work. Often, the migrant would attempt
to move to a regional city to find a job. This attempt to maintain some sort of
connection to the region usually failed, however. When all options in his local region
became exhausted, the beachhead would move to a place he heard there were jobs,
12
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usually to a Midwestern city. Once there, the migrant found work and, through word of
mouth, serve as a contact for friends and family. The beachhead thus became a
valuable asset for other migrants. The beachhead gave migrants tips on employment,
housing, and adjustment to urban life. Furthermore, the beachhead was also indicative
of the demographics of the migration. As with most migrations, young people made up
most of the migrants from Appalachia. Many times, the beachhead was married and
would, after a time, relocate his family to the destination city. Furthermore, the
migration largely consisted of people from the better-off families of the region. As
with most migrations, the poorest people, the ones most in need of change, found it
extremely difficult to come up with the resources necessary to move to a more
promising location.13
It has been established that the Midwest was generally the preferred destination
for Appalachian migrants, but was there a pattern to the migration? Did people from
certain areas go to a particular city? Clyde McCoy and James Brown studied the
destination of Appalachian migrants and found that migratory streams of Appalachians
had a distinct pattern. Throughout the period of Midwestern migration, these patterns
showed remarkable resilience and persistence. Each city in the Midwest received most
of its migrants from specific Appalachian regions. For example, West Virginia
migrants largely went to Columbus and Cleveland, Ohio, while migrants from Eastern
Kentucky primarily went to the Cincinnati region. This raises one very important
13
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question, however. Outside of the kinship networks, what largely determined the final
destination for Appalachian migrants? The determining factor was primarily the
highways. Migrants largely followed the interstate highways to their destination, thus,
West Virginians followed Interstate 77 north into Eastern Ohio and migrants from
Eastern Kentucky followed Interstate 75 north into Southwestern Ohio and Eastern
Indiana, although there were exceptions to this pattern. For example, in their recent
work on African American migrants from Benham and Lynch, Kentucky, Thomas
Wagner and Phillip Obermiller establish that the migrants from these two small towns
moved not only to Cincinnati and Michigan, but also to Cleveland and Chicago.14
Another important aspect of the migration to the Midwest was the racial
makeup of the migrants. The majority of migrants who left their home in search of
better opportunity elsewhere were white. For example, 66.4 percent of residents in
1970 who were former migrants were white. The migrants, of course, eventually
became prevalent in working-class suburbs, where they profoundly affected the
politics, culture, and society of their destination. The migrants often brought rural
traditions to their new homes, which allowed them to keep a semblance of their culture
alive. Of course, with traditional views of Appalachian culture, one would expect
migrants to be ill-equipped to deal with life in northern cities, but actually migrants
often prospered in the North, a trend that will be explored later. An important question
derives from this discussion, however. Since migrants from the South (broadly defined
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to include Appalachia) were usually white, what happened to the African American
population? How does this fit into the experience of McDowell? As with whites,
deindustrialization forced African Americans to make the same choice, to migrate or to
stay in McDowell. During the period from 1950 to 1970, when the county went
through its largest decline in population, the African American population declined
precipitously as well. From a high of 24,128 in 1950, the county’s African American
population dropped to 9,083 by 1970, a decline of 62 percent.15
Migrants found it difficult to leave their familiar lives, and their new lives in the
Midwest were not easy. Throughout the adjustment period, Appalachian migrants
struggled to cope and often dreamed of life back home, particularly on a farm. Not
surprisingly, therefore, many migrants saw their situation as only temporary, and
longed to return home as soon as the economic conditions improved. There are many
examples of migrants who consistently moved between the Midwest and home. Chad
Berry, in Southern Migrants, Northern Exiles, tells of one such tale. Berry recounts a
story about a West Virginian who consistently sought to return home for a decade after
his first move. Finally, the migrant gave in and permanently moved to Chicago after it
became clear that conditions back home would not improve enough for him to provide
for his family.16
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Although many former migrants sought to return, a phenomenon that will be
discussed in more detail later, most migrants had to adjust to a permanent life in their
new urban homes. After moving from their previous homes, rural Appalachian
migrants faced many difficult challenges. The decision to migrate involved many
different steps. A migrant faced the severance of community ties, an identity change,
and relocation. Migrants modified their value systems to gain acceptance in their new
homes. With profound differences in the culture of Appalachia and that of the
receiving cities, migrants faced a very difficult adjustment period. Clearly, most of the
demands made on migrants to conform to city life required them to change their own
values.17
During the 1960s, the northern economy entered a downward trend and the
opportunity for Appalachian migrants to move to the Midwest declined. Although
opportunity lagged in the Midwest, more people sought new lives and followed the
traditional migratory streams to Cleveland, Cincinnati, Detroit, and other destinations.
A predominant reason for the continued migrations during the 1960s was the new
popular culture vision of the “good life,” particularly through an increase in
consumerism. By the end of the 1960s, however, the luster of migration had begun to
wear off, and significant return migration materialized at the end of that tumultuous
decade. Migrants returned for three primary reasons. First, the pattern of
deindustrialization that affected McDowell County and other coal-producing regions of
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Appalachia began to cause a decline in heavy industry in the Midwest, closing off the
source of employment for Appalachian migrants. Second, the period between the late
sixties and late seventies saw a revitalization in the coal industry, primarily after the
energy crisis of the early to mid-seventies. Third, many former migrants became
disillusioned with life in the Midwest and sought a simpler life back home, a process
that will discussed in more detail below.
The process of migration could be psychologically difficult for the Appalachian
migrant. The migrant had to leave everything that was familiar, the land, friends, and
family. Migrants had to enter a world that was new, in both good and bad ways. As
recounted by Carl Feather, one West Virginia woman said: ‘“I am worried about my
children moving to the city because I hear every day of children being destroyed,
being…run over by cars,…being on dope. One dose of it calls for another, and they go
from bad to worse. A lot of them wind up in prison, and a lot of them wind up
dead.”’18 Not only was the experience of moving to an urban environment frightening,
Appalachian migrants faced a different culture that would be difficult to assimilate into.
It could be said that the Appalachian experience was comparable to the experience of
foreign immigrants during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One
excellent comparison is in the language of the migrants. Like foreign immigrants,
Appalachian migrants often faced discrimination, embarrassment, and harassment
based on their accents. 19 One excellent example is the Lockhart family of the Panther
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area in western McDowell County. Belinda Lockhart, a child of migrants who moved
to Chicago in 1960, discussed the difficulties when moving to a new area:
Moving was quite drastic and we hated it. We wanted to go home and looked
forward to moving back. My parents kept the home in WV and our vacations
were spent there.
We were called Hillbillies-despite the fact that we wore shoes. We had difficult
times communicating. Our English was southern with different expressions and
pronunciations. Progress was made when we started high school-they called us
Appalachian whites.20
Besides cultural difficulties, how did Appalachian migrants adjust economically
to their new homes? The sociologist John Photiadis conducted a study, published in
1970, of West Virginians who, like fellow migrants from McDowell, migrated to
Cleveland, Ohio. Many West Virginians settled in the so-called “Appalachian ghetto,”
located on the west side of Cleveland. The ghetto received its name because of the
large number of migrants who settled there and for the poverty found in the
neighborhood. Those people who did not move to the ghetto usually found their way to
the suburbs of Cleveland. The primary determinants of whether migrants went to the
ghetto or the suburbs were family connections (particularly those pioneers who
established beachheads), job skills, and educational level.21
Photiadis found that West Virginia migrants shared the common characteristics
of age and gender. Most West Virginia migrants were unemployed men between the
ages of twenty and forty. In Cleveland, almost twice as many men aged twenty to
thirty lived in the Cleveland suburbs than stayed in West Virginia, and there were
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almost four times as many young men in the Appalachian ghetto than in West Virginia.
These characteristics are found in Everett Lilly’s work on the Clear Fork Valley of
Raleigh County, West Virginia. Lilly found that in the Clear Fork Valley, the decision
to leave West Virginia took place around the time of a migrant’s high school
graduation. These migrants also struggled mightily at first. The migrants of Clear Fork
had no defined goals other than getting a job, and they had few skills that would help
them achieve that one goal. As a result, many of the migrants from the Clear Fork
Valley moved into areas similar to the Appalachian ghetto of Cleveland. As one Clear
Fork migrant put it when talking about living with his brother in Virginia: ‘“It was the
slums, man. It was just—you just lived in a rat’s den. It was so crowded, you know,
they had a kid at that time and it was too much so I just packed up and left. I
hitchhiked from there to Cleveland, Ohio. I had a brother there.”’22 Lilly recounts that
this migrant faced further difficulties in Cleveland with inferior housing and low
wages.23
Education was a very important adjusting factor for the migrants because it
allowed the migrants to adjust to the culture, and determined their economic success.
In Cleveland about 33 percent of the migrants living in the Appalachian ghetto
completed high school, compared to approximately 60 percent of those living in the
suburbs of the city. Because of the poverty found in the ghetto and the correlation
between economic success and educational levels, it may be surmised that more people
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living in the ghetto dropped out of high school than did people living in the suburbs. In
both areas, however, roughly the same proportion, about 10 percent, of children
dropped out of school. In his study, Photiadis asked several questions about migrants’
attitudes towards education. The responses showed that most migrants held education
in high esteem, 91 percent of ghetto residents and about 83 percent of the suburban
residents of Cleveland disagreed with the statement that most young people get too
much education. The miners realized that the problems they faced at home stemmed
from depending on mining rather than on education, and so they hoped that their
children could receive an education that would help them to make better lives for
themselves.24
In addition to economic gain, education also allowed Appalachian migrants an
opportunity to avoid the social stigma suffered by many poorly-educated people. In the
West Virginia coalfields, because male children were expected to enter the mines just
as their fathers did, there was little support for any but the most rudimentary education.
With a good education, migrant children could enter the dominant society and avoid
being seen as ignorant by their peers. Many times, however, the urban school system
created more problems for the Appalachian children by misunderstanding their culture;
educators often equated slow speech with slow mental activity. Many times, negative
images presented in the media and by educators instilled a pattern of failure in children
and led to their lowering their expectations. Only by overcoming the shortcomings
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found in the urban school systems could migrant children take advantage of available
educational opportunities.25
Occupational patterns for West Virginia migrants varied. Nearly all male
migrants who moved to Cleveland were former miners. The only difference was the
level of their skills. Residents of the ghetto had the largest proportion of semiskilled
workers, about 67 percent. The suburbanites, in contrast, had the largest proportion of
skilled workers, nearly three times that of skilled workers residing in the ghetto. The
suburbanites acquired most of their skills after they reached the city. Only about 5
percent of West Virginians living in the suburbs of Cleveland were skilled workers
before they left West Virginia. Most were either coal miners or unskilled workers. In
1965, migrant suburbanites reported having lived in Cleveland much longer than those
living in the ghetto, about sixty percent had been in Cleveland longer than ten years.26
The income earned by West Virginia migrants supported their decisions to
migrate. After initial difficulty in finding jobs, most earned more money in the city.
Cleveland migrants, for example, had a much higher income than people who stayed in
West Virginia. In Cleveland, there was also a differentiation between migrants. While
ghetto residents tended to earn higher weekly wages than suburbanites, steady jobs
were hard to come by in the ghetto, thus allowing suburban migrants to earn higher
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yearly salaries. Ghetto residents who held steady jobs usually left to settle in the
suburbs. Despite the differences within Cleveland, West Virginia migrants were
somewhat successful in gaining jobs and adequately providing for their families.27
Photiadis’s study of West Virginia migrants to Cleveland fits into general trends
of Appalachian adjustment to Midwestern cities. As with most internal migrations,
Appalachian migrants have gone through a series of adjustment stages in their new
homes. The first categorization of the Appalachian migrant was that of transient.
Many of the stereotypical views of Appalachian migrants set forth by the Northern
media during the early years of migration derived from their idea of the Appalachian as
mobile. Because many Appalachians had an important connection to place and made
frequent trips home, they were often seen as undependable, shifty, and unreliable. This
prevailing image was often corroborated by the fact that migrants often had frequent
address changes as they moved numerous times within the port-of-entry neighborhoods,
including the Appalachian ghetto of Cleveland. This phenomenon was the result of the
Appalachians’ search for better jobs and housing within the cities. From a native
perspective, the Appalachian migrants were a temporary problem that would be fixed
when the migrants returned home.28
When it became clear that the migrants had become permanent residents of the
destination cities, the identity of the migrants entered a second stage. Social service
organizations and governments realized that the Appalachian migrants were not only a
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temporary problem, but rather were a permanent social problem that had to be dealt
with. The social problem approach to Appalachian migrants seems to be the origin of
many of the misconceptions about the migrants in the literature. The social problem
approach implies that the persons who suffer from poverty only need to adjust their
own behavior in order to improve their situations. The theory does not take into
account institutional reasons for poverty. The social problem approach characterizes all
urban Appalachians as people who live in certain neighborhoods with low levels of
educational achievement and job skill. Appalachian migrants spread throughout the
destination cities, living in diverse working-class neighborhoods and were not confined
exclusively to the “ghettoes.”29
The many stereotypes of Appalachians persisted throughout American culture
during the 1950s and 1960s, at least in part, because of the misinterpretation of the
migrants and their problems. The caricature of mountaineers seen in the comic strip
Snuffy Smith often clouded the way northerners saw the mountaineers. The Chicago
journalist Albert Votaw, for instance, warned northerners in Harper’s that:
These farmers, miners, and mechanics from the mountains and meadows of the
mid-South—with their fecund wives and numerous children—are, in a sense,
the prototype of what the “superior” Americans should be, white Protestants of
early American, Anglo-Saxon stock, but on the streets of Chicago they seem to
be the American dream gone berserk. This may be the reason why their
neighbors often find them more obnoxious than the Negores or the earlier
foreign immigrants whose obvious differences from the American stereotype
made them easy to despise. Clannish, proud, disorderly, untamed to urban
ways, these country cousins confound all notions of racial, religious, and
cultural purity.30
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In short, to Votaw southern migrants were a “disgrace to their race.”31
Votaw was not the only one to characterize the southern migrants in this way.
Journalist James Maxwell reported that an Indianapolis native argued that migrants “are
creating a terrible problem in our city. They can’t or won’t hold a job, they flout the
law constantly and neglect their children, their moral standards would shame an alley
cat. For some reason or other, they absolutely refuse to accommodate themselves to
any kind of decent, civilized life.”32 In Detroit, the citizens of the city responded to a
poll during the 1950s which asked what group of people would be the most undesirable
to have in the city. The top response to the question was “criminals and gangsters” at
26 percent, however “poor southern whites and hillbillies” drew 21 percent, coming in
second. Perhaps surprisingly, this response drew a higher number of votes than
drifters, African Americans, or immigrants. Although many of these stereotypes had
roots in the years prior to the Appalachian migration, the social problem approach to
migration helped to strengthen and solidify the generalizations.33
Despite the many problems inherent in the migratory experience, Appalachian
migrants made remarkable adjustments. One of the ways the migrants adjusted was
through transplanting some of the traditional aspects of their culture. Two excellent
examples of this are country music and religion. Country music developed as a
regional musical genre in the southern Appalachians that combined popular music with
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traditional lyricism and instrumentals. Many of the Appalachian migrants brought this
music with them and, in a sense, are responsible for the national popularity of country
music today. The second important adjustment tool for the Appalachian migrants was
through their traditional religious activities and institutions. Most of the Appalachian
migrants were not comfortable in the mainline Protestant and Roman Catholic churches
found in the destination cities. Rural Appalachians traditionally felt most comfortable
in evangelical churches that were an offshoot of the revivalism that began during the
Second Great Awakening of the nineteenth century. As a result, Appalachians
traditionally flocked to churches that preached individual salvation and a literal
interpretation of the Bible, such as Baptist and Pentecostal churches. 34
The migrant churches played an important role in the adjustment of the migrants
for several reasons. First, the churches served the obvious spiritual needs of the
congregation, providing comfort in a period of adjustment characterized by great stress.
Second, the churches provided comfort and advice for the migrants with their everyday
problems that everyone goes through, including problems with work and the family by
providing social services to the congregation. Third, the churches provided the
members a connection to home. For example, the churches might provide summer trips
or provide for burials back in the mountains. Donald Bowles, the migrant who moved
from McDowell County to Michigan in 1965, became involved in evangelical churches
in the Flint area after they moved to the region. The church provided the Bowles
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family a social network that counterbalanced the uncertainty of relocation.35 The
churches also had an important effect on the culture of the destination cities. The
migrants brought new denominations, the Southern Baptist Convention for example,
into the culture of the North. By doing so, the migrants played an important role in the
diversification of northern culture and made the South (broadly defined) into a less
distinct culture.36
The Midwest was not the only destination for Appalachian migrants. Many
Appalachians also made their way into the Baltimore metropolitan area. An important
question derives from this fact; did Appalachian migrants to Baltimore have similar or
different experiences from the migrants to the Midwest? Although Midwestern
migration began before the “great migration” of the 1950s, it did not explode until the
decline of employment in the coal industry after World War II. In Baltimore, the bulk
of the migration occurred during World War II as Appalachian migrants moved to the
Baltimore area to work in the defense factories. Thaddeus Smith, in his work Where
there are no Mountains, discusses the role of Appalachian culture and migration in
Baltimore during World War II. Although his work has some serious problems in
perpetuating common stereotypes of Appalachians, Smith does give a solid overview of
what might be the forgotten Appalachian migration. The region along the Chesapeake
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coast in northeastern Maryland, which was called the industrial war strip, was forty
miles of defense factories in Cecil, Harford, and Baltimore counties. This region
included Elkton in Cecil County, whose population increased from 4,000 in 1940 to
11,000 in 1943, and Aberdeen in Harford County, home of the Army’s Aberdeen
Testing Complex, as well as Baltimore County.37
The migrants to the industrial war strip came from many different Appalachian
regions, including western Maryland, West Virginia, and Virginia. In northeastern
Maryland, about half of the migrants worked for the Army in Aberdeen and lived in
military housing in the region. Those who did not live in military housing moved to
other local communities and were lucky to do so. There were numerous migrants who
did not succeed in finding quality permanent housing which forced them to either rent
temporary, makeshift housing or to live in their cars at night. One of the primary
reasons for this problem was the high cost of living in northeastern Maryland. Many
migrants simply could not afford the high rents that were so prominent in that region.38
Baltimore enjoyed a period of prosperity even before World War II, as
companies in the city received orders from overseas for war materiels. In the first two
years of the European War, over 100 factories either started or expanded existing
operations. The location of the city was also important in explaining its large growth
rate. The city was the nation’s second largest port, had extensive infrastructure for
improved communication and transportation, and was the closest industrial center for
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much of the Southeast, which put Baltimore in a situation where it could be an
important destination for migrants looking for good jobs. Between 1940 and 1943,
Baltimore grew by 119,000 people, which was over 75 percent of the entire state’s
population increase during the same period. Baltimore was also the center of the
industrial war strip because most of the important government contracts went to the
city.39
The extensive expansion of industry in Baltimore obviously drew many
migrants into the city, as shown by the population increase during the early years of the
1940s. One question remains, however. How many migrants specifically came into the
region? In 1940 alone, over 61,800 new migrants entered Baltimore, mostly from small
towns and country settings in the South, particularly North Carolina, Virginia, and West
Virginia. Like the migration to the Midwest, migration patterns were evident in the
migration to Baltimore. Geography played an important role in migrants’ decision
making process as to which destination city they would choose. Baltimore was in close
proximity to certain areas of Appalachia, particularly Virginia and West Virginia.
Coupled with the fact that there were many different defense industries located in the
industrial war strip, it is easy to see why so many migrants chose the Baltimore region.
If a migrant could not find work in one plant, he or she could try another. Also, high
wages characterized the defense industries, naturally drawing migrants to the region.
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After Pearl Harbor, Baltimore’s war industries were in desperate need of workers,
serving as a migratory “pull’ bringing migrants to the city.40
The Appalachian migrants to Baltimore basically were invisible because they
accounted for only a small percentage of the total number of migrants coming into the
city to work. Migrants came from areas throughout the eastern region of the country,
including New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. Appalachian migrants,
therefore, only accounted for about 6.7 percent of migrants to Baltimore in 1940. A
plurality of the Appalachian migrants, 35 percent, came from West Virginia. All areas
of the state were represented, including the southern coal fields. As with the
Midwestern migration, the evidence suggests that these migrants to Baltimore did not
possess the adequate skills for the industrial occupations of the region. For example,
Smith notes that over half of the Appalachian migrants came from a coal or farming
background. As a result, Smith argues that these workers were in low-skill positions at
home and did not adjust well to their new jobs.41
As with the Midwestern migration, the age of the migrants to Baltimore was
very young, an average of 25. Over half of the migrants were younger than 34. The
demographic characteristics of the migrants also suggest that they were highly mobile.
About half of the migrants who came to the city alone left a spouse or children behind
when they moved to Baltimore. The rest were single men These statistics
characterized all of Baltimore’s migrants, not just Appalachian migrants. Smith makes
an indirect correlation with Appalachian migrants by studying the Appalachian
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population during the same period. Smith notes that during this period the under 34
population was declining in Appalachia, while growing significantly in Baltimore. He
makes a similar correlation with the number of single individuals in Appalachia decline
in comparison with the number of single individuals increasing in Baltimore.42
Although there were a large number of migrants working in the defense plants
of Baltimore, there continued to be a significant labor shortage suffered by the
employers of the region. The reason for the shortages stems from many of the migrants
being unskilled laborers who had to be trained for defense jobs. The government
attempted to implement training programs to improve the labor skills of the migrants
and rectify the labor shortage inherent in the defense industry of the area. Smith argues
that the success of the program was mixed. The competition among migrants for the
jobs revolved around skill requirements, sex, and race. White females had the most
success in finding work, primarily because of employers’ belief that women had a
better dexterity in their movements and high-quality eyesight. White males had few
problems as well, although African American workers found it extremely difficult
because of discrimination against them by employers. Employers actually asked for
certain groups, either by race, religion, or ethnicity. As a result, blacks had a hard time
finding work in the defense industries.43
There were many ways in which migrants were mobile. Migrants moved from
job to job within Baltimore in search of higher paying jobs or jobs which had the
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potential to become permanent after the war. Sometimes the migrants heard rumors of
work closer to home and would leave as a result. This was an acute problem for the
city. It was estimated that an average of 2000 workers left the city weekly during 1943.
The stereotype of the shiftless, undependable Appalachian migrant became more
prevalent in the press and among the native Baltimoreans as the war progressed. In
July 1943, an editorial in the Baltimore Sun said the following about the migrants:
When they get here they find that Baltimore isn’t the Utopia they had come to
expect. There they find the big wages. But they also find that jobs though not
necessarily bad, ain’t soft, either. And they find that living conditions are pretty
dreadful and transportation to and from work is a big headache. So, after
they’ve cashed a few checks they start to get fed up, or they hear about some
other war industries near the place where they came from, or they just get
homesick. One day, right after payday, they don’t show up for work. They buy
a ticket and go back home.44
To the city leadership, the Appalachian migrants remained an invisible
population. The group not only constituted an extremely small percentage of the city’s
migrant population, there were also no civic groups to lobby for the benefit of the urban
Appalachians. Furthermore, the migrants’ rural heritage set them apart from the other
whites in the city. The migrants, therefore, had little sense of community in Baltimore.
The Appalachian migrants seemed to be part of a larger problem, that of a city
struggling to deal with a significant group of temporary workers. And there were
plenty of problems associated with the migrant workers. The city had become used to
the transients during the years of the Great Depression because Baltimore was a
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preferred destination for migrants during those years. Many of the workers went
straight to the factories or to the employment service seeking work.45
Many migrants had a harder time finding decent housing than in finding work.
Although the city leaders argued that there was no housing shortage in Baltimore, many
of the Appalachian migrants would argue otherwise. There was a housing shortage as
evidenced by the fact that many Appalachian migrants lived in their cars or in other
shanty, makeshift homes. For example, a migrant family from Tennessee had to live in
an abandoned hot dog stand without electricity or plumbing. The wife said, ‘“It’s the
best we can do. We couldn’t find any other place we could afford. You can’t spend all
your money on a place to live when you don’t know how long you’ll be working.”’46
Some Appalachians had to move outside of the city to find an affordable place to live.
Families were not the only ones to feel the housing crunch. Even single men who had
come to Baltimore had issues with the available housing. One said: “Who wants to live
in a one-room cabin with three other guys?”47 Part of the problem with housing
resulted from the fact that Baltimore’s defense industries failed to estimate the labor
needs of their factories. This failure made it difficult for city leaders to successfully
implement a long-term housing plan. The building of private homes was not practical
because private investors would not want to build homes for defense workers because
most of the defense workers were transient and would not become a permanent part of
the community. So, the question remained; how would Baltimore meet the housing

45

Smith, “Where There Are No Mountains,” 170-171.
Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 February 1941.

46
47

Ibid.

187

needs of its migrant workers? The solution was a temporary one. The government
brought in temporary housing, in the form of trailer parks and dormitories. These
temporary structures could then be removed when the war was over and the land could
revert to its original use. The plan was designed to meet the needs of the city’s unstable
work population without requiring the assistance of private investment.48
Despite the efforts of the government to meet the city’s housing needs, the
available housing in Baltimore remained in terrible shape. Only about 50,000 people
lived in defense housing, the rest lived in the older residential neighborhoods of the
city. Appalachian migrants seem primarily to have lived in these older sections, where
the conditions ranged from comfortable to crowded and terrible. The city’s Housing
Authority conducted a survey and found that fifty-eight families lived on one block in
South Baltimore. Of these families, over half lived in unsafe housing, with only five
families having central heating. The standard occupancy rate for the city of one and a
half people per room was exceeded by many of these families. Twenty-five had
densities of three or more; ten had densities of five or more. Despite the problems
facing many Appalachian migrants in housing, some believed life in Baltimore was a
luxury compared to what they had come from. Many more, however, hated life in the
city. Smith notes that migrants had two major complaints, the high cost of living and
the lack of privacy.49 One Appalachian noted, ‘“Our young people don’t have many
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dates; there’s hardly any room for any visitors in the trailer, and the front steps are so
narrow we have to line up on them duck-fashion.”’50
Native Baltimoreans also treated the migrants in similar ways to native
Midwesterners. At best, the native population of the city regarded the Appalachian
migrants as different; at worst, the natives saw the migrants as a drag on the city. Many
migrants saw the natives as being cold and unfriendly. As a result, many found it
difficult to adjust to life in the city. Part of the reason for the animosity of the native
Baltimoreans was because of the building of temporary housing in the older residential
neighborhoods of the city. Another reason for the cold attitude from the natives was
simply because of a feeling of overcrowding. Unlike the rest of the industrial war strip,
Baltimore had no room in which to expand. Finally, the differences in culture help to
explain why Baltimoreans considered the Appalachian migrants to be different based
on differences in accents and behaviors. Despite the disdain shown by much of the
native population, many churches and other social organizations provided services to
migrants in an effort to soften the adjustment to urban life. Many migrants, however,
did not take advantage of either the spiritual aspects of the church or the social welfare
programs. A major reason for this attitude is the migrants’ self-identification as a
temporary citizen of Baltimore. Because they were not permanent, the migrants were
not interested in becoming part of a church community.51
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According to Smith, when the war was over most of the migrants returned home
as the defense industries demobilized. Most of the migrants, never fully becoming
accustomed to life in the city, were pleased to be returning home. Baltimore did not
turn out to be the city of opportunity many thought it would be and, with the loss of
their defense jobs, many seized the chance to go home. Throughout the city, migrants
vacated their apartments on a massive scale. When the migrants left the city, there was
also little reason for the government to continue running the temporary housing. The
housing projects, trailer parks, and dormitories were de-programmed by the federal
government and the land was returned to its original use. As the Baltimore Evening
Sun described the scene in August 1945: ““Debris is scattered over the grounds of the
projects…casted off materials have been thrown up on the roofs of structures. Window
glasses are broken.””52
There are examples, however, of Appalachian migrants who did not return to
the region. My great aunt and her husband moved to Elkton, Maryland (Northeast of
Baltimore on the Delaware border) around the time of World War II. This served as a
potential beachhead for other members of the Myers family. In fact, my grandfather,
Charles F. Myers, went to Maryland looking for work in the mid-1950s during a slow
time in the mines; his wife, Betty Rae Myers, was with him during this period as well,
leaving their three children with their grandparents. Although Charles Myers
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eventually returned to his job for U.S. Steel, his sister and brother-in-law remained in
Maryland, making it their permanent home.53
The pattern of Appalachian migrants returning home, as shown by Smith’s work
on Baltimore, was a small, yet significant characteristic of the general Appalachian
migration. Some migrants realized that life outside of the mountains did not offer the
same quality of life as living back home. This was either a very small group of people
or a group without a recorded history, however. The migration literature has studied
the difficulties and successes of permanent migrants rather than the so-called “birds of
passage,” those migrants who had no intention of staying in the destination city.
Although Smith’s perception of Appalachian migrants to Baltimore suggests that most
of the migrants to that region were “birds of passage,” it seems that many more either
stayed in the destination city or moved with every intention of staying there for the
work. If this is the case, what expectations did the return migrants have when they
came home? Did their experiences meet those expectations? In many ways, the
success of the return migrants seem to be directly connected to the amount of success
enjoyed in the destination cities.54
Lilly, in his study on migration from Clear Fork Valley, recounts a few stories
of migrants who returned to the mountains. One couple, in particular, tried to return to
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West Virginia in the early 1980s from Dayton, Ohio. Failing in their attempt to live
back home again, the couple decided to return to Dayton. Although Lilly does not tell
of the couple’s success in Ohio before their attempt at moving back to the mountains,
only by moving back to Ohio did they find economic success. Another example from
Lilly’s work concerns a couple who came back after many years away. This couple
had struggled when they first moved from the mountains, but eventually had achieved a
comfortable existence in their new home. The mountains, however, continued to
beckon. This feeling of connection to place, combined with a concern for aging
parents, led the couple to return permanently to Clear Fork. For this couple, the
experience of coming back home was rewarding because it allowed their parents the
opportunity to spend their twilight years with the children.55
Many mountain migrants also had the desire to return home after retiring from
the jobs that took them out of Appalachia. Carl Feather tells the story of Ralph and
Emma Bonham, native West Virginians who moved to Northeastern Ohio in 1955.
After working for twenty-eight years, Ralph retired as a pipe fitter for Union Carbide
Metals. They raised four children in Ohio who, when they were grown, went to college
and moved out of the area. The fact that the Bonhams no longer had connections to
Northeastern Ohio through their children, coupled with the deaths of numerous
relatives and one of their children, persuaded them to move back to West Virginia. The
account of their experiences does not show the Bonhams’ level of satisfaction, however
the couple did make the conscious decision to return and take their chances at home.56
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No matter the reasons for the return migration to West Virginia, the fact remains that
many Appalachians decided that only the mountains could offer them the quality of life
they so desperately wanted.
The loss of so many people from McDowell County as a result of the massive
out-migration of the 1950s and 1960s left a lasting mark on the county. The county lost
its best and brightest citizens, as well as the unique sense of community that
characterized the coalfield regions of the twentieth century. The out-migration from
McDowell County was part of a general movement of people out of Appalachia during
the post-war period. Thousands of Appalachians, facing the prospects of
unemployment and potential poverty, made the conscious decision to move in order to
find work. There were two primary streams of migration from McDowell during the
1950s and 1960s, one to the Midwest and one to the Baltimore region of Maryland.
The literature of migration seems to be convoluted in regards to the success rate of the
Appalachian migrants in their new homes. Some of the literature argues that
Appalachian migrants struggled during the adjustment period in their new homes.
However, much of the recent literature discounts this position. Many Appalachian
migrants made good lives for themselves in their new homes. The literature does not
deal only with the economic success, or lack thereof, of the migrants, but also the social
adjustment of the migrants. In this instance, the literature seems to be more in
agreement. Because of cultural differences, Appalachian migrants often found it
difficult to adjust to their new, urban homes. They faced humiliation and ridicule at
worst from natives of the destination cities; at best, the migrants had a feeling of
abandonment and alienation. As a result of the quality of life issues plaguing them, a
193

small but significant group of migrants decided to return to the mountains. A larger
group, however, succeeded and made lives for themselves in their new homes.
Although many would have liked to have returned, the economic situation at home
would not allow it. Conditions within McDowell County deteriorated rapidly until
there were few people who could be characterized as success stories. Life at home
consistently deteriorated as the coal industry became less and less dependable for the
county’s livelihood. Many who stayed, or were forced to stay, found themselves mired
in poverty with little chance for economic success.
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Chapter 6
A World of Contrasts: McDowell After Deindustrialization
By the end of the 1950s, it was clear that deindustrialization caused serious
structural problems in the Appalachian economy. Many individuals who failed to
migrate found themselves without work, as the coal industry closed mines and began to
employ machinery in order to decrease labor costs and increase production. By the
early 1960s, McDowell County was one of the poorest counties in the nation, with
socio-economic conditions that rivaled some third-world countries. Conditions in some
areas were so poor that John F. Kennedy, campaigning in the 1960 Democratic
presidential primary, made a promise to implement policies to fight poverty, if he were
elected to the presidency. His promise marked the beginning of the War on Poverty of
the Johnson administration of the mid-1960s.1
After 1963, the economic condition of the region improved slightly. The coal
industry stabilized and the unemployment rate decreased somewhat. Part of the reason
for this improvement stems from the region’s attempt to diversify its economy.
Statistics show that between 1963 and 1967 the level of employment in other economic
endeavors, including manufacturing, trade, and service industries, increased as
employment in the coal industry declined. In McDowell County, service industries
became a bigger part of the economy since the population remaining in the county was
older with the out-migration resulting from deindustrialization. Many of the younger
generation who remained also required governmental support in the form of AFDC and
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food stamps. Therefore, members of the community who received an education could
potentially get a job and remain in the county.2
A good indicator of the slightly improved economic conditions in Appalachia is
the change in the per capita income of the region in relation to the rest of the United
States. In 1962, Appalachia’s per capita income was 76.9 percent that of the rest of the
country. In 1967, the per capita income of Appalachia had risen to 77.9 percent of the
national income. Also, unemployment in Appalachia as a region declined during the
same period. In 1963, the national rate of unemployment was 5.7 percent. In
comparison, the Appalachian unemployment rate was 8.1 percent for the same year.
Although the Appalachian unemployment rate remained 30 percent higher than the
national average the total unemployment rate for the region fell significantly during the
four year period in question. In 1967, the national unemployment rate stood at 3.8
percent while the Appalachian rate was 4.6 percent. It is very difficult, however, to
understand the conditions of every locale in Appalachia when discussing regional
statistics. A more telling picture lies in the statistics for Central Appalachia. Although
Central Appalachia did see an improvement in the rate of unemployment for the period,
the unemployment rate was still extremely high in comparison with the rest of the
region. In 1966, the unemployment rate in Appalachian Kentucky was 9.8 percent; in
West Virginia, the rate stood at 6.4 percent.3
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An important development during the mid-1960s that helps to explain the
somewhat improved economic conditions in Appalachia was the creation of the
Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). The ARC was extremely important
because it pumped an immense amount of money into the region. The federal money
distributed through the ARC provided funding for infrastructure and public sector
employment for the people of the region. Another important aspect of the ARC was
that it focused national attention on the region, and then forced policymakers to address
problems that befell the region. A problem with the ARC, however, was that the
agency provided money primarily to the most economically-advanced regions, which
explains why much of Central Appalachia continued to lag behind the rest of the
region. Although money is important to improve the infrastructure of Appalachia, the
ARC was also created under a false impression of Appalachia’s “otherness.”
Therefore, the ARC was a test of the modernization theories, including culture of
poverty theory. The major premises of the ARC followed the major premises of
modernization theory. First, the ARC was founded on the belief that Appalachia was a
depressed region because of its physical, cultural, and economic isolation; second, the
ARC contended that isolation of the region not only led to economic depression, it also
inhibited economic growth that could bring the region out of this depression. Third, the
ARC was founded on the belief that economic growth can benefit all the citizens of the
Appalachian region. As a result, the ARC thought it would eradicate poverty
throughout the region by promoting economic growth and causing economic
development.4
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Because of the inherent, fundamental beliefs surrounding the ARC, the money
pumped into the region to build the infrastructure was designed not only to improve the
economy of Appalachia but also to decrease the “isolation” of the region. In addition to
building up infrastructure, the ARC was required to use its funding for industrial
subsidies. As the ARC legislation stated, the money was to go to “investments…in
areas where there is a significant potential for future growth…where the expected
return on public dollars will be the greatest.”5 The idea was to spread the money
throughout the region, creating jobs and leading to the eradication of poverty. The
problem is that the subsidies to business failed to do much to eradicate poverty in the
region. A 1969 report found that despite the massive amount of money sent into the
region by the ARC and other programs of the War on Poverty, capital continued to flow
out of the region; in fact, capital was leaving the region at a faster rate, probably
because of the industrial subsidies provided by the government.6
Another example of the failure of modernization theory to explain fully and to
provide solutions for poverty in Appalachia was that the quality of life in the region
actually diminished even during years of improvement in economic indicators such as
per capita income. Throughout the 1970s (which was a decade of economic growth as
will be discussed below) economic growth was unevenly distributed throughout
Appalachia. For instance, two-thirds of the counties in Appalachia declined
economically between 1970 and 1985 despite the influx of money into the region. This
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development proves that poverty in the region is not because of a lack of development
but because of the type of development in the region.7
Of course, the development in the Central Appalachian region has focused
around the coal industry. This is the single biggest problem facing McDowell County.
Because of the lack of diversity in the economy of the region, all of the people of
McDowell suffered when the coal industry declined in the 1950s and 1960s.
Furthermore, because of the lack of diversity in the economy, much of Central
Appalachia did not enjoy much of an improvement in the economy during the improved
economic years of the mid-1960s. One question remains, however. How did the
failure to improve the economy of the county happen? How can there be such wealth
in natural resources and such poverty at the same time? Why was there no move to
diversify the economy by bringing in other industries to make up the slack? To
understand this question, an examination of the landowning patterns is necessary.
The biggest indicator of the economic imbalance found in many Appalachian
counties is the comparison between large and small landowners. As one Appalachian
said: ‘“The biggest problem down here is that so many of the mines are operated by
large corporations which are so far away from the coalfields. Their sole concern is the
balance sheet. No humane system could possibly develop from them.”’8 The statistics
seem to bear out this resident’s opinion. In the coalfield counties of Central
Appalachia, absentee corporations own up to 85 percent of the total land available for
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use. In many ways, the prevalence of absentee ownership seems to support much of
dependency and internal colonial theory. Because these outside landowners control so
much of the land, Appalachians are forced to depend on the landowners for their
livelihood. Since there was no available land for locals, Appalachians basically became
colonial subjects of the coal industry.9
What is the exact scope of the absentee landholding in Central Appalachia? In
the early 1980s, the twenty largest landowners controlled 4.5 million acres of land. Of
these twenty companies, only three had headquarters in Appalachia, with only one
coming from the coalfields. These companies that owned the land in Central
Appalachia usually mined very little coal. Instead the companies usually leased the
land to the mining companies. Although the mining companies did employ workers in
the region, the landowners did not employ enough Appalachians to make a difference
to the people. Therefore, much of the money made from the vast natural resources of
Appalachia passes to the outside interests, without ever making it into the hands of the
Appalachian people.10
The unequal land holding pattern evident in the Central Appalachian region also
led to another problem, an unequal tax structure. In many locales, the mineral wealth
of the land is not taxed, or taxed at an extremely low rate relative to its value.
Justification for this trend comes from two sources. First, unused land is not
productive. Since much of the land owned by the out-of-state corporations is not leased
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for farming or residential purposes, it is very difficult to tax the land at a fair rate based
only on surface activities. Second, the mineral wealth of land is difficult to determine;
in some locations the mineral wealth is not even taxed. As a result, gross inequities
developed in the tax structure, further affecting the people of the region. For example,
in the coal counties of Tennessee in 1971, nine companies owned 34 percent of the
land, 80 percent of the mineral wealth, and only paid 3.6 percent of the local property
taxes.11
There is another problem that results from the absentee ownership of land in
Appalachia. Because the out-of-state companies own so much of the available land in
Central Appalachia, these companies have immense power in deciding the economic
characteristics of the region. Companies that might be interested in relocating to
Appalachia have a very difficult time in acquiring adequate land to build their facilities.
This problem is especially acute for those industries that might be competitive with coal
and timber. One example of the problem is cited by Mirvis. A community leader in
Harlan County, Kentucky spoke of his experience with the issue of diversification:
I was working for the CAP agency (Community Action Program). A large
corporation called and told us that if we could find a suitable spot for a factory
they would build one here. We went out and promptly found them three
suitable spots, each one with immediate ninety-nine year leases. They came in,
saw the spots were suitable, and before they had a chance to complete the lease,
the coal companies bought the land.12
The problem does not just affect the diversification of the economy; it also impacts
public service facilities. In most instances, community organizations must gain
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permission from the landowners in order to build facilities that would benefit the
community. For example, in 1972 a group of residents in Tennessee asked an English
company, the American Association, for one-half acre to build a community health
center. The American Association owned over 50,000 acres of land in Tennessee, yet
the company refused to allow the construction of the health facility that would benefit
the residents of the region greatly. As a result, it is clear that not only do the people
suffer from the lack of diversification in the economy because of fewer employment
options, they also suffer from poor social services, such as education and health care,
because of absentee ownership of the land.13
Despite the economic problems facing McDowell County, many coal
companies attempted to put a positive spin on the situation. In 1965, the United
Pocahontas Coal Company sent a letter to their miners which exuded optimism for the
future:
United’s coal tonnage and store volume have almost doubled as a
consequence (of mechanization). Such expansion certainly serves to express
United’s faith in the coal industry’s future and in the people who are United
Pocahontas.
Of course, the material progress made has brought with it serious
problems, many of which are far from being solved as yet. However, we are
confident that, with your continued loyalty, cooperation, and help, substantial
progress will be made in 1966 in solving these difficulties.14
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This optimism of the United Pocahontas Coal Company executives was unfounded.
Conditions continued to deteriorate throughout the 1960s in the county, forcing
residents to either migrate or face the prospect of poverty.
There are not only economic reasons for the lack of diversification in Central
Appalachia, but also political reasons. State governments, from the earliest years of the
industrial period, usually supported the coal industry in its efforts to establish economic
hegemony over the Central Appalachian region. In the early years, state support
focused on the development of transportation networks (i.e. railroads) and the
establishment of an adequate labor pool to foster mineral extraction. As the years
passed, state governments, particularly in West Virginia, have continued to support the
coal industry to the detriment of the people living in the region. One example of this
support is the tax policies as noted above. Another example is the failure of political
leaders, both local and statewide, to realize the boom and bust nature of the coal
industry and to use their political power to realize the important economic
diversification of the region that would have improved conditions and the lives of the
people.15
The years between 1967 and 1977 can be characterized as years of significant
economic improvement in Central Appalachia. The decade can be further subdivided
into two periods, 1967 to 1972 and 1972 to 1977. Both periods were years where the
economy improved throughout the region, however the difference is the reason for the
improvement. Between 1967 and 1972, the major change that occurred was an
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increased demand for coal. This increase occurred for several different reasons. First,
as the Vietnam War escalated during the late 1960s, the demand for coal increased as
military orders rose significantly. War was not the only reason for the increase in
demand for coal. Across the board, both foreign and domestic orders for coal rose at a
rapid rate. Appalachian coal accounted for about 95 percent of all national coal
exports. Domestically, coal use was increasing nationwide. During the first half of the
1960s, the United States increased its consumption of coal by an average rate of 3.6
percent each year. During the second half of the decade, the average annual increase
had risen to 5.0 percent. The late 1960s was a period of boom in the coal industry as
demand exceeded supply for the first time in many years. Because of the increased
demand, among other factors, there was a shortage of trained workers for Appalachian
coal mines. Miners were able to negotiate and strike for better benefits, including wild
cat strikes designed to win black lung benefits. This labor militancy was a result of
both the economic improvement of the age and the legacy of the coal industry in the
coalfield communities of Appalachia as discussed below.16
The period between 1973 and 1977 is best understood within the context of
international events. The 1973 oil embargo sent shockwaves throughout the world
economy. In the United States, the overwhelming dependence on oil led to serious
inconveniences at best and outright crisis at worst. Looking for alternative fuel sources,
American business began looking at coal once again to meet the energy needs of the
nation. With the rise in demand that resulted from the energy crisis, the price of coal
16
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rose substantially, over 117 percent between 1963 and 1973. The primary benefit of
this improvement in conditions in the coal industry was the expansion of the industry in
McDowell County. Companies hired many more employees through expanding their
operations and new mines were opened throughout the county. The job climate was the
strongest it had been in over twenty years in the mid-1970s. The end result of the
expansion of the coal industry that resulted from the energy crisis was an increase in the
average per capita income in Appalachia. As Miernyk noted in the journal Appalachia
in 1975: “Throughout the present recession personal income in the major Appalachian
coal-producing states has increased more rapidly than that of the nation as a
whole….While other factors might be partly responsible for this favorable showing,
rapid increases in coal revenues are undoubtedly the most important cause.”17 By 1975,
the per capita income of Central Appalachia had risen from 58.5 percent to 69.4 percent
of the national level, showing some improvement in the relative economic position of
the region.18
Per capita income is not the only appropriate indicator to examine in trying to
develop an overall view of the decline in poverty in the Central Appalachian region.
For the period 1970 to 1990, Appalachia did a much better job in reducing poverty than
the rest of the nation. Of course Appalachia had a much higher rate of poverty than the
rest of the country, allowing for much more room for improvement. For example, 17.7
percent of the people in Appalachia lived in poverty in 1970. By 1980, this percentage
had fallen to 13.7 percent. The national rate decreased from 13.3 to 12.4 percent during
17
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the same period. Of the three subregions within Appalachia, Central Appalachia had
the largest decrease in the poverty rate during the 1970s. In 1970, 34.0 percent of the
population in Central Appalachia lived below the poverty line. By 1980, the percentage
had fallen to 22.3 percent. It is clear that the 1970s expansion of the coal industry had
an important effect on the amount of poverty found in the Central Appalachian
region.19
What did the economic improvement of the 1970s really mean? Primarily, the
expansion of the coal industry in the 1970s meant not only that the percentage of people
in poverty decreased during the decade, it also meant that there were fewer children
forced to grow up in poverty. Regionwide, the percentage of families in poverty
dropped from 14.9 percent in 1970 to 11.0 percent in 1980. Central Appalachia
enjoyed a decline in childhood poverty as well. In 1980, the Central Appalachian
region had a family poverty rate of 19.2 percent, up from the 1970 rate of 30.2 percent.
The family rates of poverty do not fully explain the number of children living in
poverty since families have different numbers of children. Of course, high rates of
poverty for families usually mean that a high percentage of children live in poverty.
Conversely, an improvement in the poverty rate for families also means that fewer
children will face the prospects of impoverishment. As a result of the improved
economic conditions of the 1970s, the child poverty rate in Appalachia improved from
18.9 percent to 17.0 percent during the decade. As with every other indicator of
poverty, Central Appalachia had a higher rate of poverty than the other subregions of
Appalachia. However, even Central Appalachian children saw an improvement in their
19
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economic situation. In 1970, the poverty rate of children living in the Central
Appalachian subregion was 35.0 percent. In 1980 25.7 percent of the children of the
subregion lived in poverty. The improvement in childhood poverty rates in Appalachia
stand in stark contrast to those of the rest of the nation. As deindustrialization spread
throughout the country, along with other economic problems of the turbulent 1970s,
more children nationwide fell under the poverty line. Nationally, the rate of children in
poverty rose from 14.9 percent in 1970 to 16.0 percent in 1980. Therefore, while the
situation for Appalachian children continued to improve during the 1970s, nationally
the economic climate was unhealthy, foreshadowing the problems Appalachia would
face in the 1980s.20
There was another significant result of the improved economic conditions of the
1970s. Because the demand for coal increased as a result of the energy crisis of the
1970s, job prospects improved significantly. Many Appalachian migrants who left the
region during the 1950s and 1960s were now able to return. Donald Bowles was one
such example. After moving to Michigan in the mid-1960s to work in the construction
industry, homesickness eventually began to set in for the Bowles family. When an
opportunity arose to return to McDowell County and work in the mines in 1975,
Bowles decided to move. When asked why he came back, Bowles had a simple
answer, “This is home.”21 After working in several mines in the Kimball and Keystone
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areas, Bowles eventually went to work for U.S. Steel in Pineville, Wyoming County,
from which he retired in 1997.22
The late 1970s ushered in a new, yet familiar period in Appalachian economic
history. Nationally, the American economy began a period of recession during the
latter part of the decade. Appalachia suffered from the same problems as the rest of the
country. One of the primary reasons for the downturn in the national economy was the
shift of the economy from a manufacturing to a service-based economy. Furthermore,
government cutbacks during the Reagan administration damaged the social safety net
created by the War on Poverty. Deindustrialization was in full swing and the entire
nation was feeling the effects of the problem. In February 1982, at the height of the
recession, the regional unemployment rate stood at 12.4 percent in Appalachia. Budget
cuts in social programs, including the ARC, disproportionately harmed the Appalachian
economy. One reason for this problem was the fact that much of the money earmarked
for social programs was transferred to military spending. Because there are few
military installations in Appalachia and the importance of government programs for the
people of the region, the transference of money from social programs to the military
had an adverse effect on the region.23
As impressive as the gains were in Central Appalachia during the 1970s, the
1980s represented a significant decline in the economic indicators of the region. In the
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1980s, McDowell County had a decline of 19.6 percent in the ratio of county per capita
income to the national rate. The 1989 ratio of county income to the national rate was
49.3 percent. The per capita income of the entire Central Appalachian region fell by 5
percent during the decade as well. The primary reason for this problem was the very
nature of the coal industry. Although the 1970s was a decade of great expansion in the
coal industry due to the energy crisis, the 1980s proved that the expansion was shortlived and that the industry had fallen back into the traditional boom and bust cycle. The
1980s happened to be a period of bust for the industry. The period between 1982 and
1984 was the worst period for mine closures, including for many of the mines discussed
before in this study. The Olga operations shut down and reopened a few times during
this period before being permanently closed.24 U.S. Steel miners in the Gary district
were not immune to the job cuts. A 1984 Welch Daily News headline declared “1,500
U.S. Steel Workers Idled.”25 The company that was for many years the largest single
employer in the county would leave McDowell for good by the late 1980s.
The problems of the 1980s implemented a new dynamic into the discussion of
the current state of the Central Appalachian region. The economic problems of the
decade created a new class of poor, those who suffered from the economic restructuring
in the region as coal companies further deindustrialized and left the region, this time for
good. The problems of this class, along with the problems of those who could not
make it out of the poverty of the 1960s, created a society in which people had very
24

Welch Daily News, 4 October 1982; Dennis Myers, interview by the author, 17 April 2008, Muncie,
Indiana, tape recording, in the author’s personal collection.
25

Welch Daily News, 27 September 1984.

209

little. The poverty that struck the county, and the region as a whole, forced folks to
make the best of a difficult situation and, in many ways, they have succeeded.26
The Central Appalachian region saw a decline in the other predominant
economic indicators during the 1980s as well. The increased poverty indicative of the
1980s brought poverty levels similar to the period before 1970 in some areas of the
region, particularly the coal producing counties of southern West Virginia. In Central
Appalachia as a whole, the gains made during the 1970s leading to the decline of
people living in poverty were reversed by the subsequent decline in the coal industry.
As stated above, the poverty rate in 1980 stood at 22.3 percent in Central Appalachia.
By 1990, however, the rate had increased to 25.3 percent. In sum, fully one-quarter of
the people living in Central Appalachia in 1990 lived in poverty. Therefore, although
there were slight improvements in the poverty rate after 1970, poverty remained an
epidemic throughout the region.27
The decline in family income that characterized Central Appalachia during the
1980s represents the real effect poverty had on the people of the region. The median
family income in Central Appalachia as a percentage of the national median family
income fell during the decade from 70.6 percent to 61.1 percent. The median family
income in McDowell County as a percentage of the national rate is even lower than the
region as a whole. McDowell County’s percentage of national median family income
was below 50 percent in 1990, a rate comparable to the poorest counties of the region.
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What does this decline in median family income truly mean? Simply stated, the decline
in family income resulted in an increase in the number of families in poverty. The
family poverty rate in Central Appalachia increased from 19.2 percent in 1980 to 22.2
percent in 1990. The rates of families in poverty in Central Appalachia in 1990 were
more than double the national rate, which stood at about 10 percent during that year.
Logically, if more and more families were faced with poverty during the 1980s,
childhood poverty should increase as well. This is the exact pattern faced by
Appalachians during the late 1980s. The poverty rate for children in Central
Appalachia increased from 25.7 percent in 1980 to 30.1 percent in 1990. As with the
median family income indicator, McDowell County had a childhood poverty rate that
was even higher than the region as a whole. In McDowell, the poverty rate for children
was more than 40 percent.28
Statistics can only tell so much of the story. How did the economic climate of
the 1980s affect the inhabitants of Appalachia? How did the people of the region cope
and react to the declining opportunities indicative of the era? It is extremely important
to discuss the experiences of the people in order to put a human face on the story of
McDowell County, and the rest of Central Appalachia, during this trying time in its
history. One important story was described by Mike Yarrow in his selection “Voices
from the Coalfields,” from the edited work titled Communities in Economic Crisis.
Yarrow spoke to 90 people affected by the decline in the coal industry in southern West
Virginia and southwestern Virginia in 1986 and 1987. With the restructuring occurring
in the coal industry during the 1980s, the biggest fear for working miners was losing
28
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their jobs. As a result of this fear, miners agreed to work long hours, usually six days
each week. As one miner put it:
During the last year before any mine blows out they usually try to get all
the coal they can. So I was working six days a week, sometimes 10 and 12
hours a day. And I made about $35,000. It sounds like a lot but it’s a lot of
Saturdays. I was able to save a little bit of money.29
But for many miners, their greatest fears were realized as mines began to shut down
during the 1980s. As the miner above continued:
But I didn’t think I’d be laid off, because I was working for a mine
owned by a railroad. I knew they weren’t making a lot of money on the coal,
but I thought they was making their money on the haulage. But they shut her
down. It’s been flooded and it’s not going back. It shocked me. I took all my
savings and paid off every bill I had, Master Charge, car, and put away $2,000.
We planned to get through to the end of August.30
With the lack of diversification in the economy of the region, laid off miners
had few options for employment. The employment that was available primarily
consisted of low-wage service jobs in the restaurant or retail business. Even low-wage
service jobs were preferable to the possibility of losing everything and depending on
the government, friends, and neighbors. As our unnamed miner said:
I thought by that time [August] I would really find a job. I have been to
7-Eleven stores. I have been to every hotel applying for a night auditor job.
And everything conceivable I applied for. I ended up mowing grass. When you
don’t have nothing, $10 is a lot of money.31
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Also, as time passed with the workers of the region depending on unemployment
benefits from the government, difficult decisions had to be made. Everything from
large decisions such as car maintenance to small issues such as providing non-essential
items for the children, such as a small toy or a treat, took on much larger meanings. For
some, this state of affairs lasted only a short amount of time.
I was off for nine months one time and unemployment run out. You had
to weigh the decision to buy a popsicle for your child. I was going to graduate
school and I came home to find out I had been called back to work and had to
quit school. I was so happy—the feeling of going back….I remember getting
the first paycheck and going to the store and buying food and coming home and
crying. Crying because I was happy I could buy food. But at the same time all
the other people at the store were on food stamps. Because West Virginia has
been going down for a long time. I was watching how they weighed their
decisions to buy this or that with their food stamps, decisions I was making just
a week before. And I filled my cart up with steaks, with soda pop for the
mines.32
Others were not as fortunate as the lucky ones who were called back to work.
For many, unemployment and government assistance became a permanent reality. As
the problems became more evident in the psyche of the people of the region, social
problems sometimes developed in the families and communities affected by the
downturn in the coal industry. As a miner’s wife stated:
What is so bad around here is that men only know coalmines. I bet our
divorce rate has gone up fifty percent since our mines have shut down in the
past three years. When times get hard, some don’t pull together. Wives,
husbands have left. The security goes. Some women look at their husbands as
a meal ticket. People panic, put too much value on money.
You see depression, you see aggravation, you see alcoholism, you see
drug abuse, you see battered wives, you see mistreated children, you see
abandoned children. I’m talking about the whole country. You see suicide.
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You see some of the women having to get work, and the men staying home and
having to take care of the kids. They resent that.33
Although the economic problems facing the region did change the communities of the
coalfields, residents adapted extremely well to the changing economic situation. There
continued to be strong support networks among family and friends, even if it was not
the same as it had been before. Families learned to cut expenses, take on odd jobs, and
support one another. As one young father described:
Your in-laws will help you, or your parents. If you don’t want them to
give it to you, you go up there and do a job for them, paint their house, help
them with carpentry work. You work it out so you are not accepting charity. I
painted one house that is like forty feet high. The yard is straight down toward
the riverbank. I got paid darn good. I painted it once before during the strike in
1978. I told my wife then, “Never would I paint that house again.” Well, there
I was.34
There were other folks besides miners who suffered as a result of the decline of
available employment in the coal industry. Even people who were not directly affected
by the deindustrialization of McDowell felt the impact of the lack of jobs in the county.
For some people, the impact was aesthetic. Angeline Harmon, in discussing the
changes taking place in the county, noted: “There’s so much filth. Didn’t used to be
like that. This used to be the prettiest community right here….Everybody was clean;
their children was clean. You could let your children go visit neighbors. Now I
wouldn’t let my grandchildren out of this yard under no circumstances….You saw what
a mess you had to come through to get here.”35 Although an aesthetic quality does not
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impact the economic livelihood of people, a perception of disarray and filthiness can
lead to a decline in the quality of life of a people.
There was also a significant change in available services in McDowell County.
The decline of such disparate services as retail stores, funding for infrastructure, and
financing for education all contributed to a decline in the feeling of community so
prevalent in the McDowell County of yesteryear. Many people noted the significant
contrast between the county of their youth and the county of the present. In discussing
the quality of life in the coal camps, McDowell resident Lola Dunigan describes the
changes that took place in the region. In talking about what people did for fun in her
youth, she stated: “Yeah go down to War and shop around. When you go to War, gets
so crowded on payday or maybe all the time because I just only went on payday, and
you couldn’t hardly get through town. They was stores differ[ent]….You don’t see
things like that now. You really don’t, and you just couldn’t hardly get through town
for the life of you; there was so many people. Just like New York City….It’s altogether
a different town.”36 She goes on to say: “It looks like a ghost town from what it used
to be….It used to be everything you’d want.”37 Because of a decline of available retail
stores in all the communities of McDowell County, residents were soon required to
travel to distant cities such as Bluefield or Beckley to purchase needed items. Without
the opportunity to shop local stores, residents lost much of the loyalty they had
previously felt toward their community.
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Of course, aesthetic concerns and the loss of opportunity to support local
business were not the only problems resulting from the deindustrialization of
McDowell County. With the loss of business in the last quarter of the twentieth
century, the county suffered a significant decline in tax revenue. A decline in tax
revenue led to a corresponding decline in funding for schools of the county, as noted by
Ira Short, a former assistant superintendent of McDowell County schools.:
As your population declined, you had to watch. Some teachers had to be
discharged, but in the main, usually retirement took care of most of that. I don’t
recall that we ever had any teachers that we really could not place somewhere.
They might not be right where they wanted but they couldn’t. The population
decline affects everything. When your population declines, your taxes go down,
and your schools, the population in the school goes down. At times, you have
to rearrange your schedule….38
Opportunities declined for the children of McDowell County as well because of the tax
shortfall. With a decline in funding and a decrease in the school population, many
programs had to be cut. Although Short, when interviewed in 1992, downplayed the
problem, any cut in services potentially could mean the difference between success and
failure for children. To improve the economy of any disadvantaged region, an
improvement in infrastructure, both physical and human, is required. Because human
infrastructure primarily includes education and job training, a decline in school funding
hinders the economic development of the region. Although the decline in school
funding seriously harmed specific groups living in McDowell County, how did the
impact on deindustrialization on schools result in the decline of community? For many
people, the schools represented the focal point of the community. With the closing of
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many of the schools due to a decline in funding, communities lost one of the ties that
bound residents together.39
For most members of the McDowell County community, the deindustrialization
of the county caused great sadness. Many remembered with great nostalgia the county
of their youth and wished things could have been like they were before. The sense of
community many of these folks felt was immeasurable. There were some people,
originally from McDowell, who felt differently, however. For Gene Webster, realism
overcame any desire for the McDowell community of yesteryear. Webster was born in
1927, and many other people who grew up in the same era discuss how wonderful
growing up in McDowell County was during the coal boom. Webster’s sentiment was
more mixed. When asked if he had any final thoughts about growing up in the southern
West Virginia coalfields, Webster stated: “No, if you can do better, better to never stay
in coalfields….You go to work in the mines, you get hurt or something, and a lot of
people’s on Black Lung for working in the mines. That’s why they went in the mines.
To me, it was very dangerous, but right now the coal fields are more or less gone.”40
Webster’s response is a rare one for people of his generation. Most did not suggest
leaving the county; rather they usually talked about the changes occurring with great
sadness. Webster’s matter-of-fact response shows that he has a keen insight and
interest in the problems facing the county. His response was mixed, however, because
39
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he does display a bit of nostalgia in discussing how nice the local cities were during the
heyday of the coal industry. Yet, he concludes his statement by analyzing what would
need to happen for the coal industry to improve once again. “But, I don’t know if
they’ll ever come back. I don’t think they’ll ever come back unless the oil runs out.”41
One other example of a decline in community spirit among people of the county
can be seen in discussions of the causes of the economic catastrophe that faced
McDowell County in the latter decades of the twentieth century. Some blamed the
people of the county for being too dependent on government assistance for their
survival. Some blamed the government, while others blamed the union for the decline
of available jobs in the coal industry. Very few people, in the small sample available,
blamed the companies or the economic system for the problems facing the county. By
blaming the people who depend on government assistance for help, citizens of the
county show a lack of the community spirit, the willingness to help those in need, that
so characterized the McDowell County of the industrial period. Of course, there are
examples of people who, as Angeline Harmon put it, “have gotten too durn sorry to
take care of themselves.”42 The problem is that many people dependent on welfare
benefits for survival would actually work if given the opportunity, yet are often
grouped into the same class as those who do not want to work.
After 1960 McDowell County faced an economic crisis of immeasurable
proportion. Because of the county’s overdependence on the coal industry, the decline
of coal employment resulting from the deindustrialization of the county put a
41
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significant crunch on employment options for the county’s residents. For the residents
who decided not to migrate to areas where job opportunities were better, times became
difficult as many lost their jobs as the industry reorganized itself. From 1960 to 1990
the economic climate of McDowell County fluctuated as the industry continued through
the boom-and-bust cycles indicative of the coal industry. Despite the improvement of
the coal industry as a result of the energy crisis of the 1970s, poverty remained a
serious problem in the entire Central Appalachian region, of which McDowell County
is a part. Throughout the entire region, up to 25 percent of the population remained
mired in poverty by 1990, creating a serious social problem to be dealt with by social
scientists. Why has the region continued to suffer from endemic poverty? Theorists in
the past have suggested that there is an inherent cultural flaw in Appalachian society
that results in an endless cycle of poverty. As time passed, it became clear that these
so-called cultural flaws, particularly the so-called fatalism of the Appalachian psyche,
have been over-generalized as a standard aspect of Appalachian society. Theorists of
the 1970s looked to a different explanation for poverty in Appalachia. To the
proponents of the internal colony theory, outside interests who owned Appalachia from
the industrial period have taken the region’s natural resource wealth without reinvesting
the money into the local economy. Because of the lack of money going to the local
people, poverty developed as the industrial system matured during the mid-twentieth
century. I argue that both predominant theories of Appalachian poverty have serious
flaws. First, the culture of poverty theory over-simplifies the problem and places a
cultural explanation on what is essentially an economic problem. The internal colony
theory, while placing an appropriate emphasis on the economic nature of the problem,
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does not place enough of an emphasis on the role of local leaders in the economic
development of the region. Although absentee owners did, and continue to, own much
of the available land throughout the Central Appalachian region. Local leaders did not
do enough to try to diversify the economy of the region. Without economic
diversification, the people of the county were unable to find alternate work at home
once many of the coal-related jobs disappeared.
Structural reasons for poverty are not the entire story, however. Although many
of the traditional community relationships declined as people moved from the region
and those who stayed slipped into poverty, relationships between people continued to
thrive in a different way. As the people of the region suffered with the loss of their
jobs, family members and, in some cases, friends came together to ensure the survival
of their families. In many instances, people moved in together and shared resources to
get through the hard times. There are also stories of success as many people who were
called back to the mines during the 1970s succeeded in making a career for themselves.
Miners are not the only members of the community as well. As the economy changed
from one dependent on industry, the service sector became more important to the
overall economic health of the region. As a result, there are numerous stories of
success in the middle class of the county. Therefore, despite the overwhelming poverty
that many studies focus on when discussing the economic condition of the region, there
have been stories of success. Generalizations are extremely difficult and do not fully
explain the story of McDowell County in the post-war period.
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Conclusion
The history of the Central Appalachian region has been primarily characterized by
the socio-economic impact of extractive industries, predominantly coal. Because of the
rural nature of the region prior to the introduction of the coal industry, the construction of
coal towns, importation of outside labor, and the generally exploitive nature of the coal
industry resulted in the development of a unique coalfield community based on common
experiences in the coal-based economy. Historians have studied this period in detail, but
have only recently turned their attention to another pressing historical issue, the impact of
deindustrialization, as characterized by mechanization and consolidation of the coal
industry, on the region. McDowell County is an important microcosm of the problems
resulting from this phenomenon throughout the region because of the relative importance
of the county in the nation’s coal production for many years and the profound
significance the industry had on the county’s economy. The contraction of available jobs
in the coal industry led to a drastic decline in population, a drop in tax revenues, and an
increase in poverty that has come to characterize the entire Appalachian region in the
American consciousness.
The evidence of a decline in the community that characterized McDowell County
for so many years is multifaceted. The primary evidence lies in the fact that thousands of
people from McDowell realized the need to leave the region in order to find work and to
provide a quality of life unattainable in West Virginia. Community connections often fell
apart with distance. For the people who remained in the county, a mixed record of
success and poverty became the norm. Rather than coming together based on common
experiences, people living in the county tended to drift apart. Neighbors hardly knew one
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another. Towns lost the schools that played such an important role in their communities
as consolidation occurred after the mid-1960s. People began to look at others who were
less fortunate with great disdain; community pride was at a nadir. The county just did not
mean what it once did to the people who lived there as can be seen in the nostalgia for
yesteryear described by so many.
Although the community that characterized the county for so many years is
irretrievably gone, it is still possible that a socio-economic improvement could
characterize the McDowell County of the early twenty-first century. New economic
opportunities, particularly in the field of corrections, the plan for two four-lane highways
to foster development, and continued improvement in the school system provide hope for
those who for many years had little to look forward to. This story is also important
because of what it tells scholars about the nature of Appalachian industrialization.
Although in many ways Appalachia was an internal colony control by outside capitalistic
forces, local political and business elites also played a role in the eventual
impoverishment of the region. In the example of McDowell County, no business,
political, or labor leader made an effort to diversify the economy of the region in order to
provide options for the people of the county. In many instances, this was not in the best
interest of the leadership, particularly business leaders. However, the failure of the union
to provide opportunities for the displaced miners stands as a tragic example in the history
of labor, Appalachia, and the nation.
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